PRIVATE BUSINESS

University Of Wales, Cardiff Bill [Lords]

Queen's Consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified.
	Read the Third time, and passed, without amendment.

Oral Answers to Questions

NORTHERN IRELAND

The Secretary of State was asked—

Decommissioning

John Robertson: If he will make a statement on progress towards decommissioning.

Ian Pearson: There have been four acts of decommissioning to date. The latest act occurred on 21 October 2003, whentheIndependent International Commission on Decommissioning reported that it had witnessed a third event in which IRA weapons were put beyond use. As the Prime Minister made clear at Leeds castle, the Government regard the completion of decommissioning by paramilitary groups as essential to progress in Northern Ireland.

John Robertson: The chairman of Sinn Fein is on record as describing any visible act of decommissioning as counterproductive. Does my hon. Friend agree that, for the decommissioning process to gain the confidence of the people of Northern Ireland, we cannot rely solely on the word of the paramilitaries or their political representatives? What steps does he envisage being able to take to convince the people of Northern Ireland that there is no prospect of the IRA retaining its arms while Sinn Fein exercises its authority in a future Executive?

Ian Pearson: It is clear that, if there is to be public confidence in the decommissioning process, greater transparency is required in relation to the arms that are to be decommissioned and how long it will take to complete the process. We as a Government are clear that all paramilitaries must give up violence completely in a way that satisfies everyone and enables the people of Northern Ireland to move the process forward. Every party that wants to be in government must abide by the same democratic rules.

Ian Paisley: Will the Minister confirm that Government policy is unchanged in the matter of decommissioning with regard to the IRA? I refer him to what the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons. He said:
	"It means giving up violence completely in a way that satisfies everyone and gives them confidence that the IRA has ceased its campaign, and enables us to move the democratic process forward, with every party that wants to be in government abiding by the same democratic rules."—[Official Report, 27 November 2002; Vol. 395, c. 309.]
	Will the Minister confirm that that is still the policy of the Government and that they will carry it out?

Ian Pearson: I am happy to confirm that. The Prime Minister put it far more eloquently than I could. The hon. Gentleman is right. We are adamant that all paramilitaries must give up violence completely, in a way that satisfies everyone in Northern Ireland. That remains our position.

Eddie McGrady: Following the Minister's answer to that question, will he refer to the fact that in March this year the Government declared at Hillsborough that there must be
	"a complete, total and definite end to all paramilitary activity across the board"?
	Do the Government intend to apply that requirement to the current process of decommissioning and/or peace, in view of the fact that paramilitaries associated with political parties with which the Minister is in dialogue are increasingly involved in drugs, extortion and protection rackets, or have the Government simply changed their mind?

Ian Pearson: As Security Minister, I am well aware of the links between paramilitaries and organised crime. They are graphically demonstrated in the Independent Monitoring Commission report that was published earlier this year. The Government are clear that we want an end to all paramilitary activity. We want to take the gun out of politics for ever. That is what the people of Northern Ireland want and that is what, in the continuing dialogue that is going on at present, we are all aiming to achieve.

Lady Hermon: Will the Minister explain to the House how the Government intend to address the serious problem arising from the deficit of confidence in the Unionist community that General de Chastelain is the person best placed to verify further acts of decommissioning?

Ian Pearson: As a Government we have total confidence in the integrity and abilities of General John de Chastelain. We accept, however, that there is an issue of public confidence in decommissioning and that greater transparency is required in the process. That is currently under discussion and it would not be appropriate for me to comment further at this stage.

David Lidington: Will the Minister confirm, to put the matter beyond any doubt on the record, that the Government still believe that, to secure the enduring peace that we all want, decommissioning must be visible and conducted according to a clear and finite timetable?

Ian Pearson: I am happy to make it clear that decommissioning is a vital component of the Good Friday agreement, which the Government want to see implemented. It is important that there is greater transparency. We have trust and confidence in General John de Chastelain, but as I said earlier, we need to ensure that paramilitaries give up violence and their weapons in a way that satisfies everyone. Greater transparency is required as part of that process, and we also want a definite time scale; the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right on that point.

General Practitioners

Iris Robinson: If he will make a statement on changes to the provision of general practitioner out-of-hours services in Northern Ireland.

Angela Smith: From 1 January 2005, where GPs have chosen to opt out of providing out-of-hours services to their patients, statutory responsibility will pass to the health and social services boards. The boards are well advanced in detailed planning for out-of-hours services to ensure a smooth transition from the current to the new arrangements and to continue to provide a safe, effective service.

Iris Robinson: I thank the Minister for her response, but does she agree that, until now, the true costs of the out-of-hours work of GPs have been disguised? The funding required to establish and sustain new out-of-hours arrangements from 1 January will be a new cost. Has she made an assessment of the expected resultant costs over the first 12 months, and can she reassure me that other current services will not suffer as a result?

Angela Smith: I know that the hon. Lady has been concerned about the service provision, and I am pleased to be able to reassure her. She will no doubt be aware of the recent article in Doctor magazine that stated:
	"NI goodwill speeds opt-out",
	which shows how well the service is making that change. The cost of providing the service will be about £21 million in a full year and a good service will be provided. I assure her that the funds will be available to ensure that we have effective, safe and efficient out-of-hours services for all patients in Northern Ireland.

Martin Smyth: Will the Minister confirm that there are doctors who do not want to work out of hours and that there are areas in Northern Ireland where there is great concern that people may not be getting the services that they require, particularly in rural areas?

Angela Smith: There may be some confusion about what is happening. The days when the doctor put on his overcoat over his pyjamas and rushed out in the middle of the night were a long time ago. What we are saying is that, where doctors wish to opt out of providing out-of-hours services, responsibility for them passes to the boards. I am well aware of the concerns about rural areas. That is why the boards have been carrying out detailed planning to ensure that we have a safe, efficient and effective service for patients throughout Northern Ireland.

Peace Process

Ann Winterton: If he will make a statement on the peace process.

Bill Tynan: What further discussion is taking place in Northern Ireland with a view to re-establishing the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Paul Murphy: We made good progress on the key points at the intensive negotiations at Leeds castle, and talks with the Northern Ireland parties and the Irish Government continue. As the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach have made clear, it is now very important that they reach a conclusion.

Ann Winterton: Surely the peace process cannot progress unless there is full and verifiable handing over of weapons by Sinn Fein-IRA, sooner rather than later. The token surrender of weapons to date is simply not good enough.

Paul Murphy: The Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, South (Mr. Pearson), made it clear that decommissioning is an essential part of any deal that has to be made to restore the institutions. Decommissioning is also an essential part of the Good Friday agreement in itself. The exchanges over the Floor of the House a few moments ago made it clear where the Government stand.

Bill Tynan: May I encourage my right hon. Friend to continue the peace process, because as far as finding a solution to the problems that exist in Northern Ireland is concerned, re-establishing the Assembly is vital to the people of the Province? What recent discussion has he had with the new Irish Foreign Minister? If we are to continue co-operation and maintain momentum for the peace process, we must ensure that the relationship that existed previously with Brian Cowen continues with Dermot Ahern.

Paul Murphy: I agree with my hon. Friend that success is important in the Northern Ireland peace process. We need good relations with the Irish Government, and I believe that they have never been better. I pay tribute to the work of Brian Cowen, who was Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs and is now Finance Minister. He played a significant role in the process and we wish him well in his new job. We also welcome Dermot Ahern, who will prove an able successor. My hon. Friend is right to bring the vital significance of the British and Irish Governments' working together to the attention of the House.

Michael Mates: While everyone agrees on the necessity of full decommissioning, the argument continues about how it can be brought about in a way that will satisfy the public, and in particular the citizens of Northern Ireland. In view of the fact that the Sinn Fein leader has accused the Government of trying to play politics with that important issue, for the avoidance of doubt, will the Secretary of State tell us the Government's minimum requirements for visibility in decommissioning?

Paul Murphy: I agree with the right hon. Gentleman that the issue is important—it cannot be avoided and it is a vital part of the Good Friday agreement. Discussions are taking place between the parties and the Government, and I cannot go into the detail of how we will deal with the issue, because that would affect the talks. Unless there is sufficient transparency to induce confidence among people in Northern Ireland, whether they are Unionist or whether they are nationalist, we will not make progress. That lack of confidence was one reason why we did not make progress back in November 2003. He may rest assured that his general points about transparency and confidence are at the heart of the discussions.

John Hume: Does the Secretary of State agree that, for the first time in history, the people of Ireland as a whole—north and south—voted on how they want to live together by overwhelmingly endorsing the Good Friday agreement? It is therefore every true democrat's duty to implement the will of the people, which means implementing all aspects of the agreement. Does he agree that any renegotiation of any aspect of that agreement would be undemocratic?

Paul Murphy: My hon. Friend is right to emphasise the importance of the agreement to Northern Ireland's future. He knows full well that the principles that underlie the agreement cannot be altered in any accommodation that we may arrive at. The details on power sharing, the north-south arrangements and the principle of consent are all vital to any future accommodation.
	My hon. Friend knows that the operation of the agreement's institutions has been reviewed and we have an opportunity to reflect on how we can change it for the better. Even when we examine the operation of the agreement, any changes must be made by agreement. However, he is right to point out that the fundamental principles of the Good Friday agreement must lie at the heart of any future accommodation.

Gregory Campbell: Does the Secretary of State agree on the need to ensure greater confidence in both communities in Northern Ireland, and particularly the Unionist community, before the discussions reach fulfilment and the Assembly returns?

Paul Murphy: The hon. Gentleman is right—at the end of the day, proper trust and confidence must be developed. He knows as well as me the reason why the Assembly has been suspended for more than two years, and it is nearly one year since there were elections in Northern Ireland for that Assembly. A lack of trust and confidence lies behind that situation. Any discussions must deal with the need to increase confidence, which is his point.

Seamus Mallon: The Secretary of State knows that policing is central to creating peace in Northern Ireland. I am sure that he has noted some ill-judged statements about policing that have been made recently. Will he ensure that the opinion of the oversight commissioner—an independent, impartial oversight commissioner—that Patten is being fully implemented with competence is not overlooked? Will he consider extending the oversight commissioner's tenure of office so that the public in Northern Ireland can base their opinion on his professional judgment and not on the party political propaganda or self-serving interests of others?

Paul Murphy: My hon. Friend is right to remind the House about the work of the oversight commissioner. It is a vital part of our progress on policing in Northern Ireland. I greatly support what he has done to date and I shall reflect seriously on my hon. Friend's point about his term of office.

Lembit �pik: Do not demands for a statement that the war is over fundamentally miss the point? Although it sounds less dramatic, should not our goal be to ensure that all groups abide by paragraph 13 of the joint declaration, which means full and permanent cessation of all military activities? Does the Secretary of State therefore agree that it would be better for politicians from all parties to focus on implementing a measurable outcome in an existing declaration rather than fixating on a politically charged but practically undefined demand?

Paul Murphy: As I have said several times this morning, the issue is confidence. The only way in which we can restore the institutions and fulfil what we have to fulfil in the Good Friday agreement is by ensuring sufficient confidence in all parts of the community, Unionist and nationalist, in Northern Ireland so that politicians can work together in an Executive and an Assembly and the important matters of paramilitary activity and decommissioning can be addressed. How we do that is the key. Unless people are confident that such progress is to be made, we cannot achieve our goals. However, I am reasonably optimistic that there is a will among parties in Northern Ireland to do a deal and restore those institutions.

Nigel Dodds: On Monday, the vice-chairman of the Northern Ireland Policing Board, Denis Bradley, made grossly irresponsible comments about attacks on police and district policing partnership members. He also made offensive political remarks that went way beyond his role and remit. Should not he now resign? If he does not, should not the Secretary of State remove him from an office for which he is clearly unfit?

Paul Murphy: Obviously, Mr. Bradley expressed personal opinions, to which he is entitled. However, it is important to point out that he has been the subject of much intimidation in past months and that he is sincere in wanting progress on policing. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman agrees with that. I know that he can address the comments about the political situation more than adequately through debate. I understand what he says but I believe that everyone would agree with Mr. Bradley's emphasis on the fact that progress in the peace process was important for progress in policing.

David Lidington: Will the Secretary of State confirm that steps towards so-called normalisation, for example the withdrawal of troops from Northern Ireland and dealing with terrorists on the run[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. We must be fair to the hon. Gentleman. I ask hon. Members not to hold conversations in the Chamber. Perhaps they could do that outside.

David Lidington: Does the Secretary of State agree that issues such as the withdrawal of troops and dealing with terrorists on the run depend not only on decommissioning but on the clear cessation of all paramilitary activity and the effective end of the IRA as an active military organisation? Will he make it clear that the Government will not move on those normalisation issues without that clear end of paramilitary organisation and activity?

Paul Murphy: That lies at the heart of the joint declaration, in paragraph 13. The Prime Minister has said that the acts of completion, as we have termed them, to which the hon. Gentleman referred will not happen unless there is an end to paramilitary activity and to the other issues that the hon. Gentleman mentioned. I hope that those issues will be addressed in the current negotiations, so that we can move into the other areas that the hon. Gentleman described. We cannot do so, however, unless there are acts of completion on those points.

David Lidington: I am grateful to the Secretary of State for that reply. I welcome today's news that he is soon to meet representatives of the Ulster Political Research Group. Does he agree that it would build community confidence hugely if the loyalist paramilitaries decommissioned their arms, ended their paramilitary activity and renounced the vicious criminality which terrorises too many people in the loyalist communities? Would that not also open the way for the jobs and investment that the people desperately want to come into those communities?

Paul Murphy: I could not agree more with the hon. Gentleman. It is vital that, as well as tackling republican paramilitary activity, we tackle such activity among the loyalists. As he rightly says, I hope to meet the UPRG, which represents loyalism of a certain type, next week. I shall also meet David Ervine of the Progressive Unionist party. The message is that we welcome political loyalism as a political force in Northern Ireland, but anything that involves criminality or paramilitary activity must be condemned very robustly, as the hon. Gentleman rightly said.

Paramilitary Activity

Laurence Robertson: If he will make a statement on the current level of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland.

Ian Pearson: The Government remain concerned at the level of paramilitary activity and control exercised by both republican and loyalist paramilitary organisations within their communities. Internal tensions within loyalist paramilitary groups remain high, with continuing incidents. Dissident republicans continue to carry out attacks, although many of their activities have been thwarted, intercepted or nullified by the security forces. The Independent Monitoring Commission is due to report again on this issue shortly.

Laurence Robertson: A few moments ago, the Secretary of State told my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Ann Winterton) that relations with the Irish Republic were very good. Can the Minister therefore explain why the Irish Republic refuses to hand over Paddy Dixon, who was wanted for questioning in connection with the Omagh bombing? Can he also tell me whether Paddy Dixon has been relocated to the United Kingdom? He was recently stopped by the authorities in Cardiff and found to have a great deal of cash on him. Why was the Police Service of Northern Ireland not alerted to the fact that he was in Great Britain?

Ian Pearson: What I can say to the hon. Gentleman is that there is a good, strong level of co-operation between the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Garda Siochana on a wide range of issues, which certainly include dealing with paramilitaries and with the issue of organised criminal activity. So far as the individual whom he mentioned is concerned, I will look into that issue and get back to him.

Tony Clarke: Does my hon. Friend share my concern at the continued involvement of paramilitaries in the rise in hate crime in Northern Ireland? Will he ask the PSNI to look at two issues? One is the continuing protection and extortion rackets run by loyalist paramilitaries and aimed against ethnic communities that have small businesses in Northern Ireland. The second is the involvement of the British National party and the White Nationalist party on those estates, almost at the requestand certainly with the co-operationof some of the paramilitaries there[Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Hon. Members are being far too noisy.

Ian Pearson: My hon. Friend is right to point out the continuing level of paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. In the first nine months of this year, there were 184 paramilitary attacks, and three times more loyalist attacks than republican attacks. Extortion and organised crime are particular issues. The police made an arrest only last week, which shows that they are very much on the case so far as dealing with extortion is concerned. My hon. Friend is also right to point out the issue of racism and the involvement of the BNP. This is something that the Government are extremely aware of, and we are committed, through the Northern Ireland Office and the Northern Ireland Departments, to combat racism wherever it occurs.

Roy Beggs: It is believed that between 250 million and 500 million is being taken up by criminals in Northern Ireland. Paramilitary activity is funded by illegal activity. Apparently the Assets Recovery Agency has successfully picked up about 3 million to date, but does the Minister accept that much more must be done to disrupt paramilitary activity and that that means cutting those people away from their financing? Can he assure us that, if it is needed, the ARA will be granted more funding to cut out the sale of counterfeit goods, the smuggling of tobacco and cigarettes and, of course, the importation of illegal fireworks from China?

Ian Pearson: I agree with the hon. Gentleman that more needs to be done, and it is being done at the moment. The PSNI has a range of activities under way to tackle organised crime. The Assets Recovery Agency has had some major successes in recent weeks and, as he will be aware, went to court only last week with another major seizure. We need to hit criminals where it hurts them, in the pocket, as well as bringing them to justice. The Assets Recovery Agency has an adequate budget, which increased by 20 per cent. this year. We shall continue to keep that under review.

PRIME MINISTER

The Prime Minister was asked

Engagements

Andrew Miller: If he will list his official engagements for Wednesday 27 October.

Tony Blair: This morning I have had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others. In addition to my duties in the House, I will have further such meetings later today.

Andrew Miller: My right hon. Friend will know that as health indicators have continued to improve, one set of statistics nevertheless continues to give public concernthat of cancer. That is partly because diagnostic techniques have improved and partly because things that used to kill people before cancer have been wiped out through good medication and so on. What will my right hon. Friend do to help improve public understanding of that disease, particularly in terms of improving issues around lifestyle, and what will he do to improve screening within the NHS for the disease?

Tony Blair: The public health White Paper will be published shortly. It is worth pointing out to the House that there is a huge extra investment that is going into cancer services at the moment, with more than 1,000 extra cancer consultants and more than 1,000 items of modern equipment to diagnose and treat cancer. I should also say to the House that over the past seven years, the number of premature deaths through cancer is down by over 12 per cent.; that is 33,000 lives saved.
	However, we recognise that we have to do more, and today my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health is announcing that we are investing almost 40 million over the next two years to fund a national bowel cancer screening programme. That will begin in April 2006 and this is all part of the investment and reform programme being rolled out across the whole of the health service.

Michael Howard: Last week the Prime Minister said there was no question of cutting the size of the Army. That answer, as he must know, was quite wrong. Will he now correct it?

Tony Blair: We have increased the amount of investment in defence considerably over the past few years. It is correct, as we have said, that we are going to reduce the number of battalions, I think from 40 to 36we will announce the results of the review shortlybut actually, overall the number of people in our armed forces will not be reduced.

Michael Howard: Well, I have here a statement from the Chief of the General Staff in which he says that Army numbers are falling from more than 108,000 to 102,000. Is the Prime Minister saying that the Chief of the General Staff does not know what he is talking about?

Tony Blair: I am certainly not saying that. What I am saying, however, is that the number of people employed in the armed forces overall is not going to fall. We retain the commitment to invest in our armed forces; we will carry on doing so. But the right hon. and learned Gentleman will know that, as a result of the strategic defence review, we decided that we needed to reconfigure the money that we spend on defence capability, and we will be spending that money on, for example, things like strategic lift capability, where we need new equipment. Also, other people will be employed in our armed forces to provide better logistic services. It is therefore true that fewer will be employed in one area and more will be employed in other areas. Overall, however, the number of people supporting our armed forces is not falling.

Michael Howard: I think that we actually got an admission from the Prime Minister that the answer that he gave this House last week was wrong. Does not it say everything about the Government's priorities that, when there are already more civil servants in the Department for Work and Pensions than there are soldiers in the British Army, the Government are cutting the Army by more than 6,000 men and women? In a dangerous world, we need stronger forces and a Prime Minister who gives straight answers. Is it not clear that under this Government we have neither?

Tony Blair: First, I find it extraordinary that the right hon. and learned Gentleman accuses us of cutting defence forces in circumstances in which he and his party are pledged to freeze defence spending. The shadow Chancellor has said that every budget, apart from schools and hospitals, will be frozen in cash terms. It is true that his defence spokesman has said something different. Perhaps he will now tell us whether the shadow Chancellor is right to say that all budgets other than schools and hospitals will be frozen in cash terms.

Hilton Dawson: Now that the Association of Chief Police Officers is saying that a complete ban on the physical punishment of children would be more workable than the partial ban proposed in the Children Bill, would my right hon. Friend be prepared to meet a small group of Members this week to discuss whether we can have a free vote on what is a fundamental issue of conscience?

Tony Blair: I am very happy to meet my hon. Friend and any other Members on this issue. My view is that there is a common-sense way through this issue. It is important that we recognise that most parents can tell the difference between disciplining their child and abuse of their child. I know that there are strong arguments on all sides in relation to this matter, and I shall listen carefully to any argument that he puts to me. Sometimes in these circumstances, however, it is best to feel one's way instinctively as a parent, rather than as a politician.

Charles Kennedy: Last week, the Prime Minister assured us that the Black Watch would return home by Christmas. The clear impression conveyed was that that would mark the end of the requirement for British forces to carry out this additional responsibility. Can I clarify whether that is the case?

Tony Blair: Yes, we have said that the Black Watch will come back by Christmas. As to what then happens, we cannot be sure at the moment. We do not believe that there will be a further requirement for other troops, but I cannot guarantee that, because, obviously, I do not know the situation that may arise. What I do know is that if there is any contingencyI think that this is what the Chief of the Defence Staff was sayingwe are able to meet it. I said, with the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff, that the Black Watch will be back by Christmas, and that holds.

Charles Kennedy: I thank the Prime Minister for that reply. May I press him further on one aspect? Has he sought, or been given, any assurances by the United States Government that if the Black Watch is withdrawn in due course, its position will be filled in by American rather than British troops?

Tony Blair: I have not been given such an assurance, and I have not sought such an assurance. First, we can be immensely proud of the work that our troops are doing in Iraq. We can be proud of the Black Watch and the work that it is doing. But we are engaged in a joint operation in Iraq with this purpose in mind: to make sure that elections in Iraq can take place in January. If they can, it will be the biggest blow for freedom, stability and prosperity in that country that we can imagine. We should not go into this with an attitude of mind that tries continually to pick holes in the strategy. That does not help the overall joint effort in Iraq, which I believe passionately is in the interests of the security of this country.

Chris Mole: Will my right hon. Friend tell us what steps his Government are taking to encourage agencies such as the Independent Committee for the Supervision of Telephone Information Services, Ofcom and the telecoms network operators to protect our constituents from organisations, both at home and abroad, that are dispersing automatic network diallers over the internet? The practice has caused many of our constituents to incur enormous telephone bills through no action and no fault of their own.

Tony Blair: I think I had better consult my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and get back to my hon. Friend to tell him what we are doing; but I can tell from the calls coming from behind me that this is an issue of deep concern.

Norman Lamb: The Prime Minister will know that Norfolk police authority, along with many others, faces a serious funding shortfall next year. At the same time, the Home Office is imposing yet more bureaucratic burdens. Will the Prime Minister give a guarantee that front-line policing will not suffer as a result?

Tony Blair: I understand that there are record police numbers in Norfolk. That, of course, is a result of the Government's extra investment in policing. Of course we want that to be maintained. As well as providing record numbers of police not just in Norfolk but throughout the country, we are increasing the number of community support officers and support staff. This is all part of bringing back community policing for today's world, and I assure the hon. Gentleman that I want to see it extended, not curtailed.

Laura Moffatt: Modernisation of the accident and emergency services is bringing real improvements to patient experience and safety. Sir George Alberti's report, published yesterday, made that clear. How can we ensure that if there are local difficultiesas there are in the Surrey and Sussex trust, where most services have been transferred to another hospital and ambulances are waiting for up to two hoursthey do not undermine the fantastic work that is going on?

Tony Blair: I entirely understand my hon. Friend's concern. It is important for the strategic health authority to decide how local needs can best be met, but my hon. Friend is right to point out that, as yesterday's report said, accident and emergency care has undergone something of a transformation over the past few years. It is good to note that people coming from abroadfrom America and Australia, for instancehaving observed our accident and emergency services, describe them as an example that should be followed elsewhere. Nevertheless, that does not take away the difficulties that can arise locally. My hon. Friend can make representations about them to the strategic health authority, but I think that in the end such decisions are best made locally.

Michael Howard: The answer to the completely bogus point made by the Prime Minister a few moments ago is that both the shadow Chancellor and the shadow Defence Secretary are pledged to increase spending on Britain's front-line forces by 2.7 billion. Why, on Friday this week, is the Prime Minister going to sign a constitution that will entrench Europe's economic failings, and drag Britain down as well?

Tony Blair: Just before I get on to that point, I should like to continue the discussion on defence spending a little longer, if I may. It simply is not right. How can the right hon. and learned Gentleman have the shadow Chancellor saying that he is going to impose that[Interruption.] Oh, yes. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order. Perhaps the Prime Minister will leave the subject of defence now, and answer the question.

Tony Blair: We shall continue that discussion over the coming months. As for Europe, we want to sign the treaty because we think that it modernises European institutions. When Europe is operating as a Europe of 25, or perhaps 27 and later 30 countries, it is important to have sensible rules in Europe; but that protects absolutely the right of this country to set its tax rates and its foreign and defence policy, and it preserves our opt-in on asylum and immigration. It is therefore a sensible deal for this country. We know where the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his friends want to go: they want to go out of Europe, and that is not sensible.

Michael Howard: The description that I gave and which I shall repeatthat the constitution will
	entrench Europe's economic failings and drag Britain down too
	comes from a man who was the Prime Minister's chief economic adviser for six and a half years. Should we not take his advice seriously?

Tony Blair: I am sure that I always took his advice seriously, but it is important to recognise that a Europe of 25 is a Europe that Britain should be part of. Why? Because 60 per cent. of our trade is with Europe, millions of British jobs depend on our being in the European Union[Interruption.] The Tory party actually wants to use the refusal of this treaty as a means of renegotiating existing membership of the European Union. [Hon. Members: Hear, hear.] So let us be quite clear: the right hon. and learned Gentleman's opposition to this new treaty is not about the treaty itself; it is about using the treaty as an excuse to renegotiate existing terms of European membership, which means getting out of Europe. Perhaps he will at least confirm this: that it is his policy to renegotiate our existing terms of membership.

Michael Howard: Well, let me tell the Prime Minister a few more things that his adviser said. He said this morning that
	those in favour of the constitution would like to box people in to suggesting the only alternative . . . is leaving the European Union . . . that is not the case at all.
	He continued:
	The British government never really thought through its own position. First, it opposed a written constitution and then it put forward its own draft, which was treated with contempt. Then there was all that nonsense about tidying up . . . There was no strategic thinking.
	So why is the Prime Minister going to Rome on Friday to sign up to a constitution that he himself said was never necessary, which his advisers say is damaging for Britain, and which the British people overwhelmingly do not want? He promised that he would
	stand up for Britain's interests in Europe,
	but his own adviser says that he was gutless. Is it not now clear that this Prime Minister is all talk?

Tony Blair: I shall tell the right hon. and learned Gentleman what is gutless. It is gutless to run from the UK Independence party into a position[Interruption.] Oh yes, that is what is gutless. He has ended up in a situation whereby his policy now is to renegotiate Britain's existing terms of membership, which would mean that Britain would face either humiliation in that negotiation, or withdrawal from Europe. I agree that it is difficult sometimes in this country to make the case for Europe, but I will carry on making that case because it is right and in Britain's interest. A true leader would stand up to UKIP, not run from it. [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker: Order.

David Winnick: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is genuine concern in the country about various aspects of the Gambling Bill, which is due to be debated shortly, and in particular about the establishment of very large casinos? Instead of trying to encourage further gambling and debt, would it not be far more sensible to reduce these problems? The last thing that we want is a casino-type society. Ministers should reconsider the whole matter.

Tony Blair: I entirely understand the concerns that my hon. Friend and others have expressed, but it is important to realise that 90 per cent. of that Bill is actually about regulating gambling better and more strictly. For example, it will have restrictions on access to gambling, particularly in respect of children, that are being introduced literally for the first time. It is also important to emphasise that where one of these casino leisure complexes is sought, any local authority has the right to declare that it will have no such complexes in its area at all.
	The issue that we must really decide on is this. We are modernising in a sensible way the overall gambling laws. Let us be clear: this process has been going on for four years and, until very recently, with a large measure of cross-party support. The fact is that as well as better regulating gambling, the Bill will allow some of these large casino leisure complexesprobably 20 to 40in areas that will be regenerated with hundreds of millions of pounds of investment and thousands of jobs. As the debate proceeds through the House of Commons, those arguments will become a little clearer.

Elfyn Llwyd: Further to that answer, can the Prime Minister elaborate on which British interests will be served by the Gambling Bill? Does it not, in fact, provide further evidence of the fast-evolving and special, if not unique, relationship between this Prime Minister and the United States?

Tony Blair: Many British companies also want to be involved in casino and leisure complexes, as they are involved in gambling across the country. It is also worth reminding the Houseand perhaps, through it, the countrythat this process began with an independent report by Sir Alan Budd in 2001 and we then had two lots of Scrutiny Committee deliberations on a draft Bill, so it is not true that we have ignored it. About 130 of the 160 recommendations were accepted. As to the others, there will be ample opportunity to debate them during the course of the Bill. I would point out to the hon. Gentleman that 90 per cent. of the Bill is actually about establishing better regulation. People on both sides of the House have been saying for years that we should modernise our gaming laws, and that is what we are trying to do.

David Hamilton: Iraq has divided this House as it has divided this nation. However, there is a position on which we should all agree: that the innocents in Iraq are the children. Within my Midlothian constituency is a young woman, Katrina Turner, who was watching television 19 months ago and saw a young girl, Hannan, get burned beyond recognition. Over those 19 months she has waged a personal campaign, as a result of which Hannan is now in Scotland with my constituent. Tomorrow the girl is going to a special burns unit at St. John's hospital to receive treatmentpainful treatmentthat will take up to six months or longer to complete. Can I ask the Prime Minister to use his good offices to talk to world leaders, to recognise the fact that there are no burns units in Iraq and to make a plea for people in Iraqand, indeed, throughout the worldto be able to get that sort of treatment?

Tony Blair: The point that my hon. Friend makes is right. Of course, specialist health services suffered enormously under the previous regime and it will take a long time for Iraq to catch up to UK and international standards. I can tell my hon. Friend that there is a multi-donor trust fund, managed by the World Bank and the United Nations, which provides funds precisely for those types of specialist services. The UK is contributing about 70 million to those funds this year, and we are also working with the Iraqi ministry of health to try to make sure that we develop those specialist services. At the present time, I have to say, most of the emphasis in Iraq is on primary and emergency care, which is being introduced across the country for the first time in a proper and measured way. The Iraqis want to move on to specialist medical services and I can assure my hon. Friend that we will help them to do so.

Chris Grayling: A group of former inhabitants of the island of Diego Garcia, who were dispossessed under a previous Labour Government, have started arriving in the UK and are currently being housed at the expense of the residents of Reigate and Banstead in Surrey, and thousands more could be on the way. Will the Prime Minister explain why my constituents in a small Surrey borough should pay substantial housing and legal costs as a result? Can he also explain why appeals to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and to the Deputy Prime Minister himself for help have so far gone unanswered?

Tony Blair: I think it is because of the concern that if we start providing finance for this particular case, we would have to provide it for a whole series of others. The hon. Gentleman refers to thousands of people coming in, but that is an exaggeration. I shall have to look into the precise numbers that we anticipate, but I am told at the moment that it is far fewerperhaps 40 so far. I will look into it very carefully and get back to the hon. Gentleman about it. As I said, the concern has been that if we start providing funding in these circumstances, there is no reason why we should not provide it across the board.

Gordon Prentice: A decade ago, my friend won the Labour leadership on a manifesto promising change and renewal. Now, after seven years in government, can he think of a single dramatic act of renewal that would make the British public sit up and take notice? [Interruption.]

Tony Blair: Actually, I can think of several[Interruption.]apart from the fact that we have had two successive Labour Governments. That is one renewal. What is more, we have had economic stability in place of boom and bust; we have had 2 million more jobs in place of 3 million unemployed; we have had a national minimum wage in place instead of no minimum wage; we have had record investment in health and education in place of cuts; and we have had half a million children lifted out of poverty. That is some renewal. Maybe my hon. Friend should go back and tell his constituents about it.

Stephen Dorrell: Has the Prime Minister seen the paper published by the Department for Health advocating the reintroduction into the NHS of practice-based commissioningwhat we used to call GP fundholding? Will he confirm that it is the policy of this Government, as it was of their predecessor, to extend the opportunity of practice-based commissioning to any GP who wants to take advantage of it? Will he also confirm that the excellent policy set out in the paper by the Secretary of State for Health has the unqualified support of the Chancellor of the Exchequer?

Tony Blair: First, the policy is most certainly not a return to GP fundholding. We have no intention of reintroducing that two-tier system. However, it is true that we are devolving money down to the front line of the health service, as well as putting record investment into the NHS. If the right hon. Gentleman is saying that, having read that document, he supports it, I am delighted.

Mike Hall: This week saw the sixth anniversary of the establishment of the new deal for lone parents. So far, 270,000 lone parents have found their way into work. That is why unemployment in my constituency has fallen by 53 per cent. since May 1997 and why, directly as a result of the new deal, 420 lone parents in Weaver Vale are now in work. However, 1,188 people in my constituency remain unemployed. What does my right hon. Friend propose to do to ensure that everyone in my constituency who wants a job gets the opportunity to work?

Tony Blair: I am glad that the new deal has had such a positive impact in my hon. Friend's constituency. It has helped hundreds of thousands of peoplelone parents and young peopleto get off benefit and into work. It is a tragedy that the Opposition are committed to abolishing it. That would be a very regressive step. We intend to extend it and, through tax credits and the other help that we give people, to make work pay. In addition, the new training and skills measures and the extension of child care will give many people the chance to acquire new skills and get help with looking after children. That is all part of creating a society in which everyone who wants to work is able to do so.

Sue Doughty: Last month's report from the organisation Safer World identified that at least 450 million is spent subsidising UK arms exports. Would not taxpayers' money be better spent on local health services, such as those offered by Cranleigh Village hospital and Milford hospital in my constituency, which are so much valued by my constituents?

Tony Blair: I shall have to check into the figure of 450 million but, if that covers defence sales as a whole and not just arms sales, it would be extraordinary if the Liberal Democrats were to say that we should not provide any support for our defence industry, which involves many thousands of jobs in this country. I do not think that it is wrong for this country, under the proper guidelines, to sell defence equipment. That is an important part of our manufacturing base.

Meg Munn: Last year, I received many letters from constituents complaining about the abuse of fireworks. Last week, Mrs. Catherine Foster wrote to me to say how different things are this year and how much quieter it is as a result of Government legislation. Will my right hon. Friend assure me that the efforts that have been made to tackle the problem will continue so that all our constituents can enjoy this time of year without worrying about the distress caused to their pets?

Tony Blair: I am delighted that the legislation has had that impact on my hon. Friend's constituency. The introduction of fixed-penalty notices for firework offences has given the police a power that they can use easily and prevents the need for a long drawn-out court hearing. The police are able to take swift action, and that is all part of our measures on antisocial behaviour. We have closed down crack houses, shut down pubs and clubs where violence happens and under-age drinking goes on, and introduced antisocial behaviour orders. It is a question of ensuring that we give the power to local communitiespolice, local authorities and the local residentsto take action against that menace. In general, the powers have been widely welcomed.

Michael Mates: Is it not a serious setback to the tremendous efforts being made to prevent weapons proliferation to rogue states that some highly sensitive nuclear equipment and a very large quantity of high-quality explosives have gone missing in Iraq? Do the Government have any say in the protection and security of those very sensitive sites, either through our diplomatic services or our forces on the ground? If not, why not?

Tony Blair: We do, of course. I think that I am right in saying that that was a result of the immediate aftermath of the conflict in Iraq and that nothing has gone missing in recent times, but we are awaiting a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency. We will obviously act on that report, but until we have the report, we do not know what the precise facts of the situation are, and they may be somewhat different from how they appear.

Mark Todd: Derbyshire constabulary and the crime and disorder reduction partnership in South Derbyshire have made tremendous progress in pressing down on crime in my area. I met representatives of the police authority last week to discuss their analysis of funding needs in the coming year and their bid for community support officers. Will my right hon. Friend commend to the Home Secretary their proposals for CSOs? Can he give me some assurance on their future funding?

Tony Blair: Community support officers are having a big impact, along with neighbourhood wardens, in support of local police, particularly in dealing with antisocial behaviour. I can assure my hon. Friend that, as I said a moment or two ago, we want to see that encouraged and extended, not curtailed. The important thing is not just to have extra numbers of uniformed people on the ground, but to ensure that they have the powers to act where necessary. The combination of the additional police and community support officers and the powers is making a real difference, and as the report on antisocial behaviour that will be published tomorrow indicates, that is now beginning to have a real impact for the better on people's lives in this country.

Points of Order

Crispin Blunt: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), the Prime Minister said that only a few dozen Ilois islanders would apparently come to the United Kingdom. He should have been aware that there are about 4,300

Mr. Speaker: Order. That is not a point of order; it relates to the Prime Minister's reply. Take it up with the Prime Minister.

Bob Russell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. A few minutes ago, the Prime Minister stated that there would be no reduction in the size of Her Majesty's armed forces. You will recall

Mr. Speaker: Order. This is not a continuation of Prime Minister's Question Time.

Norman Baker: rose

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am trying to answer a point of order. The hon. Gentleman is a bit quick.
	If there is any concern about the Prime Minister's reply, drop him a note, and I am sure that he will answer.

Peter Ainsworth: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. On 19 October, I wrote to the Minister for Local and Regional Government about the people from Diego Garcia, who were referred to in Prime Minister's questions, asking him urgently to contact Reigate and Banstead council to provide advice and assistance. It is simply unfair that my constituents and those of my other hon. Friends whose constituencies are in Surrey should be faced with footing the bill for an event that is entirely of the Government's making

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am going to stop the hon. Gentleman. If he and other hon. Members who represent the area have a difficulty and a concern about these matters, I am very generous in offering Adjournment debates, particularly when a group of MPs is interested. The hon. Gentleman should raise the issue in an Adjournment debate.

Norman Baker: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I ask for your protection for the proper role of the House of Commons. At 9 o'clock this morning, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced a major change in environment policy and did so to a collection of journalists and pressure-group people. That change is an application for an increase in carbon emissions

Mr. Speaker: Order. I am going to interrupt the hon. Gentleman. He applied to me for an urgent question. When I refuse an urgent question, I do not give any reason why, and I do not expect hon. Members to try to raise the issue on a point of order. The Minister to whom the hon. Gentleman refers has made a written statement to the House, and he is perfectly entitled to pursue that matter through oral or written questions.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will recall that last week I raised the issue with you of Ministers talking to the press and issuing press releases on changes in Government policy without coming to the House first. Today, lots of newspapers report a change in Government policy on forced marriages for Asiansa very important issueand again, the Home Secretary has not sought to come to the House to make a statement but has talked to the press first. I suggested to you in my point of order last week that, if that continued to happen and your ruling on this matter was continually flouted, you should bring certain Ministers to the House and ask for an explanation. I ask for your further ruling on this matter.

Mr. Speaker: I understand from the Clerk that there is a written statement about that matter, so the Minister has acted properly, but I undertake to look at the material that the hon. Gentleman has if he sends it to Speaker's House.

St. George's Day (Public Holiday)

Andrew Rosindell: I beg to move,
	That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make St. George's Day a public holiday in England in place of the May Day public holiday.
	My Bill would designate St. George's day, 23 April, as an annual national public holiday in England. If that date were to fall during a weekend, the following Monday would be a public holiday.
	I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for the opportunity to introduce a Bill on an issue that I sincerely believe to be dear to the hearts of many. The date of 23 April, as the day of the patron saint of England, means a great deal to people throughout our green and pleasant land, but sadly it has become undervalued in recent times. Before I ask the House to vote in favour of giving the people of England a new public holiday to recognise St. George, I should perhaps say a little about the great man himself.
	George lived during the 3rd and 4th centuries and spent much of his time as a warrior in the area that we now know as the middle east. He became widely known for his chivalrous behaviour, protecting women and fighting evil. He was noted for his dependence of faith, might of arms and largess to the poor. Devotion to George became commonplace during the 10th centurysome 500 years after his martyr's death. The stories of George slaying the dragon emerged later as his legend grew. It is believed that his adoption as a patron saint of England first occurred in 1061 when a church in Doncaster was dedicated to him. As crusaders returned from the middle east, they brought with them stories of the great George and his bravery on the battlefield. Indeed, the red cross on the flag of England might have come into being at the same time.
	If the Bill were to reach the statute book, it would not be the first time that St. George's day was a public holiday in England. In 1222, at the Council of Oxford, 23 April was declared a public holiday. The popularity of the day quickly grew in England and it was soon celebrated every year with feasting in towns and cities throughout the land. In 1348, King Edward III introduced the battle cry, St. George for England, and after the battle of Agincourt in 1415, St. George's day became one of the main features of the year. St. George became the patron saint of England around that time, but it is not clear exactly when. Sadly, the traditions have slowly died away over the centuries, but I am glad to stand before the House today as part of their resurgence.
	I believe that all constituents of English Members would be delighted if St. George's day were reintroduced as a national holiday. However, I make it clear that I am also in favour of extending the same rights for St. Andrew's day in Scotland and St. David's day in Wales, but as you will appreciate, Mr. Speaker, I shall leave that to other hon. Members, although I am sure that some of my reasoning would be valid in all parts of the United Kingdom.
	The history of the day rightly has religious significance, but I am certain that the legend of St. George and 23 April could be celebrated in such a way as to ensure that everyone felt included. If the day were again to become a public holiday, it could be one of the most inclusive days in our calendar because many existing public holidays are significant to only the Christian faith. As a national holiday for England, St. George's day could become a wonderful springtime celebration, in which everyone takes part in being proud of our history, culture and English heritage.
	However, it is not just me who wishes formally to recognise the day. Many people and organisations are clamouring for St. George's day to be given adequate recognition. Only this week, a third of members of the Trades Union Congress voted in favour of reclaiming the day for public enjoyment and celebration. The Royal Society of St. George is also doing an enormous amount to promote St. George's day. Indeed, it is fast becoming a national event. In my constituency and home town of Romford, Havering council ensured that the flag of St. George was displayed throughout the marketplace on 23 April as traders proudly displayed the flag from every stall, as schools held competitions and as children around the borough dressed in red and white specially for the occasion, while red roses were handed out at railway stations by my local St. George's committee.
	Many people already choose to celebrate St. George's day because they know that it represents the true spirit of England. To make it a public holiday would be a wonderful opportunity for all the people of England to participate in events and parties celebrating our nation. A fine example of that in practice is Ireland and Northern Ireland, where St. Patrick's day17 Marchis famously celebrated. The people of both sides of the border have a day off, enjoying time with their families and taking part in parades and other celebrations.
	In Switzerland on 1 August this year I was pleased to attend its celebrations of Swiss national day. Flags were displayed from every balcony and there were open air concerts, firework displays, alpine bands parading through the streets and the sound of cow bells echoing from every mountain. Gibraltar's national day on 10 September is a magnificent celebration of the Gibraltarian people, showing not only their pride in being British, but also their love of their homelandthe rock itself. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and scores of other countries also celebrate their national days in style. It is no coincidence that all those nations have a strong sense of national identity and pride, something that can only be a source of strength and unity in any country. I hope that England will follow their example and give this country an annual day to remember and cherish.
	However, some of those things have been associated with less desirable elements. A tiny minority have used the symbols of our patriotism to promote causes of fear and intolerance. It is high time that we reclaim the flag of St. George and his truly English values for all the people of England. It is time that we promoted pride in our nation; pride in our flag; pride in our English way of life. I would even argue that our country is crying out for an opportunity to celebrate all those things.
	As such, recent performances in the Olympics, success in the rugby World cup and the resurgence of England's football team in recent years have all led to the St. George cross becoming a near permanent feature in many high streets, pubs and clubs all over England. It seems that the people of England crave an occasion on which they can show their pride in St. George, their flag and, most importantly, their country. I suggest that 23 April would be the ideal day to allow our nation to come together and celebrate the country of which we are all proud. I ask hon. Members to join me in crying for God, Harry, England and St. George and vote in favour of the Bill. I commend the Bill to the House.

John Cryer: To return from planet Zarg where we have spent the past 10 minutes, the hon. Member for Romford (Mr. Rosindell) failed to mention one aspect of his Bill. The motion states:
	That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make St. George's Day a public holiday in England in place of the May Day public holiday.
	[Hon. Members: Ah!] Judging from their reaction, I suspect that that bothers my hon. Friends and, I believe, other hon. Members. It will be interesting to see whether, in the Division that will follow, Tory Front Benchers will go into the Aye Lobby to attack the labour movement and working people, or whether they will join us in the No Lobby. May day is part of the history of the labour movement, the Labour party and trade unions. The public holiday was introduced by the 197479 Labour Government, but it was always an aspiration of the labour and trade union movement to have a May day holiday in the years when miners were being slaughtered by the hundreds in work, and when there was a battle for improved working terms and conditions. Although it was not fundamental to people's lives, it was always a dream to have such a holiday.
	May day also has religious connotations, and is a celebration of the Virgin Mary and St. Joseph the worker[Interruption.] I can see that that reference has gone down well among the Tories, as it always does. The Bill is an attack on working people, and the dreams and aspirations of the labour movement, which has been in existence for more than 100 years. In fact, the ambition to make May day a bank holiday predates the foundation of the labour and trade union movement, and is something that many Labour Members would defend as long as we have breath in our bodies. Finally, I was born into the labour movement and I intend to die in it, although not just yet. This is an over-my-dead-body issue, and I will defend May day as long as I live and breathe.

Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 23 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of public business):
	The House divided: Ayes 83, Noes 112.

Question accordingly negatived.

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords] (Programme) (No.2)

Paul Goggins: I beg to move,
	That the programme order of 14th June 2004 in relation to the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords] be varied as follows
	Consideration and Third Reading
	1. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order shall be omitted.
	2. Proceedings on consideration shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table.
	3. The proceedings shown in the first column of the Table shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the time specified in the second column of the Table.
	
		TABLE
		
			  
			 Proceedings Time for conclusion of proceedings 
			 New Clauses, New Schedules and amendments to Clauses 1 to 15. Two and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the motion for this Order. 
			 Amendments to Clauses 16 to 21 and Schedule 1. Four and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the motion for this Order. 
			 Amendments to Clauses 22 to 24, Schedule 2, Clauses 25 and 26, Schedule 3, Clause 27, Schedule 4, Clauses 28 and 29, Schedule 5, Clauses 30 and 31, Schedule 6, Clauses 32 to 41, Schedule 7, Clause 42, Schedule 8, Clauses 43 to 47, Schedule 9, Clauses 48 to 52, Schedules 10 and 11, Clause 53, Schedule 12, Clauses 54 to 57 and remaining proceedings on the Bill. Five and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the motion for this Order. 
		
	
	4. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on consideration are commenced.
	Throughout the deliberations on the Bill, we have always tried to achieve consensus, and I think that for the most part we have managed to do so. There has been good communication and consultation throughout. I know that the Opposition have views about programme motions. I hope that they will not divide the House, but if they do so, we will continue to have constructive discussions later.

Cheryl Gillan: I am grateful to the Minister, who is right that we have had a great deal of consensus during the passage of the Bill. That is quite right, because of the sensitive subject matter and the fact that the Government have tried to do something in this area. However, this Bill started its passage back in December last year in another place. It has taken a long time to get here and it has been changed many times on its way. As late as this morning, we are seeing fresh announcements from the Home Office that concern the subject matter of the Bill. The motion is most inappropriate in this case because it will not give us an opportunity for proper discussion. I have no choice but to divide the House as a matter of principle.

Julia Drown: I think that it is important for us to programme the proceedings, but I would be grateful to know whether my hon. Friend the Minister can assure the House that we will have enough time to discuss the need for mandatory risk assessments in family court proceedings, because there are concerns about children who have been killed when courts have ordered residence or contact orders that have been unsupervised.

David Heath: The hon. Member for South Swindon (Ms Drown) has raised an important issueone of many substantial issues that will not, sadly, be adequately debated in one day of Report and Third Reading. That is the real problem: we simply do not enough time to do justice to what is a very important and complicated Bill on which many people will wish to put to the Government serious arguments about its application in due course. That is why the Liberal Democrats also oppose the motion.

Paul Goggins: I anticipate that we will get to the issues raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Ms Drown). I certainly hope that we will do so, and that we will get to a great many others as well. The sooner we can proceed to those discussions, the better.

Question put:
	The House divided: Ayes 280, Noes 144.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Orders of the Day
	  
	Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords]

As amended in the Standing Committee, considered.

New Clause 10
	  
	Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order: representations

'(1) This section applies if section 36 applies.
	(2) If
	(a) a person makes representations about a matter specified in section 36(5) to the local probation board mentioned in section 36(4) or the relevant local probation board, and
	(b) it appears to the relevant local probation board that the person is the victim of the offence or acts for the victim of the offence,
	the relevant local probation board must forward the representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter.
	(3) The duty in subsection (2) applies only while the restriction order made in respect of the patient is in force.
	(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board if he is considering
	(a) whether to give a direction in respect of the patient under section 42(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (directions lifting restrictions),
	(b) whether to discharge the patient under section 42(2) of that Act, either absolutely or subject to conditions, or
	(c) if the patient has been discharged subject to conditions, whether to vary the conditions.
	(5) A Mental Health Review Tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board if
	(a) an application is made to the tribunal by the patient under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or
	(b) the Secretary of State refers the patient's case to the tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).
	(6) Subsection (7) applies if
	(a) the relevant local probation board receives information under subsection (4) or (5), and
	(b) a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence
	(i)when his wishes were ascertained under section 36(4), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 36(5), or
	(ii) has made representations about such a matter to the relevant local probation board or the local probation board mentioned in section 36(4).
	(7) The relevant local probation board must provide the information to the person.
	(8) The relevant local probation board is
	(a) if the patient is to be discharged subject to a condition that he reside in a particular area, the local probation board for the area;
	(b) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the hospital in which the patient is detained is situated.'.[Paul Goggins.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.

Paul Goggins: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 11Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order: information.
	Government new clause 12Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: representations.
	Government new clause 13Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: information.
	Government new clause 14Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: representations.
	Government new clause 15Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: information.
	Government amendments Nos. 34 to 39.

Paul Goggins: The first group consists exclusively of Government amendments and new clauses. The amendments may appear detailed and complicated, but they seek to achieve a simple aim and, I believe, a shared aim, namely, that victims of serious sexual or violent offending should have the right to information about the release of the offender, whether the offender has received a prison sentence or has been dealt with under mental health legislation.
	The amendments combined effect is that when the court sentences for a serious sexual or violent offence, the local probation board acquires a duty to identify the victim of the offence. If the victim wishes, they can be kept informed about decisions in relation to the offender's release. They have the right to make representations about measures to be taken for their protection and to be informed about those measures. That duty already exists under section 69 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 in cases in which the offender receives a prison sentence. These provisions extend it to cases in which the offender is dealt with under mental health legislation, whether or not the offender is under a prison sentence.
	The amendments consolidate section 69 of the 2000 Act with new provisions covering the three powers in the Mental Health Act 1983, under which such offenders may be detained. Those powers are first, a restricted hospital order; secondly, a transfer direction with restrictions, which is made by the Home Secretary to transfer a mentally disordered prisoner to hospital for treatment; and thirdly, a hospital direction, which is made by the court to direct admission of a prisoner to hospital at the time of sentencing. Those provisions are necessarily lengthy, because they cover each detention authority separately. However, their combined effect is that whichever the detention authorityeven if it changes during sentencethe victim retains the right to be informed that a decision on release is being made and to make representations about conditions for their protection and that of their family.
	The Home Secretary, the mental health review tribunal or the parole board may take decisions on the discharge of mentally disordered offenders and the provisions place a duty on each decision-making body to advise the relevant local probation board. The probation board can then pass the information on to the victim to enable the victim to make representations or simply be advised of the discharge and conditions, if they so wish.
	For each of the three powers in the 1983 Act, there are two sets of provisions. The first enables the identified victim to make representations about the conditions of the offender's discharge through the local probation board and requires the local probation board to inform the victim whether any conditions will apply in the event of the offender's discharge. The local probation board must also advise about the end of restrictions on the offender and give any other appropriate information. In turn, both the Home Secretary and the mental health review tribunal are required to give the local probation board the information on discharges to enable the victim to be kept informed.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister will recollect that one of the problems when we discussed the matter in Committee was the extent to which information can properly be provided to victims about the mental health condition of somebody who might be released. An improvement in a person's mental condition often leads to release to taking place, and it is not clear from what the Minister has said how information will be provided in practice. Is it not the case that a person's medical condition is confidential between that person and those who treat them? How will the Government reconcile providing information with respecting patient confidentiality?

Paul Goggins: Patient confidentiality clearly raises some issues, but conditions can be laid down in relation to a particular offender when they are released from prison or hospital. A line must be drawn, but the provisions that we are introducing today make it clear that victims can be kept informed, where that is their wish, about whether the offender is released from hospital or prison. Although the provisions are complex and lengthy, I am convinced that they give us the cover that we need.
	The second set of provisions requires the local probation board to keep the victim informed of decisions on discharge, and the Home Secretary and the mental health review tribunal to provide the board with the information that it needs to meet that requirement.
	The remainder of the amendments are technical changes to clauses 36 to 40, to effect the structure.

Dominic Grieve: I do not want to take up the House's time. I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for taking on board the point that emerged in Committee that victims need to be kept informed about the release of patients who may be subject to restrictions under the Mental Health Act 1983. I hope that he will forgive me if I emphasise that the rules are complicated; I trust that they will achieve the desired effect. I have no reason from reading them to believe that they will not.
	At the risk of repeating of myself, there is an issue about the amount of information that can be provided. I want to highlight the point so that it is placed on the record. It is clear that, in many cases, the release of someone who may have committed a violent offence may be intimately linked to the extent of the improvement of their mental condition while under treatment in hospital. Yet difficult ethical issues surround the amount of information and reassurance that can be provided to a victim about the offender's mental condition. I do not know how that will be resolved in practice. I do not know whether guidelines will be issued about the amount of information that can be supplied.
	I can envisage a position whereby those who treat a patient, who is subject to restriction, in a mental hospital or psychiatric unit will feel constrained about what they can properly say without breaching patient confidentiality. That is not to diminish what the Government are trying to do, but I wonder whether it will prove problematic in practice. I assume that a victim can be given only the barest information that someone is due to be released and that the authorities are satisfied that that person does not currently pose a risk. The victim will inevitably ask, Why do you believe that? With the release of an ordinary prisoner, it might be possible to provide more information, but in the case that we are considering, there may be some problems with giving the information that people want. That is a problem for the Under-Secretary and it will be interesting to observe how the provisions work in practice. Subject to those comments, I welcome the amendments.

David Heath: I also welcome the proposals' intent. I share with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) the view that there may be difficulties in implementation. Obviously, when conditions attach to an individual's release, specific information can be given to the victim. Indeed, new clause 13 lists such information. There is an ancillary matter, which is associated with the point that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield made, about medical assessments of the perpetrator's current mental condition. That is more difficult to define.
	Are there any restrictions on the victim's use of information? In some circumstances, victims may wish to go to the local press and media and broadcast the fact that the person who caused them or their family a great deal of grief and anguish is to be released and is in the vicinity. It is an understandable reaction and, whatever conditions apply, they may believe that they have a story to tell. It may be published and that could pose difficulties for the offender's rehabilitation. One can foresee great difficulties only too easily.
	However, if the information is given on restricted termsI am not clear from the amendments that that is the casefurther questions arise about the extent to which the information can be shared with, for example, Victim Support, which might be a helpful organisation in the circumstances; a local general practitioner; anyone who might want to provide counselling to the victim; or the local police, who were not directly involved in the case but have a locus standi.
	We have important concerns about the operation of the proposals but we do not oppose the intent, which is clearly right.

Paul Goggins: The provisions do not allow for the disclosure of personal medical information or specific information about an individual's mental health. They ensure that the victim has the right to make representations about the conditions that will apply when the offender is released. They can be given simple factual information, namely, that the individual has been released from hospital or prison and the details of any prohibitions on contact.
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asked about restrictions on the use of the information. I need to check that and I shall contact him later. I understand that there are no strict legal limits, although it is good sense that people do not share the information. The point of providing it is to reduce rather than accelerate anxiety. If the information is passed to the media, it can serve only to heighten anxiety. That is not in the victim's interest. Of course, it would be useful if a victim could disclose the information to Victim Support and get some additional support. I shall examine the hon. Gentleman's point. As far as I can tell at this stage, there are no strictly enforced legal limitations, but common sense dictates that the closer the information is kept, the better.
	Question put and agreed to.
	Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 11
	  
	Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order: information

'(1) This section applies if section 36 applies.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence
	(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 36(4), expressed a wish to receive the information specified in section 36(6), or
	(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to receive that information.
	(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps
	(a) to inform that person whether or not the patient is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge;
	(b) if he is, to provide that person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family;
	(c) if the restriction order in respect of the patient is to cease to have effect, to notify that person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect;
	(d) to provide that person with such other information as the board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
	(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board
	(a) whether the patient is to be discharged;
	(b) if he is, whether he is to be discharged absolutely or subject to conditions;
	(c) if he is to be discharged subject to conditions, what the conditions are to be;
	(d) if he has been discharged subject to conditions
	(i) of any variation of the conditions by the Secretary of State;
	(ii) of any recall to hospital under section 42(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20);
	(e) if the restriction order is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the Secretary of State, of the date on which the restriction order is to cease to have effect.
	(5) Subsections (6) and (7) apply (instead of subsection (4)) if
	(a) an application is made to a Mental Health Review Tribunal by the patient under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or
	(b) the Secretary of State refers the patient's case to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).
	(6) The tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board
	(a) of the matters specified in subsection (4)(a) to (c);
	(b) if the patient has been discharged subject to conditions, of any variation of the conditions by the tribunal;
	(c) if the restriction order is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the tribunal, of the date on which the restriction order is to cease to have effect.
	(7) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board of the matters specified in subsection (4)(d) and (e).
	(8) The duties in subsections (3) to (7) apply only while the restriction order is in force.
	(9) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section [Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order: representations](8).'.[Mr. Heppell.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12
	  
	Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: representations

'(1) This section applies if section 37 applies.
	(2) If
	(a) a person makes representations about a matter specified in section 37(3) to the local probation board mentioned in section 37(2) or the relevant local probation board, and
	(b) it appears to the relevant local probation board that the person is the victim of the offence or acts for the victim of the offence,
	the relevant local probation board must forward the representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter.
	(3) If the representations are about a matter specified in section 37(3)(a), the duty in subsection (2) applies only while the limitation direction given in relation to the offender is in force.
	(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board if he is considering
	(a) whether to give a direction in respect of the offender under section 42(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (directions lifting restrictions),
	(b) whether to discharge the offender under section 42(2) of that Act, either absolutely or subject to conditions, or
	(c) if the offender has been discharged subject to conditions, whether to vary the conditions.
	(5) A Mental Health Review Tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board if
	(a) an application is made to the tribunal by the offender under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or
	(b) the Secretary of State refers the offender's case to the tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).
	(6) Subsection (7) applies if
	(a) the relevant local probation board receives information under subsection (4) or (5), and
	(b) a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence
	(i) when his wishes were ascertained under section 37(2), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 37(3)(a), or
	(ii) has made representations about such a matter to the relevant local probation board or the local probation board mentioned in section 37(2).
	(7) The relevant local probation board must provide the information to the person.
	(8) The relevant local probation board is
	(a) if the offender is to be discharged from hospital subject to a condition that he reside in a particular area, the local probation board for the area;
	(b) if the offender is to be supervised on release by an officer of a local probation board, that local probation board;
	(c) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the hospital, prison or other place in which the offender is detained is situated.'.[Mr. Heppell.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13
	  
	Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: information

'(1) This section applies if section 37 applies.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence
	(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 37(2), expressed a wish to receive the information specified in section 37(4), or
	(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to receive that information.
	(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps
	(a) to inform that person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge;
	(b) if he is, to provide that person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family;
	(c) if the limitation direction in respect of the offender is to cease to have effect, to notify that person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect;
	(d) to inform that person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any licence conditions or supervision requirements in the event of his release;
	(e) if he is, to provide that person with details of any licence conditions or supervision requirements which relate to contact with the victim or his family;
	(f) to provide that person with such other information as the board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
	(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board
	(a) whether the offender is to be discharged;
	(b) if he is, whether he is to be discharged absolutely or subject to conditions;
	(c) if he is to be discharged subject to conditions, what the conditions are to be;
	(d) if he has been discharged subject to conditions
	(i) of any variation of the conditions by the Secretary of State;
	(ii) of any recall to hospital under section 42(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20);
	(e) if the limitation direction is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the Secretary of State, of the date on which the limitation direction is to cease to have effect.
	(5) Subsections (6) and (7) apply (instead of subsection (4)) if
	(a) an application is made to a Mental Health Review Tribunal by the offender under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or
	(b) the Secretary of State refers the offender's case to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).
	(6) The tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board
	(a) of the matters specified in subsection (4)(a) to (c);
	(b) if the offender has been discharged subject to conditions, of any variation of the conditions by the tribunal;
	(c) if the limitation direction is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the tribunal, of the date on which the limitation direction is to cease to have effect.
	(7) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board of the matters specified in subsection (4)(d) and (e).
	(8) The duties in subsections (3)(a) to (c) and (4) to (7) apply only while the limitation direction is in force.
	(9) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section [Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: representations](8).'.[Mr. Heppell.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14
	  
	Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: representations

'(1) This section applies if section 38 applies.
	(2) If
	(a) a person makes representations about a matter specified in section 38(3) to the local probation board mentioned in section 38(2) or the relevant local probation board, and
	(b) it appears to the relevant local probation board that the person is the victim of the offence or acts for the victim of the offence,
	the relevant local probation board must forward the representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter.
	(3) The duty in subsection (2) applies only while the restriction direction given in respect of the offender is in force.
	(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board if he is considering
	(a) whether to give a direction in respect of the offender under section 42(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (directions lifting restrictions),
	(b) whether to discharge the offender under section 42(2) of that Act, either absolutely or subject to conditions, or
	(c) if the offender has been discharged subject to conditions, whether to vary the conditions.
	(5) A Mental Health Review Tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board if
	(a) an application is made to the tribunal by the offender under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or
	(b) the Secretary of State refers the offender's case to the tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).
	(6) Subsection (7) applies if
	(a) the relevant local probation board receives information under subsection (4) or (5), and
	(b) a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence
	(i) when his wishes were ascertained under section 38(2), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 38(3), or
	(ii) has made representations about such a matter to the relevant local probation board or the local probation board mentioned in section 38(2).
	(7) The relevant local probation board must provide the information to the person.
	(8) The relevant local probation board is
	(a) if the offender is to be discharged subject to a condition that he reside in a particular area, the local probation board for the area;
	(b) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the hospital in which the offender is detained is situated.'.[Mr. Heppell.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15
	  
	Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: information

'(1) This section applies if section 38 applies.
	(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence
	(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 38(2), expressed a wish to receive the information specified in section 38(4), or
	(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to receive that information.
	(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps
	(a) to inform that person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge;
	(b) if he is, to provide that person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family;
	(c) if the restriction direction in respect of the offender is to cease to have effect, to notify that person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect;
	(d) to provide that person with such other information as the board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.
	(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board
	(a) whether the offender is to be discharged;
	(b) if he is, whether he is to be discharged absolutely or subject to conditions;
	(c) if he is to be discharged subject to conditions, what the conditions are to be;
	(d) if he has been discharged subject to conditions
	(i) of any variation of the conditions by the Secretary of State;
	(ii) of any recall to hospital under section 42(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20);
	(e) if the restriction direction is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the Secretary of State, of the date on which the restriction direction is to cease to have effect.
	(5) Subsections (6) and (7) apply (instead of subsection (4)) if
	(a) an application is made to a Mental Health Review Tribunal by the offender under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or
	(b) the Secretary of State refers the offender's case to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).
	(6) The tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board
	(a) of the matters specified in subsection (4)(a) to (c);
	(b) if the offender has been discharged subject to conditions, of any variation of the conditions by the tribunal;
	(c) if the restriction direction is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the tribunal, of the date on which the restriction direction is to cease to have effect.
	(7) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board of the matters specified in subsection (4)(d) and (e).
	(8) The duties in subsections (3) to (7) apply only while the restriction direction is in force.
	(9) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section [Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: representations](8).'.[Mr. Heppell.]
	Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1
	  
	Parental contact with children after separation in cases involving ill-treatment of the child or another person (No.1).

'After section 8 in Part II of the Children Act 1989 insert
	(8A) Allegations of ill-treatment made in section 8 proceedings
	(1) Where it is alleged that a party to the proceedings has inflicted ill-treatment on the child or on another person, the Court shall, as soon as practicable, determine on the basis of the evidence presented to it by or on behalf of the parties to the proceedings, whether the allegation of ill-treatment is proved.
	(2) Where the Court is satisfied that a party to the proceedings (in this section referred to as the abusive party) has inflicted ill-treatment on the child or on another person, the Court shall not
	(a) make any order granting the abusive party residence of the child; or
	(b) make any order granting the abusive party contact (other than supervised contact) with that child, unless the child wants to see the abusive party and the Court is satisfied that the child will be safe while the abusive party has residence of or contact with the child.
	(3) Notwithstanding subsection 8A(1), where in any section 8 proceedings,
	(a) the court is unable to determine on the basis of the evidence presented to it by or on behalf of the parties to the proceedings whether or not an allegation of ill-treatment is proved; but
	(b) the Court is satisfied that there is a risk of harm to the child,
	the Court may make any order under this Act that it considers necessary to protect the child..'.[Mr. Dawson.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.

Hilton Dawson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 2Parental contact with children after separation in cases involving ill-treatment of the child or another person (No.2).
	'After section 8 in Part II of the Children Act 1989 insert
	When determining whether the child will be safe if contact or residence is granted to the abusive party, the Court shall, so far as is practicable, have regard to the following matters:
	(a) the nature and severity of the ill-treatment;
	(b) how recently the ill-treatment occurred;
	(c) the frequency of the ill-treatment;
	(d) the risk of further ill-treatment occurring;
	(e) the physical, sexual or emotional harm inflicted on the child or harm suffered by the child as a result of seeing or hearing ill-treatment of another person;
	(f) whether the other party to the proceedings
	(i) considers that the child will be safe while the abusive party has residence of, or contact with, the child; and
	(ii) consents to the abusive party having residence of, or contact with, the child;
	(g) the wishes of the child, if the child is able to express them, and having regard to the age and maturity of the child;
	(h) any steps taken by the abusive party to prevent further ill-treatment from occurring;
	(i) any matters as the court considers relevant..'.
	New clause 5Use of recovery orders
	'In Part I of the Family Law Act 1986 (c.55) (child custody), after section 34 insert
	34A Use of recovery orders in cases involving either allegations of domestic violence or a potential risk to the child
	(1) If an applicant claims that their partner has abducted a child of the family, the court may grant a recovery order if the applicant already has a residence order in their name.
	(2) If there is no residence order in favour of either parent, the court may grant a recovery order.
	(3) The recovery order will require both parties to attend court within 24 hours of the discovery of the child, or the first working day thereafter.
	(4) Before returning the child to the applicant or giving the applicant any information as to the whereabouts of the child, the police must
	(a) check their records to see whether either party has committed acts of violence;
	(b) check to see whether either party is included on the register of domestic violence perpetrators;
	(c) having located the child without notifying the applicant of the child's whereabouts, make enquiries with regard to the child's welfare.
	(5) If records show that the applicant has a history of violence or the police have concerns about the welfare of the child if the child is returned to the applicant, the police will
	(a) not remove the child from the respondent;
	(b) advise the respondent to seek legal representation;
	(c) notify the court of their action immediately.
	(6) If there is no record of violence and no reason to believe that the defendant or the child is at risk, the police will return the child to the applicant.
	(7) Ex parte residence or contact orders should only be made if there is evidence that a party is wilfully refusing to attend court.'.
	New clause 18Use of recovery orders in cases involving either allegations of domestic violence or a potential risk to the child
	'In Part I of the Family Law Act 1986 (c.55) (child custody), after section 34 insert
	34A Use of recovery orders in cases involving either allegations of domestic violence or a potential risk to the child
	(1) If an applicant claims that their partner has abducted a child of the family, the court may grant a recovery order if the applicant already has a residence order in their name.
	(2) If there is no residence order in favour of either parent, the court may grant a recovery order.
	(3) The recovery order will require both parties to attend court within 24 hours of the discovery of the child, or the first working day thereafter.
	(4) Before returning the child to the applicant or giving the applicant any information as to the whereabouts of the child, the police must
	(a) check their records to see whether either party has committed acts of violence;
	(b) check to see whether either party is included on the register of domestic violence perpetrators;
	(c) having located the child without notifying the applicant of the child's whereabouts, make enquiries with regard to the child's welfare.
	(5) If records show that the applicant has a history of violence or the police have concerns about the welfare of the child if the child is returned to the applicant, the police will
	(a) not remove the child from the respondent;
	(b) advise the respondent to seek legal representation;
	(c) notify the court of their action immediately.
	(6) If records show that the respondent has a history of violence and the applicant has no history of violence, the police will return the child to the applicant and notify the court.
	(7) If there is no record of violence and no reason to believe that the respondent or the child is at risk, the police will return the child to the applicant.
	(8) If records show that both the applicant and the respondent have a history of violence, the police will immediately seek further instructions from the court and, if necessary, take appropriate steps to protect the child.
	(9) The court shall not grant interim residence or contact orders unless there is evidence that a party is wilfully refusing to attend court.
	(10) The court shall not disclose the address of a women's refuge publicly or give this information to any applicant or respondent or to their legal representatives..'.
	New clause 19Parental contact with children after separation in cases involving ill-treatment of the child or another person (No.2)
	'After section 8 in Part II of the Children Act 1989 insert:
	Section 8A Allegations of ill-treatment made in section 8 proceedings
	(1) Where it is alleged that a party to the proceedings has inflicted ill-treatment on the child or on another person, the Court shall, as soon as practicable, determine on the basis of the evidence presented to it by or on behalf of the parties to the proceedings, whether the allegation of ill-treatment is proved.
	(2) Where the Court is satisfied that a party to the proceedings (in this section referred to as the abusive party) has inflicted ill-treatment on the child or on another person, the Court shall not
	(a) make any order granting the abusive party residence of the child; or
	(b) make any order granting the abusive party contact (other than supervised contact) with that child,
	unless the Court is satisfied that the child will be safe while the abusive party has residence of or contact with the child.
	(3) Notwithstanding subsection 8A(1), where in any section 8 proceedings
	(a) the court is unable to determine on the basis of the evidence presented to it by or on behalf of the parties to the proceedings whether or not an allegation of ill-treatment is proved; but
	(b) the Court is satisfied that there is a risk of harm to the child,
	the Court may make any order under this Act that it considers necessary to protect the child..'.
	New clause 20Mandatory risk assessment checklist
	'After section 8 in Part II of the Children Act 1989 and following the proposed section 8A outlined above insert
	Section 8B (Mandatory risk assessment checklist)
	8B(1) When determining whether the child will be safe if contact or residence is granted to the abusive party, the Court shall, so far as is practicable, have regard to the following matters
	(a) the nature and severity of the ill-treatment;
	(b) how recently the ill-treatment occurred;
	(c) the frequency of the ill-treatment;
	(d) the risk of further ill-treatment occurring;
	(e) the physical, sexual or emotional harm inflicted on the child or harm suffered by the child as a result of seeing or hearing ill-treatment of another person;
	(f) whether the other party to the proceedings
	(i) considers that the child will be safe while the abusive party has residence of, or contact with, the child; and
	(ii) consents to the abusive party having residence of, or contact with, the child;
	(g) the wishes of the child, if the child is able to express them, and having regard to the age and maturity of the child;
	(h) any steps taken by the abusive party to prevent further ill-treatment from occurring;
	(i) any other matters as the court considers relevant..'.
	Amendment No. 59, in page 2, line 24, clause 1, at end insert
	'(7) If an offence has been committed under this section, a court before which a person has applied for an order under section 34 Family Law Act 1986 (on applications in private law for the disclosure of information as to the whereabouts of a child and orders authorising the taking charge of and delivery of a child) should have regard to this offence before granting the order.'.
	Amendment No. 12, in page 3, line 4, clause 5, after 'dies', insert 'or is seriously harmed'.
	Amendment No. 13, in page 3, line 11, after 'death', insert 'or serious harm'.
	Amendment No. 10, in page 3, line 17, at end insert
	'( ) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d)(ii), in determining the reasonableness of the steps which D could have been expected to take, the court shall have particular regard to the extent to which D has been subjected to domestic violence or is in fear of being subjected to domestic violence.'.
	Amendment No. 14, in page 3, line 22, at end insert 'or serious harm'.
	Amendment No. 15, in page 3, line 32, at end insert 'or serious harm'.
	Amendment No. 61, in page 4, line 5, at end insert
	'(8) For the purposes of this section, a person (D) who is a victim of domestic violence should not be regarded as having caused or allowed a child or vulnerable adult (V) to be injured or killed unless there is clear evidence that this person (D) actively contributed to the injury or killing of a child or a vulnerable adult (V).'.
	Amendment No. 62, in page 5, line 36, clause 9, after 'death', insert 'or suicide'.
	Amendment No. 72, in page 5, line 36, after 'death', insert '(including suicide)'.
	Amendment No. 63, in page 5, line 36, leave out
	'a person aged 16 or over'
	and insert 'an adult or child'.
	Amendment No. 1, in page 5, line 36, leave out 'aged 16 or over' and insert
	'(other than a person aged 16 or under in respect of whom a Serious Case Review has been undertaken)'.
	Amendment No. 64, in page 33, line 15, clause 50, at end insert
	'(3) The Secretary of State may make grants to voluntary organisations under this section for the purpose of providing appropriate protection and support services for children who have suffered impairment due to seeing or hearing ill-treatment of another person. Any payments will be subject to such conditions as he considers appropriate.'.

Hilton Dawson: First, I should like to acknowledge the work of Women's Aid Federation of England, which campaigned assiduously on contact in relation to domestic violence. I want to acknowledge its work in helping to develop the worthy amendments and new clauses.
	I make no apology for returning to this issue, which I raised on Second Reading and in Committee. Everyone should acknowledge that, in recent years, at least 28 children have been murdered by their fathers during the course of contact visits, and we really should not leave the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill without fundamentally addressing that issue by changing its provisions.
	I am surprised that I have to move an amendment such as this again. The Government have expressed their determination to make contact safer, and I do not think that anyone would doubt their determination for an instant. The Oppositionwho I understand are now set on a policy of equal parenting, although I am not quite sure what that meanshave also assured us, during the passage of the Children Bill, that they do not intend to put children at risk in any way. One would hope that there would be complete agreement among the 659 Members of Parliament on this issue. At least the Government acknowledge that there is a problem in this regard, but I am worried that some of the key issues have not been addressed, especially in Committee, and that the significance and seriousness of the problem seemed to be skirted over.
	Since Committee, we have seen the publication of the Green Paper, Parental Separation: Children's Needs and Parents' Responsibilities. Paragraph 47 of the Green Paper rightly acknowledges that the Court of Appeal has generally approved guidelines developed by the Children Act sub-committee to ensure that,
	where domestic violence is alleged, the courts must make a finding of fact as to whether or not the alleged violence has occurred and, if it has, what impact it has had on the child.
	It goes on to say:
	Any harm to the child as a result of the violence must be taken into account in the decision on contact and what kind of arrangements should be put in place to ensure that it is safe.
	That is all well and good, and it relates to the discussions that we have had throughout the passage of the Bill, but unfortunately, paragraph 48 of the Green Paper goes on to report that
	the implementation of these guidelines has been patchy.
	I am sorry to say that that statement contradicts the assurances that we were given by the Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Mr. Leslie), that the principle was robust and would provide the assurance that hon. Members required. I was not reassured in Committee, and no one who reads the Green Paper will be reassured. The Government do not believe that we have a proper system in place at the moment.
	That word patchy is one of the most grotesque understatements ever to be put before the House. It refers not to the failure of certain judges to observe some arcane guideline or dusty element or principle in the further reaches of the law, but to the colossal failure of some judges in our family justice system to protect children. We all know what happens to the most junior social workers who make colossal errors of judgment and fail to prevent children from being murdered. We know what happened to the social worker in the Victoria Climbi case, for example. She was sacked, vilified and pilloried, and her lifeor certainly, her careerhas been ruined.
	But what of the judge who ignores guidelines and orders unsupervised contact with schedule 1 offenders? That was recently reported by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children to be happening on a large scale. What of the judge who puts a belief in the virtues of contact ahead of the paramountcy principle embodied in the Children Act 1989? What of the judge who considers that there should be a higher standard of proof where there are allegations of the sexual abuse of children? What exactly should we do when children are murdered during the unsupervised contact ordered by a judge? Are those distinguished gentlementhey are almost invariably gentlemeneven asked to contribute to the part 8 review? Who questions their judgment when they get it wrong?
	The Government have responded to what they regard as an inadequate situation by, finally, proposing to bring into law by January 2005 section 120 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which amends the definition of significant harm to include the witnessing of domestic violence. That is important; it constitutes a vital protective step. The only other thing that we have been promised, however, are robust monitoring arrangements. As I have said in regard to the Children Act sub-committee guidelines, what we have had so far has not been good enough, and has been acknowledged by the Government to be inadequate. We need to make significant changes to the Bill before Parliament can be satisfied that we really are starting to protect children in these most difficult and, in some cases, dangerous circumstances.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman will recollect that he raised this matter in Committee. At that time, it was my impression that he might have had the support of a majority in Committee for his point of view. However, he did not put the matter to the vote. I wonder whether that was because he had received an assurance from the Government, which has not yet been honoured. Is that why he has had to bring the matter back on Report? What is his reason for returning to it now, given that he did not take the opportunity to press it to a vote in Committee?

Hilton Dawson: I regret to inform the hon. Gentleman that I did not have the majority of the Committee on my side. That was made very plain to me during that memorable afternoon. Would that I had.

Cheryl Gillan: I am quite surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman say that. I was flabbergasted that he did not take the opportunity to press the matter to a vote in Committee because, between those Members on our side and those on his side who had spoken to the amendment, we had a majority. I was therefore very surprised to see him duck the opportunity.

Hilton Dawson: I think that the hon. Lady is talking about a different amendment. The one about which she was most critical of me related to part 8 reviews and domestic homicide reviews. I can assure her that I am telling her the truth on this matter. My hon. Friends in the Whips Office know that I have voted against the Government on occasion.

John Heppell: If my hon. Friend could have won the vote, he would have voted.

Hilton Dawson: I think we must respect the sedentary intervention of my hon. Friend.
	I hope that we can move forward on these amendments today. The Government tell us that the paramountcy principle outweighs current case law, to which I have referred and which, frankly, does not protect children. I do not trust that case law, which seems to operate against the best interests of children. I honestly do not trust judges to listen properly to children who have experienced abuse. That is hardly a criticism that can be made solely of the judicial profession, but it is very clearly the case.
	Women's Aid has been assiduous in bringing forward young people and putting them into contact with parliamentarians, who are outraged that those young people's voices have not been listened to, and that they or their younger brothers and sisters have been placed in considerable danger and acute risk by the decisions of adults who have not listened to their very real concerns. We shall not get any further forward in this regard without the implementation of section 122 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which would ensure the separate representation of children in private law. This would ensure that the interests of children would be properly promoted in the family courts.
	Of course these decisions are some of the most difficult that anyone in public life could ever be called upon to make, and of course honest mistakes will be made, but surely we should work on the principle that it is a child's right to have contact with both parents as long as it is in the child's best interests. I am quite sure, however, that the only way for Parliament to insist that the right of children to be safeguarded is upheld is to pass new clause 1, which promotes the safety of children in contact hearings where domestic violence has been alleged and to support new clause 2, which sets out a helpful checklist to assist courts in that task.
	Those amendments support the paramount principle of the Children Act 1989, that decisions should be made in the best interests of the child, and if the Opposition are serious about equal parenting, the amendments are a vital safeguard that they should incorporate in any such approach. Every single Member of the House will be concerned about this issue; every single member of the House should support the amendments.

Dominic Grieve: As I think the hon. Gentleman is aware, I have considerable sympathy for the intention behind his amendments, which we also had a chance to look at in Committee. We fully accept that the need to protect children from violence, including violence from one or other parent, is a very important matter. We are also aware of the riskwe know of such incidentsof children being exposed to possible violence during contact with a non-resident parent. I know that that is a matter of particular concern to the hon. Gentleman. I believe that he may be involved with the passage of the Children Bill, and I should like to offer him some reassurance. The hon. Gentleman is correct that we advocate equal parenting and are in favour of the principle that the normal place of residence of a child is with its parents when living togethera principle to which I think he would not take exception. We also believe that in the event of parental separation, every opportunity should be given to competent and caring parents who are non-resident to provide an input into their child's upbringing. However, we are not seeking to undermine in any way the anxieties that he has expressed in the particular context of the amendments.
	The question does ariseI suppose it will arise also on equal parenting but I think it arises more in this contextabout whether the framework of proposals that the hon. Gentleman has put forward are necessary to ensure that the court has proper regard to possible abusive relationships within the family unit of the person seeking contact. My own experience of doing family legal work, admittedly mostly before the enactment of the Children Act 1989, is that such considerations were very much at the forefront of any decisions that were taken about whether contact should be allowed or residence altered. The checklist that the hon. Gentleman has provided in new clause 2 is the sort of checklist that I would expect the court to go through anyway.

Hilton Dawson: indicated assent.

Dominic Grieve: I am glad to see that hon. Gentleman agrees. Although I do have sympathy with the thrust of his amendments, I shall wait with interest to hear from the Minister whether he thinks that their incorporation is a necessity, because, as I think I made clear to him earlier, in my opinion the Children Act as currently drafted does already provide that those issues should be addressed. We also have to bear in mindI am sure that the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) will agree about this as wellthat it is an unfortunate feature of many a marriage or relationship break-up that false accusations of abusive behaviour are used by one party or another as a form of leverage in order to try to deny the other party contact or residence with the child. Of course, I accept that the terms of the amendments tabled by the hon. Gentleman would not prevent the court from considering that possibility.
	I wonder whether I might now discuss new clause 10, which stands in the names of my hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) and myself and of the Liberal Democrats? It seeks to address the specific issue of causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I think that the hon. Gentleman is referring to amendment No. 10. We have already debated new clause 10.

Dominic Grieve: I do apologise. I was indeed referring to amendment No. 10. For a moment, I thought I was completely out of order and was seeking to refer to something to which I could not make reference. That has been known to happen. I am grateful for the correction, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
	Amendment No. 10 relates to a person causing or allowing the death of a child or a vulnerable adult. The Minister will recollect that there was considerable debate on this matter in Committee. The Government have set on a perfectly good course of seeking to deal with the problem that arises where two people are charged with murder and it is clear that one or other of them must have done it but completely unclear as to which one. In those circumstances we have had instances where the two carers or parents involved have been acquitted because it has been impossible to tell who was responsible. Clause 5 attempts to deal with that by creating a new offence where a child or vulnerable adult dies as a result of the unlawful act of a person who was a member of the same household and had frequent contact with him.
	We are not opposed to that clause. We do, however, have concerns, as the Minister knows, about how it will operate, because one of the effective consequences of the clause is a degree of reversal of the burden of evidential proof, because it effectively compels people to give evidence against each other or to face the consequences of their silence.
	The amendment that we have tabled on Report deals specifically with the issue of those who may have been subject to domestic violence, because it is quite clear from recorded cases that there may well be instances where a person has acquiesced in violence being perpetrated against a child in the household because they themselves are in fear of violence, and we do not feel that clause 5 as currently drafted has sufficient regard to that contingency.
	We are seeking to insert after clause 5(1)(d)(ii) a requirement that, where a person has frequent contact with the child, in determining the reasonableness of the steps which the defendant could have been expected to take, the court should
	have particular regard to the extent to which
	the defendant
	has been subjected to domestic violence or is in fear of being subjected to domestic violence,
	because it must be the case that where someone has been in fear of violence or subjected to violence, they will be in a much less favourable position to take effective steps to protect the child from the risk. It is that point which we think the court should have very much in mind when the time comes to direct a jury, at the end of a jury trial, in respect of such matters.
	I concede that it is already possible that that could happen because a judge may do it of his own motion. But although a judge may do it of his own motion, if Parliament thinks that it is a matter of sufficient importance that we should highlight it, I do think that there is a very good argument for including it in the Bill.

Meg Munn: Is the hon. Gentleman not concerned that if we include this caveat, defendants might seek to claim domestic violence to escape from the seriousness of what has happened, when, in effect, the introduction of this offence is intended to make people face up to the responsibility of having been involved in or having caused the death of a child?

Dominic Grieve: I understand the hon. Lady's point, but I do not think that that is a particular risk. It is the sort of assertion that may be made in any event and it will not contribute to people deciding to assert it more frequently. The question that we must ask is: in cases of serious domestic violence that may be perpetrated against one person by their partner, are they in as good a position as others to fulfil the legal obligations that we place on them in relation to the offence that we create in clause 5? I would have thought that the hon. Lady would have no difficulty in agreeing that such a person, because of their vulnerability, would be poorly placed to provide protection to a child who was also suffering abusive behaviour and domestic violence from their partner. That may be a matter for mitigation of sentence at the end of the court case. But the question arises: should it also provide a possible defence?
	We are creating a very unusual offencean offence of negligence that places specific burdens on an individual. If that individual does not discharge those obligations, and even if they are not the person who was responsible for the injuries, they are still guilty of an extremely serious offence for which they can go to prison for a very long time. I look to the Minister to give the House his views on the matter.

Hilton Dawson: Does hon. Gentleman feel that the Bill as it stands reflects the seriousness with which people should rightly regard child abuse, and does he believe that it is important that people should not be given any opportunity to excuse their complicity in child abuse? Surely, there should be a spur to a woman to help herself out of a violent situation if she felt that a child was being hurt as well.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, but it is worth bearing in mind the nature of this offence, which is punishable by a period of imprisonment of up to 14 yearsit is not a slight matter, it is extremely seriousand which can be committed by an individual without their having done any positive act of violence whatever against the child in the family. That is a fairly unusual state of affairs and it is a very unusual offence under our laws.
	I understand why the Government have introduced the offence, but it is worth bearing in mind whether it will act fairly, as it has the potential to be used to send people to prison for an extremely long time, when there may be doubtor it may ultimately become clearthat they were not responsible for the injuries sustained by the child, which may or may not have caused death. In those circumstances, is it right that we should convict a person if it becomes clear that that person was the subject of serious domestic violence during the period when their alleged negligencethat is what it amounts totook place, which was possibly meted out from exactly the same source as the violence being perpetrated on the child and that led to its death? That is the issue.
	I would feel more comfortable were amendment No. 10 accepted because I do not think that it undermines the intention behind the offence in clause 5. It provides a proper safeguard, however, against what are often tragic situations.

Vera Baird: I want to return to the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson). I have tabled terribly similar clauses, which are as close to his as makes no difference, although I am grateful to the Table Office for noticing the difference.
	I, too, want to pay tribute to Women's Aid. I cannot imagine that anyone in the Chamber who considered the Bill in Committee and who has an interest in the hugely important question of domestic violence does not appreciate the number of years and the amount of effort that Women's Aid has contributed to ensure that we, for example, are concentrating on this issue today. Without its determination and campaigning record, we would not have focused on the issue as strongly. It has done an extremely good job and I owe much of what I will say on various amendments this afternoon to its work.
	The difficulty with contact and domestic violence can best be summed up simply in some figures. In 2002, there were 61,356 contact orders, and contact was refused in only 518 cases; in only 0.8 per cent. of all cases. Notwithstanding that, the family court welfare service says that it is dealing with about 16,000 disputed contact cases a year in which domestic violence is an issue. In some recent research, the Department for Constitutional Affairs has found that allegations of domestic violence feature in 23 per cent. of contact and residence cases.
	I appreciate and respect the welfare principle, but those on the ground are satisfied that society at large is still at the slightly curious stagecurious to those who are very acquainted with the issue of domestic violenceat which truly domestic violence is not given the priority that it ought to have, because, to some extent, it is still an emerging issue. Although it is now known that it exists, and the figures are bruited around, its impact on individuals, particularly on children, is not yet appreciated to the fullest extent. That must be right; given the figures that I have just mentioned, it sounds as if a disproportionate amount of contact is being granted in cases in which there is undoubtedly at least an allegation of domestic violence. In 16,000 cases, however, the family court welfare service says that domestic violence is involved, which seems to go beyond allegations. One is therefore very concerned that the welfare principle is not safeguarding children when domestic violence is on the scene. Once I have set that out, it is clear that these new clauses and amendments are important, at least in testing how the Minister's thinking has moved on since Committee.
	The welfare principle, of course, is open to a multitude of interpretations. If one has a strong, old-fashioned viewsuch views take a long time to diethat what is absolutely paramount for the welfare of a child is that it should be kept in touch with both its parents, almost come what may, that is one's interpretation of the welfare principle; one will give too much precedence and too much priority, in the light of what we know about domestic violence, to ensuring that that occurs. One will devalue contraindications of that.
	That is a huge worry, and I have strong concerns, based on a certain amount of experience, that the judiciarynot all of its members, by any means, but some, particularly older membershas a fixed view as to the importance of fathers in families. Nobody gainsays that, but it is allowed to take precedence over examining more closely and thoroughly the impact on children of what domestic violence has taken place; they must find out that it has taken place to act on it. The same clauses and check lists have therefore been tabled again to say to the Minister that, on the figures that I have put forward, the welfare principle does not seem to be enough, and to ask what more we should be doing.
	It is a good thing that section 120 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 requires the courts to take into account the fact that children have witnessed abuse. That is important and puts the issue of domestic violence well up the agenda. Another fact that cannot be overlooked is the impact of the new court application forms that the Government introduced after the Act came into force. The form contains specific and fairly detailed questions about allegations of domestic violence so that the allegations are drawn out and the issue identified at the outset and dealt with.
	I do not see any real difficulty with that, but I should be grateful for the Minister's comments. The court is happy to introduce a new series of application form questions that intend to draw out information on domestic violence, and that is a good thing. That requires the court to be aware of domestic violence and to think through its extent, depth and gravity. It also requires the court to focus some thought on how to deal with the existence of domestic violence. Given that such requirements are already on the application form, I do not see any difficulty with including the mandatory risk assessment checklist in, at the very least, guidance to judges. It is slightly rumif I may put it that wayto have a form on which specific questions about domestic violence are set out and then not to give judges any guidance at all about how they are supposed to weigh in the balance, evaluate and put strength on the allegations that emerge.
	Guidelines, such as those in new clause 2, would be very helpful. The definition of the welfare principle is wide. However, there are other aspects of the law in which judges would say that wide definitions that give them open discretion have been closed down to them only in the sense that they have been required to take a fixed set of steps in coming to their conclusion. In effect, their discretion has been guided, and I suggest that that should be the position here. Empirical evidence in many cases in which issues of domestic violence have been raised but have resulted in contact shows that the welfare principle on its own will not do. We have to set out the steps that the judiciary needs to take to satisfy ourselves that the issue of domestic violence is being given the importance that it should have.
	Research that I recently read from Professor Sylvia Walby concluded that previous domestic assault is now identified
	as the simplest, most robust risk marker of subsequent domestic assault.
	Let us get well away from the idea that domestic violence stops when the parties separate; it does not. If it has been present before, it is, on that analysis, likely to be present again and therefore is a factor to which the judge should give lively consideration when deciding when to allow contact.
	My name is attached to a number of the amendments in the group, but I shall not spend a huge amount of time on amendment No. 64, because we discussed it in Committee. The amendment requires the Secretary of State to give himself the ability to give grants to voluntary organisations for the purposes of providing protection and support services for children who suffered from seeing the ill treatment of a parent. Despite the fact that two thirds of the children resident in refuges have either seen or been the victims of domestic violence, no funding at all is provided for paid staff to work specifically with those children.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre quoted Children's Voices in Committee, and I quoted Women's Aid. The children said how sad they had been because they had no one to talk to about the issues and, I am afraid, the position remains the same. I therefore invite my hon. Friend the Minister again to respond to the question of what we do about children who have undoubtedly suffered and for whom no resources of conversation, counselling and support are available.
	Another amendments deal with the new offence relating to killing a child, mentioned by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). I support the new offence completely. Indeed, I have done my best to drive it forward having, with others, tabled a new clause to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 to try to deal with the terrible situation in which three children under the age of 10 are killed each week by carers. In some cases, it is perfectly plain that one or other of the two carers on trial is responsible but it impossible under the current rules of jurisprudence to ascertain which. I am strongly in favour of creating the new offence, but I want to prompt my hon. Friend the Minister to comment on the dire situation of women who suffer from domestic violence. What can he do to help with such problems?
	On the death of a child, it is likely that a woman who experienced domestic violence will be charged along with its perpetrator. That will probably take place on the basis that the woman failed to protect the child, but it is well known that it is difficult for women to talk readily about domestic violence. It is also well known that when there is domestic violence, there is almost always sexual violence. It is even harder for people to talk about that. It is extraordinary difficult to expect women to talk readily about sexual violence when they are interviewed by police officers in the immediate aftermath of the death of one of their children. Such women are bound to be traumatised again, well beyond anything that the domestic violence has inflicted on them.
	As my hon. Friend the Minister knows, I have dealt with many cases in which women have killed their violent partner. In early interviews to the police, those women did not disclose the extent of the domestic violence, let alone the sexual abuse, to which they were subject. However, over time and after talking to a sympathetic psychologist, psychiatrist or even solicitor, they have started to be able to talk about it. Once somebody is charged and interviewed, or interviewed and chargedwhichever way round it comesthe process to court follows reasonably quickly. I do not think it right to put in place a defence for people who have suffered domestic violence, because there is probably already a defence in jurisprudence for people who have been unable to stop themselves from committing a crime because they were under duress.
	Domestic violence would constitute duress in many cases, so I do not see the need for such an offence. However, within the sculpture of what has rightly been referred to as a very unusual offence in which the burden of proof is rightly reversed, there must be critical thinking as to what we will do to get women to talk about domestic violence and sexual abuse and accept that they were unable to resist what their partner had done to them and their children. The experience of lawyers like me shows that such proceedings can involve a slow process, but we must consider what special resources can be provided to ensure that, in every case in which domestic violence could be a factor, information on it is drawn out from the person involved. With the reversal of the burden of proof pretty well in place, the real danger is that, unless proper resources are provided to draw the information out, people might be wrongly convicted.
	Following a conviction when the burden of proof is, as it were, the usual way round, a body such as Women's Aid or Justice for Women will get a pretty salty reaction from the Court of Appeal if they say, But over the period since this woman was convictedin fact this began to emerge during the trial, but not very fullyshe has been able to tell us exactly how bad the domestic violence was, and exactly how incapacitated by it she was. The Court of Appeal tends to think that the woman was telling the truth in the original interviews, and has lied since.

Dominic Grieve: I agree with the hon. and learned Lady. In such circumstances, is it not all the more desirable for us to make plain in the Bill that the issue needs attention? If we do not, there is precisely the risk that the truth will only emerge subsequently, and will not be dealt with properly at trial.

Vera Baird: I do not deny that the hon. Gentleman has a point. My amendment is intended to add weight to it. The hon. Gentleman knows, however, that judges tend to see what is in statute as being more important that any other possible factor. That is what makes me shrink from naming domestic violence specifically; other factors may have equal potency for one or other of the parties. Nevertheless, it scares me stiffI put it as bluntly as thatthat if special resources are not put into cases of this kind, women who have done nothing other than suffer from domestic violence will be convicted. I invite my hon. Friend the Minister to tell us what he thinks he can do.

David Heath: I listened carefully to the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) and the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). My party and I agree with many things that they said. I only wish that Ministers listened more attentively to the views of people with real experience, who have a cogent story to tell.
	I tabled a number of the new clauses and amendments in this group. New clause 5 deals with the important issue of recovery orders. My hon. Friend the Member for St. Ives (Andrew George) has been required for parliamentary duties elsewhere, but I know he would have been delighted to speak about a matter that he has pursued personally for some time, a matter that is of great importance to many of those who have informed our debate from outside. Women's Aid in particular is very concerned about the way in which the recovery order provisions currently work.
	I think I should put on record the circumstances of what is probably the most tragic case of its kind, the case that occasioned my hon. Friend's interest. In 1997 Georgina McCarthy and her son, then aged one, fled to the Penzance branch of Women's Aid following domestic violence at her home. Her husband, Paul Russell, then used section 33 of the Family Law Act 1986 to apply for information on the child's whereabouts. In that instance Georgina McCarthy's solicitor managed to prevent the address of the refuge from being revealed, but later Georgina was warned that her husband was coming to Penzance to find her. She knew that if she moved elsewhere, section 33 would again be used by her husband to enable her whereabouts to be disclosed; so she decided that moving was pointless. At least in Penzance she had contact with the police, Women's Aid, her solicitor and her barrister. Tragically, it was the wrong decision. On 9 May 1988, her husband found her and killed her in front of the child.
	That is an extreme case, but it is not unique. There is evidence of abuse of the recovery order process by those wishing to discover the whereabouts of mothers who have fled abuse, and who are then wrongly accused of child abduction by their abusing partners. I do not accept the Government's response in the other place and in Committee that arrangements in the courts were sufficient to meet the need as it stands, and that no further amendment was required. Evidence suggests that, although they may be rare, there are instances of courts being prepared to entertain applications of that kind, and indeed to allow the disclosure of addresses.
	That puts at risk the whole principle of women's refuges, which is a serious matter and one that the Government should address more seriously than they have so far. I hope that, even at this late stage, they will review the use of recovery orders and establish whether an accommodation can be reached, allowing them to make plain what they seem to assume is implicitly the case; that when abuse is involved, the whereabouts of a mother and child will not be given by means of that process.
	My amendments Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15 deal with the circumstances of the new offence. As the Minister knows, I welcome the creation of the offence. I was one of the Members who urged the implementation of the Law Commission's proposals at the outset, because I felt that joint enterprise in familial homicide involved serious issues. My amendments would reinstate the Law Commission's recommendation that the law should cover not just death, but serious harm. I have not yet heard a strong enough argumentother than the argument that the offence is new and we must see how it works before extending itfor differentiating between serious harm caused to a child by two perpetrators, neither of whom can be identified clearly for the purpose of prosecution, and the death of a child.
	I seem to remember the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) making a cogent point in Committee. I believe he said that grievous bodily harm was murder without a body. Are we really to countenance circumstances in which a child is seriously injuredperhaps put into a coma, or suffering major loss of a facultyby abusive parents, and there is no prosecution? I find it difficult to differentiate between the circumstances of familial homicide and those of that sort of abuse.
	The Law Commission recommended the insertion of these words, and they were in the draft Bill. The Government have now left them out, but I still see a strong argument for their inclusion. I understand, of course, that if the Bill were enacted the operation of the offence would need to be carefully reviewed, but it can be reviewed as carefully in the context of its value or otherwise in cases of serious harm as it can in cases of culpable homicide.
	My amendment No. 1 deals with a potential lacuna; the failure to include those under 16 in respect of whom a serious case review has not been undertaken, and who will not qualify for a domestic homicide review specified to be for those aged 16 or over. We discussed that in Committee, so I do not propose to spend any longer on it now.
	I shall finish by considering amendment No. 10, to which the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and his colleagues have added their names, and which started off in the House of Lords as a joint enterprise between our two parties. The Government removed the amendment in Committee, which was a huge mistake. The comments of the hon. and learned Member for Redcar underline the difficulties involved in dealing with such cases. I do not accept the argument that the amendment is an invitation to a defence that is also in fact an invitation to commit the crime. Rather, it is an invitation to consider mitigation, and there is a clear differentiation to be made in that regard. There is abundant evidence that a court will not necessarily take such factors into consideration because of the circumstances, and because of the difficulties that the hon. and learned Member for Redcar described.
	Those in another place who passed this amendment and have seen it removed in this House will return to this issue, and they will be right to do so. We in this House should indicate that we are not prepared to see someone who is a victim made doubly a victim by being prosecuted inappropriately for an action that they were unable to resist because of the abuse that they were suffering in the home. However, that is what will happen if we do not pass amendment No. 10 today, so I want to make it plain that it is my wish, if at all possible, to press it to a Division; unless, of course, the Minister is happy to accept it. We in this House need to send a signal to those who will consider the Bill after us that they were right and the Government are wrong.

Paul Goggins: I begin my response to what has been a wide-ranging discussion over a fairly short time by acknowledging the deep commitment and experience of many Members in respect of these issues, which is reflected in the amendments that they tabled.
	I pay tribute to Women's Aid and to the other organisations that have helped to inform our discussions today and in Committee. I should gently say to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) that of course Front Benchers have listened to such organisations; it would be a foolish Government who did not listen to organisations that are in daily contact with those who are at the sharp end of such matters.
	The Government are committed to facilitating contact between the child and the non-resident parent where that is in the best interests of the child, and where doing so is safe for the child and for all family members. I know from today's discussion and earlier ones that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) in particular hold very strong views on this issue, as well as considerable experience. I hope that they will forgive me if I tell them that the Government's position remains the same as during our earlier discussions.
	The Government are not trying to be deliberately awkward or difficult. Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, which requires courts to treat the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration in making any decision about their upbringing, is central to our policy. We consider that to be the right principle, and we do not want it to be diluted in any way. Of course, we want that principle to work in practice, and we must continue to monitor what happens and to make the necessary improvements. I am grateful for the comments that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar made about the improvements that we are achieving.
	The new forms, which will be in use from January 2005, will ensure that courts are aware of any allegations of domestic violence from the start of a case's consideration. The commencement at the same time of section 120 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 will strengthen the definition of harm, so that harm caused to a child by their seeing or hearing violence towards another will also be considered. In other words, not only direct violence to the child but violence witnessed by the child will be taken into account. Crucially, the courts will decide whether domestic violence has occurred before making orders on contact and residence.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar asked what more we can do, and it is clear that we need to do whatever is required. She is right: we need to train the judiciary and to continue to ensure that attitudes change. We will continue to monitor the situation and we will, of course, consider further evidence from Members of Parliament and voluntary organisations, but the core of our policy is the belief that it is not the Government's job, in enacting legislation, to choose between parents: rather, our job is to place the best interests of the child at the heart of our policies.

Hilton Dawson: I am mystified by the constant recourse to the paramountcy principle. I firmly believe that everything that I have advocated this afternoon is entirely in line with, and supports, the paramountcy principle, and that it gives good guidance to the courts in order to ensure that they consider the best interests of the child.

Paul Goggins: What we need in legislation is absolute clarity about our starting point in policy, which has to be the best interests of the child. We believe that if we start from there, and if we adopt from next January the rigorously enforced and improving system that I outlined, in conjunction with the new procedures that we are putting in place, the protection of children will be enhanced and increased, but I repeat that we need to make it clear in legislation that our starting point is the welfare and best interests of the child.
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome mentioned recovery orders. Before a recovery order can be made, there must be a part 1 order. If either party is worried that the provisions of the part 1 order are no longer relevantthere might be new evidence or new concernsthey can return to the court and seek a variation of the contact or residence order if, for example, they have concerns about domestic violence, or if evidence of an offence has emerged. That would have to be done through a variation of the part 1 order. I should impress on the hon. Gentleman, who brought to our attention a deeply tragic case, that parties are not required to disclose their addresses to the court. That is an important protection, particularly for those who feel vulnerable.
	I turn to familial homicide, about which a number of Members spoke, and to amendments Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15. They reflect the real determination, which is shared throughout the House, to do everything we can to solve the so-called Which of you did it? cases without unduly penalising those who have themselves suffered domestic violence. The issue is: how do we get the balance right? The question of whether the offence should be extended to cover not only death but serious harm

Mike Hancock: Will the Minister clarify his point about people not being expected, or legally required, to give their address in court? In some instances, judges have forced people to give names and addresses in open court, so I am slightly bewildered by his comment.

Paul Goggins: I am happy to say again that parties are not required to disclose their addresses to the court, and I am perfectly happy to put that in writing to the hon. Gentleman if it will help to clarify matters.

Vera Baird: The courts must surely have such people's names and addresses; the issue is whether they are given to other parties.

Paul Goggins: I apologise if there has been some slight confusion. The judge will of course have such information; the question is how that information is then handled, and it certainly should not be made public. I hope that explanation helps the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock).
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome argued consistently in Committee and today for the offence of familial homicide to be extended to cover not only death but serious harm. The borderline between death and serious injury can of course sometimes be a narrow one.
	I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not feel that I am trying to string him along when I say that I would not want completely to rule out extending the offence at a later stage. At this stage, however, as we begin to put the new offence in place, there are major arguments in favour of restricting the offence to death.
	First, defining the term serious harm is not without potential difficulties, whereas death provides a clear and fairly unarguable parameter for the offence. Death is rightly dealt with more seriously than other injuries under our law, and the Law Commission's proposals acknowledge that. In cases involving children, it is possible to bring charges of child cruelty or neglect under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. I point out to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) that the offence includes neglect as well as positive action to bring about cruelty or harm. The more serious cases where death has occurred require a different charge and a stronger penalty.

Dominic Grieve: I appreciate the Minister's point. He refers to old and established law, but the fact is that the maximum penalty for that offence is entirely different from what we are imposing in respect of the new offence under the clause.

Paul Goggins: Indeed, and that reflects our concern about death and the fact that someone has taken an action that has resulted in someone's death. That requires the most severe penalties from the courts, which is why I argue that we need to have the more serious offence in place, without ruling out the possibility that we may eventually extend it, but not now. We need to get the new offence working in our legislative system.
	The problem of working out who committed the offence is less likely to be a problem where the victim has been injured but survived. The victim might be in a position to give evidence about who caused the injury. Other witnesses within the household might come forward to protect the victim from future harm. Both those arguments make for a different situation: the victim is still about, requiring and receiving the protection of others within the household.

David Heath: I hear what the Minister says about the review being ongoing and I note his willingness to return to the matter at a later stage. I gave the examples of a child who is rendered comatose or incapable of communication by an act of violence inflicted by one or two partners and of a baby who cannot give evidence in court. Would those partners be prosecutable under the offence as it stands? I have already argued that I believe that they should be.

Paul Goggins: I simply say to the hon. Gentleman that his examples are compelling, which is why I do not rule out extending the offence at some time in the future. It is important, first, to put in place the new offence. Let us get that right first and see how the provision operates. If appropriate, we may return to the problem at a later date.
	We agree about the need to protect the victims of domestic violence and we are sympathetic to the concerns that lie behind amendments Nos. 10 and 61, but it is important to be clear, as I tried to explain in Committee, that however dreadful the experience of being a victim of domestic violence, people are not absolved from the responsibility to do what they can to protect a child or vulnerable person who is depending on them for help.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister touches on an important issue. Under clause 5(1)(d)(ii), the accusation relates to the failure
	to take such steps as he reasonably could have been expected to take to protect
	the victim from risk. What is regarded as being reasonable in that context, and to what extent is reasonableness affected by the circumstances in which individuals find themselves? Surely the whole point of the amendment is to highlight that what is reasonable for a person who is suffering from domestic violence is likely to be different than for someone who is not.

Paul Goggins: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman highlights clause 5(1)(d)(ii), as I was just about to go on to precisely that provision. A person will not be guilty of an offence unless they have failed to take such steps as they could, in their circumstances, reasonably be expected to take to protect the victim from risk. It is for the court to determine what that means; it is not a matter for Parliament to rule out. That is the key point. Including the provision in the Bill means that the courts will be able to take serious domestic violence into account. In many cases, I am sure that the court will take those circumstances into account, but in the end it is for the court rather than the House to decide.
	The practical effect of the amendment would be seriously to undermine the reasonable steps test. It would make the offence less clear. Amendment No. 10, in particular, refers to someone who is
	in fear of being subjected to domestic violence,
	but that could apply to a very large number of defendants. Furthermore, there are other vulnerable groups: there may be children or vulnerable elderly relatives in the household, so why should they not also be excluded? The reasonable steps provision is the best way to deal with the problem, rather than excluding one particular group, however sympathetic we are to them.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar spoke about the links between domestic violence and sexual violence. She is right to draw our attention to that, and I hope that she is reassured that the Government understand the connection. We are trying, off the back of the sexual offences legislation that we passed last year, to drive through a series of policies and initiatives. My hon. and learned Friend will know that we are developing a network of sexual assault referral centres, far more than were in existence when we debated the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The first 4 million from the victims fund will go to organisations that work on behalf of the victims of sexual offences. I hope that she appreciatesI know she does, as I often speak to her about these mattershow much is being done to deal with the connections that she spoke about.
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome touched briefly on domestic homicide reviews and the particular case of children. He mentioned it briefly, so I shall respond briefly. Concern was expressed at some length in Committee and it is only right to put matters straight. The concern was that the deaths of children might not always be reviewed, especially when a child or family had not come into contact with social services before the injury or death.
	I wrote to members of the Committee on 13 July and I say again today that amendment No. 1 is unnecessary because any death of someone aged under 16 that met the criteria for a domestic homicide review would already have to be the subject of a serious case review. Indeed, Government guidance published in 1999, entitled Working Together to Safeguard Children, sets out the criteria for serious case reviews and makes it clear that agencies should always conduct a review where abuse and neglect are known or suspected to have been a factor in the death. That includes all cases where a family member has killed a child, even if there was no history of abuse and no contact with statutory agencies.

David Heath: I mentioned the issue briefly because I hoped that the Minister would be able to satisfy me entirely on it, and he now has. However, he has not entirely satisfied me about amendment No. 10 and I still intend to press it to a Division, if possible.

Paul Goggins: Whether a glass is half full or half empty is a judgment that I suppose we all need to make. My final point to the hon. Gentleman on this matter is that under the new arrangements envisaged under the Children Bill, all unexpected child deaths will be investigated by local screening teams and wherever it appears that abuse or neglect may have played a part in the death the case will be referred to the local safeguarding children board for a serious case review. The Government are therefore confident that all unexpected deaths will be checked and, if necessary, reviewed so that no cases can fall through the net.
	Finally, in connection with her amendment No. 64, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar spoke about the payment of grants to voluntary organisations supporting children who have suffered after witnessing the treatment of others. However, the purpose of clause 50, to which the amendment refers, is to provide statutory authority for regular Government grants to voluntary sector bodies, and that is consistent with Treasury best practice. The clause already provides that the Secretary of State may pay grants to any organisation that appears to him to assist victims, witnesses or other persons affected by offences. Children who have been affected by offences as set out in the amendment are definitely included in that definition, so it is unnecessary to mention them specifically on the face of the Bill. Of course, we will need to watch carefully and make sure that the right amount of money goes to the organisations involved.

Vera Baird: I am sorry to be slightly out of step, but my hon. Friend said that this was his final point and I want to take him back to the question of familial homicide. I am attracted to the idea of putting domestic violence on the face of the Bill because that would make all the parties in any case that might involve domestic violence aware that it is highly relevant. As a result, they will look for it. I appreciate that judges and juries will take domestic violence into account if its occurrence has been brought out into the open, as my hon. Friend said. However, as I noted earlier, women cannot talk about domestic violence or domestic sexual violence, except in very sympathetic circumstances. That is especially true in the aftermath of a trauma such as the death of a child, and such matters often do not come out in time for a trial.
	I do not expect my hon. Friend the Minister to have a solution to that problem now, but I want him to think about it, as I do, because it is a real concern.

Paul Goggins: I do indeed think about these matters, as they are very important. My point is simply that it may be very relevant that domestic violence has occurred, in which case the court will take that into account. In resisting these amendments, we are saying that such violence cannot be used as an excuse always and in every case. My hon. and learned Friend is referring to those vulnerable individuals who will need support whether they are victims or witnesses, and that opens up a broader discussion about the criminal justice system as a whole. We are getting better at supporting people but we need to improve that, so that people in court are able to deal with, and speak about, these matters.
	I just want to repeat my final point on the previous matter, which is that we will need to ensure that an appropriate amount of money goes to those organisations working with children.
	In summary, I hope that it has been evident from what I have said that I sympathise completely with the motives behind some of the amendments under discussion. However, much of what they seek to achieve will be achieved by the Bill, although some of the amendments go further than what we feel can be justified as necessary. Therefore, I ask that the amendments be withdrawn.

Hilton Dawson: This has been a good debate, and I am grateful for the support extended by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) and by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath).
	I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) supported new clauses 1 and 2. I know that he is an experienced and extremely learned practitioner in the courts, but I sometimes think that he is a little too sanguine about how well they operate. In response to his concerns about whether these amendments are necessary, I simply refer him to some of the statistics quoted by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar, and to the abuse experienced by women and children on contact visits. I also point to the number of contact orders made on schedule 1 offenders, and to the horrendous fact that there have been 28 child deaths in recent years.
	Reference was made to the question of false allegations. Public inquiries into child deaths over the years have made it clear that an undue emphasis on not being misled by false allegations can lead professionals and practitioners to ignore the very real facts about serious abuses.
	I am very sorry that my hon. Friend the Minister cannot accept new clauses 1 and 2. They are entirely in line with the Government's thinking and would only strengthen section 1 of the Children Act 1989. The paramount interest of children should always be served when courts make decisions about their future. The amendments would clarify those best interests and focus the efforts and attention of judges on them. They would make sure that judges were not swayed by the real pressures exerted by the well articulated and strongly expressed views of warring parents.
	My hon. Friend the Minister feels that the Government have enough in the way of powers to deal with the very serious problems that arise, but the evidence that I quoted comes direct from the Government and is more recent than the Committee stage of this Bill. The Government have acknowledged that guidelines have not worked completely effectively so far in ensuring that children are safeguarded in contact and domestic violence cases.
	Section 120 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 is a great improvement, but there is also a heavy reliance on guidelines. Given the serious facts of abuse, and the fact that children's experiences and voices are not heard properly and fully by the courts, I am not certain that my hon. Friend the Minister can be fully satisfied that the Government do not need the measures envisaged in new clauses 1 and 2. Those measures are not being urged on the Government only by hon. Members here today; the need for them has been made clear by organisations outside the House that have daily contact with people going through some of the most horrendous experiences that can be imagined.
	I will withdraw new clauses 1 and 2. There has been some discussion about my mathematical judgment in previous stages of the Bill's progress through the House, but I am well aware that I need to take into account forces outside the Chamber.

Dominic Grieve: I am the first to acknowledge that, in the context of the debate, the mathematical calculations are rather stacked against the hon. Gentleman unless he has Front-Bench support.

Hilton Dawson: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I appreciate what my hon. Friend the Minister said about serious case reviews, of which Opposition Members were so critical in Standing Committee. I am pleased that that has been resolved and that we have made some significant progress on the matter.
	The Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs is about to embark on an inquiry into the work of the family courts. I have no doubt that the question of children and vulnerable adults will come up again and that the Committee will have an opportunity to talk to ministerial colleagues and to the president of the family division of the High Court and her colleagues.
	In the hope that we are making some progress, and in the knowledge that progress will be very carefully scrutinised both in this House and outside it, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
	Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3
	  
	Amendments to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to extend the category of witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear or distress about testifying

'(1) Section 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (c.23) (witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear or distress about testifying) is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (4) insert
	(4A) Where the complainant in respect of proceedings relating to any form of molestation, including violence, involving a complainant, a cohabitant, a relevant child or associated persons, is a witness in such proceedings, the witness is eligible for assistance in relation to those proceedings by virtue of this subsection unless the witness has informed the court of the witness' wish not to be so eligible by virtue of this subsection.
	(4B) For the purposes of this subsection, 'cohabitant', 'relevant child' and 'associated persons' mean a person as defined by section 62 of the Family Law Act 1996 (c.27) (meaning of 'cohabitants', 'relevant child' and 'associated person') as amended by sections 2 and 3 of this Act..'.[Mr. Heath.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.

David Heath: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 8Photography of witnesses, etc, in court
	'(1) No person shall
	(a) take, or attempt to take, a photograph in a specified court of any person being a juror, witness in or party to any proceedings before the court, or
	(b) photograph, or attempt to photograph, any person in any court if the presiding judge has determined that it would not be in the interests of justice for any photograph to be taken; or
	(c) publish, transmit or broadcast any photograph taken in contravention of the foregoing provisions of this section.
	(2) Any person acting in contravention of this section shall, on summary conviction, be liable in respect of each offence to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.
	(3) For the purposes of this section
	(a) specified court means any magistrates' court, any other court in which criminal proceedings take place, or any other court which the Lord Chancellor may by order prescribe;
	(b) judge includes a lay judge, district judge, recorder, judge, registrar or coroner;
	(c) photograph includes any image whether still or moving made by any means whether photographic, electronic or otherwise;
	(d) a photograph shall be deemed to be a photograph taken in court if the subject of the photograph is in the courtroom or in the building or in the precincts of the building in which the court is held at the time that the photograph is taken.'.
	New clause 9Amendment to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to extend the category of witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear or distress about testifying
	'(1) Section 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows.
	(2) After subsection (1) insert
	(1B) For the purpose of this chapter an applicant in civil proceedings relating to domestic violence is eligible for assistance by virtue of this subsection if the Court is satisfied that the quality of evidence given by the applicant is likely to be diminished by reason of fear or distress on the part of the applicant in connection with testifying in the proceedings..'.
	Amendment No. 20, in schedule 11, page 86, line 7, at end insert
	
		
			  
			 'Criminal Justice Act 1925 (c.86) Section 41'.

David Heath: New clause 3 returns us to a matter that we discussed briefly in Committee, but I fear that the Government did not entirely satisfy me that the present arrangements are satisfactory. The new clause deals with the special arrangements that can be made for witnesses who are considered vulnerable or intimidated, such as giving evidence from behind screens or by TV links, which give those people some sense of security in giving their evidence before the courts and have often proved critical elements in determining whether they give evidence at all.
	The difficulty is that there is no automaticity in the arrangements, although they are becoming increasingly available. I give credit for that fact. Nevertheless, instead of those who make the original complaint being told, Don't worry. You will not have to face your abuser in court because we will ensure that special arrangement are made, the best that they can be told is that an application will be made for such arrangements. That will depend on the Crown Prosecution Service making the application, but the CPS does not necessarily act in the interests of the complainant or witness; it is acts in the state's interests in bringing a prosecution. There is a subtle difference between the two. The proposal in new clause 3 is simply that such automaticity should be put in place. Of course, if those arrangements are unnecessary, they will not be provided, but there should be certainty that the witness will receive that protection if it is necessary and on the request of the witness in those circumstances.
	At first sight, new clause 9 is similar, but it deals with complainants in domestic violence cases who make application through civil proceedings. Of course, under the Bill, we are widening the scope for civil proceedings, but it is curious that section 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 deals with a complainant in criminal proceedings but not with a complainant in civil proceedings. The person will come face to face with the same abusive partner or relative and have the same sense of distress, disquiet or intimidation. The measures under consideration in a civil court will be no less serious than those in the criminal court. It does not seem entirely logical that, in one case, special measures provisions are in place but not in the other. I ask the Minister seriously to consider whether new clause 9 would be a sensible extension of the present arrangements.
	New clause 8 and amendment No. 20 deal with a quite different matter. Some would argue that it is tangential to the purpose of the BillI freely accept that it isbut this is an opportunity for the House to consider for the first time a issue that was raised, to many people's astonishment, during the summer when the House was not sitting: filming or photography in court.
	Without any great prior notice to anyone, the Lord Chancellor announced that he was running an experiment for the filming of proceedings in the Court of Appeal and that he would make further proposals at a later stage. Many hon. Members were alarmed that that was done without a proper announcement in the House. Many of us were alarmed at the possible implications, and many of us felt that benefit would be derived from at least a debate on the circumstances. None of that happened, and it is not unreasonable to say that that is not uncommon in the case of either this Lord Chancellor or his predecessor, sadly.
	I have corresponded since then with the Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, the hon. Member for Shipley (Mr. Leslie), who is in his place, and his letter to me was extremely helpful in allaying some of my concerns. He said that it was not the intention under any circumstances to allow the broadcast of the filming that was to take place in the Court of Appeal and that the filming would only ever take place there. He said that he shared some of my concerns, which I shall explore in a little more depth in a moment, about the wider implications of filming in court. He also said that the Lord Chancellor intended to publish an exploratory paper, which would not include specific proposals but invite comment on the issue, and that they would carefully consider the arguments before taking any precipitate action. All that I applaud. I shall deal with my views on the subject in a moment.
	I was worried by one thing in the letter that I received from the Under-Secretary. During parliamentary questions on Tuesday 7 September, I questioned him specifically about the legal advice that underpinned the decision to allow filming in the Court of Appeal at all. I referred to section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, which, as hon. Members will recall, expressly prohibits the taking of any photograph or film not only in the court, but in its precincts. The part of the letter that gave me some cause for concern said:
	We have been advised that section 41 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, to which you referred, does not bind the Crown.
	What on earth are we doing making statutes about the arrangements for courts if they do not bind the courts in any way, even in the simplest terms, about that which is an expressed prohibition. That seems to be nonsense. I question that interpretation, although I accept that almost certainly someone will show that Crown immunity takes precedence over anything that the House chooses to do, but I regret that; it is extraordinary in the circumstances.
	Let us be clear about what the 1925 Act does. It expressly prohibits the taking of any photograph or the making of any image of people who are in the court or its precincts. However, we are told that, if one happens to be the Lord Chancellor, one can give permission for that to take place. That is wrong, and it invites all sorts of questions. Why do I think that it is specifically wrong in the case of photography in court? First, there is a very real risk that potential witnesses, victims or jurors will not come forward to appear in court if they believe that they will be photographed or filmed doing so. Secondly, court proceedings are not an entertainment. I have seen in other jurisdictions that allow filming in court a trivialisation of court proceedings, which is wholly detrimental to the process of justice.
	I understand the arguments made on the other side of the coin that, somehow, filming in court will increase the understanding of court procedures, but I do not think that it would. What appears on the television screen in those jurisdictions that allow the filming of criminal proceedings is not the laborious work of cross-examination and finding facts, but the point at which the victim breaks down or the defendant says, Gaw, luvvie, I did it. That is the entertainment value of court television; that is what appears on the news broadcasts, but that does not nothing to increase the awareness of how the judicial process worksrather it does the reverse: it suggests that such things are the matters of a moment and that they are dramatic in content, which, I am afraid to say, careful court work is not.

Elfyn Llwyd: Some months ago, we discussed what the Government perceived as a rash of cases of jury nobbling. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that bringing television into the arena would make that problem 10 times worse?

David Heath: I am convinced that that would happen. I understand the argument that it might be appropriate to film judges delivering their judgments, if they agreed to that, because that could be educational or of interest to people. However, it would not be in the interest of justice for witnesses, jurors or defendants to be filmed. It would not be in the interest of justice to film a criminal trial, a hearing in a coroner's court or proceedings in family or youth courts. Filming civil proceedings would rarely be in the interest of justice.
	My proposal is an imperfect redrawing of the provisions of the 1925 Act. I do not intend to press my formulation to a Division, so I hope that the Minister will not spend time raising objections to the specific wordingI simply wanted to encourage debate. It is time for us to consider the matter again, although I am convinced that, by and large, the circumstances that presently apply are in the interest of justice in this country.
	It is interesting that the provisions of the 1925 Act have already started to erode. It is not uncommon for people going in and coming out of courts to be filmed. Indeed, a television crew is almost always positioned on the steps of the royal courts of justice. Such crews are in clear breach of section 41 of the 1925 Act because that specifies that people shall not be filmed going in or out of court. I invite the Minister to give his opinion on whether such actions might be a blatant breach of the law as it stands. More importantly, however, I urge him to assure the House that if he proceeds with the experiment any further, he will bring his proposal before the House so that it can be subjected to proper examination and we can decide whether we want extant statute law overturned for the purposes of a prurient and over-demanding television industry.

Vera Baird: I confess that I would be horrified by the prospect of cameras no longer being able to set up outside the royal courts of justice. A major part of most senior QCs' public relations strategies is to cut an appropriate dash while walking along, with hair and bands flowing in the wind, so as to look like no one in the world would dare defy them. What is the world coming to if that is to be stopped?
	On a more serious note, may I address the proposal in new clause 3 to extend the automatic application of special measures to victims of domestic violence because there is a lot in that argument? As the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) knows, section 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 contains two categories of vulnerable and intimidated victims for whom special measures are available: first, those who get special measures automatically, which includes victims of sexual assault and rape; and, secondly, those who get them only at a judge's discretion. Although I use the word only, the measures for such people are valuable. Domestic violence victims currently fall into the second category.
	As the hon. Gentleman said, the current arrangements allow evidence to be given through a television link or from behind a screen. Arrangements can be made whereby barristers remove their wigs and gowns so that they look less intimidating, although I am sure that curbs must be applied on that. The serious measures that have been made available are valuable and proven as being able to improve the quality of evidence put before the courts.
	The reason behind the measures is the sensitive nature of the evidence that is likely to be given, especially in sexual assault cases. As I have saidI think that this is pretty widely accepteddomestic violence is almost always accompanied by sexual abuse or sexual violence of one sort or another. Evidence in such cases is sensitive and difficult to obtain, so complainants probably always need the protection of such measures. The situation is even more sensitive in a domestic violence case because a complainant will inevitably be giving evidence against a person with whom she has had a personal and intimate relationship, which makes the process more difficult for her.
	The Home Office review on sexual offences called Speaking up for Justice was a successful pre-legislative consideration of policies that was much praised. It expected that domestic violence complainants would be placed in the category of people who automatically received the measures. Safety and Justice, the consultative document underpinning the Bill, raised the question of whether section 17 of the 1999 Act provided the right level of support for all vulnerable victims. A fairly powerful answer to that was received from Home Office research done through the Women's National Commission. The research said that section 17 did not give the right level of support, especially to domestic violence victims. It said that they should go into the automatic category. Two bodies of work that the Government undertook to examine the matter concluded that automatic protection should be available for domestic violence victims.
	If a domestic violence victim who does not receive the measures automatically is to receive the protection that she needs, she depends on the alertness of a police officer to the availability of the measures and her need for them. She also requires a representative of the Crown Prosecution Service who is properly trained in the availability of the measures and ready to understand when they are needed. Of course, the discretion of a judge is required in the end. The most significant problem that exists if automatic protection is not available is that a person cannot be given a guarantee in advance of going to court that she will be protected by special measures. Everyone knows how difficult it can be to get complainants in domestic violence cases to come to court at all. Conviction rates are extremely low, and most of the drop-out occurs between the time at which the domestic violence occurs and the time at which the case reaches the door of the court. It could only be helpful if a woman who was unsure about her courage and confidence to go through with the process could be guaranteed by a police officer at the outset that she would not have to give evidence in the presence of the perpetrator if she did not want to do so. She would thus know that she would not have to look him full in the face and face the prospect of him doing everything possible to intimidate her.
	New clause 3 would protect domestic violence complainants in not only criminal cases, but civil cases. Civil cases are usually conducted in private. They are usually held in smaller courts than those used for criminal cases and fewer people tend to be present. The relative intimacy of the environment is likely to make the experience more intimidating for a woman who has suffered domestic violence or sexual abuse because the person against whom there is a complaint would be sitting within a few yards of her. Anything that could be done to help such a woman would be every bit as valuable as a measure in the criminal context. I urge the Minister to think carefully about whether it is time to reconsider the provision and extend its ambit. Its purpose is to protect vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, which it has been proven to do. This category of people needs to be within its protection.
	A case was drawn to my attention by my local domestic violence advocacy set-up. There were serious allegations of domestic violence between a husband and wife. The husband came to court without representatives and sought the judge's leave, which was granted, to cross-examine her on the claims of domestic violence and sexual abuse. We turned our backs on that practice in the criminal courts in 1999 by stopping defendants in rape cases from cross-examining their victims.
	This situation is another manifestation of the same problem. It is probably the case that it should not be allowed either. Now that the penny has dropped with the authorities far and wide that domestic violence and sexual abuse are part and parcel of the same syndrome in 99 per cent. of cases, we have to consider whether we should prevent someone in a case in which domestic violence is a hot issue in the family context from cross-examining. What happens is that the individual is taken through the incidents in detail and is made to relive them face to face with the perpetrator in a public forum. The court simply goes along with it, and in the context of the civil case it has no choice but to do so. That problem needs specific consideration and is another reason why at least special measures should be available to protect someone in that situation. I commend the new clauses to the Minister.

Elfyn Llwyd: I agree entirely with the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) and the purport of the new clauses. Like her, I have had many experiences of domestic violence in the criminal and civil courts. Her point about civil proceedings being just as bad if not worse than the criminal forum is right. They may well be held in private, but they are usually held in more confined courts with a judge considering a non-molestation order or an ouster order. The issues are the same, involving violence and a vulnerable witness who has to retell a horrible incident in her life. It is important that we do everything we can to make it possible for that person to give her evidence as comfortably as possible. After all is said and done, we fail her and the process, and undermine the idea of justice, if we do not do that.
	The new clauses on the criminal courts and the civil courts are right. I hope that the Minister will carefully consider our points. The original special provisions of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 were introduced because youths are often vulnerable. By definition, a person who is subjected to domestic violence is in the most vulnerable category of all.
	On automaticity, I take it that that would apply unless the complainant said otherwise. That is the right way to proceed. The automatic rule should not always be applied. Indeed, applying it would, perhaps, undermine the importance of the measure in a circuitous way. Judges will be able to weigh up whether that is right or wrong in due course.
	The debate is useful. From my personal experience, I can say that the new clauses have much to commend them. From a practitioner's point of view, people are often afraid to come forward and when they do, on the morning of the court, they decline to give evidence. That is fully understandable because of the nature of the proceedings. I am not criticising complainants, but it is a huge waste of everyone's time, including the courts and lawyers, and it is a build up of pressure for that poor complainant who, at the last minute, falls back and says that she cannot go through with it. If it is known from the beginning that the provision can be obtained and that the complainant will not face, in a small enclosed room, the person who has abused her, that will go a considerable way towards enabling people with complaints to come forward and to give the evidence as it should be heard by the judge and as the court should decide on it.
	The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) mentioned cameras in the courts, which he described as a tangential point. They are not a good idea for numerous reasons, including jury nobbling, as I said in my intervention on the hon. and learned Member for Redcar. In all honesty, however, and with regard to the Home Secretary, I do not think that there is anything wrong with the Court of Appeal. There is no question of nobbling the Court of Appeal. It has a high standard of judiciary on every benchI must be careful of what I saybut we are dealing with people who routinely make the law in the changes that they make. From the point of view of a practitioner, a student and public access, I do not envisage a great objection to a pilot in the Court of Appeal, but to extend it beyond that forum would be a grave mistake for many reasons, many of which are not pertinent to today's debate.

Christopher Leslie: There are two parts to the group of amendments. The first concerns protecting complainants in domestic violence cases. The second involves photography or television in court proceedings. New clause 3 is about automaticity of special measures in all domestic violence cases and new clause 9 deals specifically with civil proceedings and the use of special measures.
	It is worth noting that special measures to protect vulnerable or intimidated witnesses were introduced by the Government in the 1999 Act. We made the improvements to encourage witnesses to come forward and overcome some of the barriers to giving evidence. Those special measures include screens to ensure that witnesses do not see the defendant and vice versa and the use of a live television link to the court room, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) said. In some circumstances, they involve clearing the court so that evidence can be given in private, allowing the removal of wigs and gownswhich some people find intimidatingand the use of intermediaries to help the witness to communicate with her legal team and the court, especially if there are language difficulties. The measures often include the recording of video evidencethe evidence-in-chiefof a witness. In fact, the main bulk can be pre-recorded and presented to the court. That range of aids, known collectively as special measures, are relatively new. They are beginning to work well and are proving popular in some courts.
	It is true that there are different categories of offences for the application of special measures. Unless the complainant opts out, there is automatic access to them in cases of alleged sexual offences, but given the special and sensitive nature of sexual offence allegations, which merit automatic availability of special measures, the law has been framed to make the distinction between automaticity for those cases and the ability to apply, and often be granted, special measures in other cases. Although we can all understand why that automatic arrangement exists in sexual offences cases, it may well not suit a variety of other cases to have an automatic arrangement, not least if a witness wants to face up to their perpetrator. I accept that that is not common in domestic violence cases, but it can be in other cases.
	I am cautious about the new clauses because we are still in the early days of rolling out the special measures. Good work is under way, but some courts are still feeling their way forward. We should not underestimate, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) will appreciate, the significant change in culture that is taking place in many courts, but it is right that that should proceed. More work is under way on the no witness, no justice initiative, to ensure that there is a comprehensive approach to meeting witness needs.

Vera Baird: My hon. Friend spoke about a situation in which a victim might want to confront the perpetrator. Under the 1999 Act, as the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) said, that option is automatically available, but if he or she does not want it they can choose to opt out. The point is that it should be guaranteed to people who do want it.

Christopher Leslie: I accept that there are good arguments for the extension of special measures and the streamlining of the process that triggers them. My right hon. and noble Friend the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs suggested, for example, that there are good grounds for extending to civil courts, particularly in antisocial behaviour cases, the availability of special measures. There is a discussion in the legal community and in government about how we can extend certain provisions and make them easier to access. However, we must strike the right balance and recognise that, traditionally, many cases are heard in public. The first priority, of course, is that justice should be done, but the second is that it should be seen to be done. However, we should not throw away lightly the principle of allowing justice to be done, at least partly, in the public arena. It is important to evaluate properly the roll-out of special measures.

Elfyn Llwyd: I do not follow the Minister's argument. Special measures for witnesses would not result in the hearing being held in camera. It would be held in public, but the witness, typically a woman, would be protected from the perpetrator of violence. Nobody is arguing that proceedings should be in camerathey should be held in publicbut there should be protection for witnesses.

Christopher Leslie: That is certainly true of many special measures but, as I said, clearing the court and public gallery to hold a hearing in private is one option in the special measures arsenal available to the judge and the court. We should be careful not to adopt a blanket approach to special measures, and must make sure that we have the right combination available for every case. As I said, we should evaluate carefully, but fairly quickly, what works best in which situations. Members on both sides of the House probably agree that we need to find ways of making victims and witnesses come forward and give evidence. Providing assurances at the outset is one method of doing so, but I beg hon. Members' indulgence as we need to look at an array of issues, including the use of video evidence versus recorded evidence. We must shift the balance in favour of victims and witnesses, but we must make sure that we get that right in relation to the legislation.
	New clause 9 deals with civil proceedings, especially family cases. In those circumstances, I accept that victims of domestic violence can be fearful and feel intimidated in court. Most cases heard in the civil courts do not involve allegations of domestic violence. Alleged perpetrators are generally not on trial, and a finding against them does not usually lead to punishments such as a fine or imprisonment. The main witness, usually the victim, is already known to them.

David Heath: To clarify an arcane point, under the Bill a criminal court will act as a civil court in making a restraining order following acquittal or conviction. However, will special measures available to witnesses in criminal court proceedings still be available in civil court proceedings?

Christopher Leslie: My understanding of the differences between the civil and criminal court is uneducated, but my answer is yes. The criminal court does not stop being a criminal court when it hears those cases. It will simply hear evidence admissible under civil proceedings.
	The proposals in clause 1 to criminalise the breach of non-molestation orders mean that one of the most contentious and confrontational hearings in family courts can now be dealt with in the criminal court, where special measures will be available. Judges in the family court already have wide powers in cases in which they decide a victim is vulnerable or intimidated, for instance children or victims of domestic violence, and can take action to assist them in giving evidence. Such cases are usually heard in private, and wigs and gowns are not worn. Where civil and criminal courts share premises it is much easier for the technology needed for special measures, such as a video link arrangement, to be shared. A small number of courts, however, do not yet have that technology, and we are trying our best, not least through Her Majesty's Court Service, to extend those facilities as best we can. Generally, we are making progress and there are provisions in the civil and family courts to enable supported evidence to be given.
	Amendment No. 20 and new clause 8 deal with other matters. New clause 8 would replace the blanket prohibition on photography in court with a prohibition on the photographing of jurors, witnesses and parties to the case, but there would be discretion to photograph judges and lawyers. That provokes an interesting debate, so I welcome the tabling of the provision. On 29 August, the Secretary of State announced that the Government would shortly publish a consultation document on broadcasting court proceedings. There are no proposals to change existing legislation, but there will be a thorough examination, not least in the light of relatively recent developments such as the televising of Parliament, of the pros and cons of relaxing the blanket restrictions on broadcasting in the courts.
	Since 1990, the House of Lords Appellate Committee judgments have been televised because they have taken place in the Chamber of the other place. If, however, through the constitutional reform programme we create a new separate supreme court, we need to think about how its judgments would be broadcast. We know that public confidence is aided when the justice system operates in the public arena and there are arguments in favour of a substantial degree of public access, but as I said, justice must be done and be seen to be done. That is not a sequential process; there is a priority order. Justice being done comes first, and we would not support anything that could deter witnesses or victims from coming forward and giving evidence. As hon. Members suggested, if it was thought that a television camera might be filming sensitive moments, I can easily imagine that might be the case.
	That is why the Secretary of State said that he did not consider that appropriate. However, there may be other forums, as has been saidthe Appeal Court, for instancewhich do not usually have evidence in chief and where it might be appropriate to experiment. We are piloting in private, not to be broadcast, a scheme with the royal courts of justice, which will be strictly limited and controlled, in the circumstances that I set out to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome.
	I hope that I have covered the full breadth of the amendments and new clauses and that the hon. Gentleman will seek leave to withdraw them.

David Heath: I am grateful for the Minister's comments. He has not entirely satisfied me, but I do not intend to press the new clause. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
	Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 6
	  
	Duration of occupation orders

'(1) In Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 (c.27) (family homes and domestic violence), for section 35(10) (one former spouse with no existing right to occupy) substitute
	(10) An order under this section shall be limited so as to have effect for a specified period of six months, but may be extended on two occasions for a further period of six months unless an application is made to discharge the order.
	(2) For section 36(10) (one cohabitant or former cohabitant with no existing right to occupy) substitute
	(10) An order under this section shall be limited so as to have effect for a specified period of six months, but may be extended on two occasions for a further period of six months unless an application is made to discharge the order.
	(3) For section 37(5) (neither spouse entitled to occupy) substitute
	(5) An order under this section shall be limited so as to have effect for a specified period of six months, but may be extended on two occasions for a further period of six months unless an application is made to discharge the order.
	(4) For section 38(6) (neither cohabitant or former cohabitant entitled to occupy) substitute
	(6) An order under this section shall be limited so as to have effect for a specified period of six months, but may be extended on two occasions for a further period of six months unless an application is made to discharge the order..'.[Mr. Heath.]
	Brought up, and read the First time.

David Heath: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 17Domestic Violence Advocacy Service (No.1)
	'(1) In this section, Voluntary organisation means a charity or an organisation operating on a not-for-profit basis.
	(2) The Secretary of State shall establish, maintain and develop a national service known as the Domestic Violence Advocacy Service for the purpose of promoting the availability to victims of services of the descriptions specified in subsection (3) and, in particular, for securing (within the resources made available, and priorities set, in accordance with subsection (6)) that victims have access to services that effectively meet their needs.
	(3) The descriptions of services referred to in subsection (1) are
	(a) the provision of help in developing and implementing a plan for ensuring the safety of the victim and the safety of the children of the victim as a priority,
	(b) the provision of general information, relevant to the victim, about the law and legal system and the availability of legal services,
	(c) the provision of help by the giving of advice as to how the law applies in the particular circumstances of the victim,
	(d) the provision of advice as to the availability to the victim of relevant support services offered by other agencies,
	(e) the provision of assistance in accessing services relevant to the victim that are offered by other agencies,
	(f) the provision of help in relation to legal proceedings, whether in the family, criminal or civil courts.
	(4) The services of the descriptions specified in subsection (3) shall be accessible to victims at any hour and on any day and shall be provided by persons of the same sex as the victim where requested by the victim.
	(5) The Secretary of State shall establish and maintain a fund known as the Domestic Violence Advocacy Service Fund from which services of the descriptions specified in subsection (3) shall be funded as part of the Domestic Violence Advocacy Service.
	(6) The Secretary of State shall prepare a code setting out the criteria according to which he will decide how to fund services as part of the Domestic Violence Advocacy Service.
	(7) When preparing the code referred to in subsection (6) the Secretary of State shall consult all relevant bodies (and, in particular, voluntary organisations) who are able to communicate the views of victims of domestic violence.
	(8) The Secretary of State may accredit, or authorise others to accredit, voluntary organisations providing services of the descriptions specified in subsection (3); and any system of accreditation shall include provision for the monitoring of the services provided by accredited organisations and for the withdrawal of accreditation from any providing services of unsatisfactory quality.
	(9) The Secretary of State may fund services as part of the Domestic Violence Advocacy Service by
	(a) entering into contracts with voluntary organisations for the provision of services by them,
	(b) making payments to voluntary organisations in respect of the provision of services by them,
	(c) making grants or loans to voluntary organisations to enable them to provide, or facilitate the provision of, services,
	(d) establishing and maintaining voluntary organisations to provide, or facilitate the provision of, services,
	(e) making grants or loans to individuals to enable them to obtain services,
	(f) doing anything else which he considers appropriate for funding services.
	(10) The Secretary of State may by order require accredited bodies providing services of the descriptions specified in subsection (3) to discharge those services in accordance with the order.'.
	New clause 23Domestic Violence Advocacy Service (No.2)
	'(1) The Secretary of State shall establish, maintain and develop a national service to be known as the Domestic Violence Advocacy Service to promote the availability of the services specified in subsection (2) to victims of domestic violence.
	(2) The services referred to in subsection (1) are
	(a) the provision of help in developing and implementing a plan for ensuring the safety of the victim and the safety of the children of the victim as a priority;
	(b) the provision of general information, relevant to the victim, about the law and legal system and the availability of legal services;
	(c) the provision of help by the giving of advice as to how the law applies in the particular circumstances of the victim;
	(d) the provision of information as to the availability to the victim of relevant support services offered by other agencies;
	(e) the provision of assistance in accessing services relevant to the victim that are offered by other agencies;
	(f) the provision of help in relation to legal proceedings, whether in the family, criminal or civil courts;
	(g) the provision of assistance and training to support the early identification of domestic violence in high risk groups.
	(3) The Secretary of State may fund services as part of the Domestic Violence Advocacy Service by
	(a) entering into contracts with voluntary organisations for the provision of services by them,
	(b) making payments to voluntary organisations in respect of the provision of services by them,
	(c) making grants or loans to voluntary organisations to enable them to provide, or facilitate the provision of, services,
	(d) establishing and maintaining voluntary organisations to provide, or facilitate the provision of, services,
	(e) making grants or loans to individuals to enable them to obtain services,
	(f) doing anything else which he considers appropriate for funding services.
	(4) The Secretary of State may by order amend subsections (2) and (3).
	(5) In this section
	voluntary organisation means a charity or an organisation operating on a not-for-profit basis;
	domestic violence means, violence against a person committed by a cohabitant, relative or member of the same household.
	(6) For the purposes of subsection (7)
	(a) violence means
	(i) physical abuse;
	(ii) sexual abuse;
	(iii) psychological or emotional abuse, including, but not limited to
	(a) intimidation;
	(b) harassment;
	(c) damage to property;
	(d) threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological abuse; or
	(e) threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological abuse against a dependant;
	(b) cohabitant and relative have the same meaning as in section 62 of the Family Law Act 1996;
	(c) member of a particular household has the same meaning as in section 5 of this Act.'.
	Amendment No. 17, in
	It being two and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings, Mr. Deputy Speaker put the remaining Questions required to be put at that hour, pursuant to Order [this day].
	Amendment proposed: No. 10, in page 3, line 17 [Clause 5], at end insert
	'( ) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d)(ii), in determining the reasonableness of the steps which D could have been expected to take, the court shall have particular regard to the extent to which D has been subjected to domestic violence or is in fear of being subjected to domestic violence.'.[Mr. Heath.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:
	The House divided: Ayes 176, Noes 297.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 12
	  
	Restraining orders: England and Wales

Amendments made: No. 26, in page 7, line 18, at end insert
	'( ) After subsection (3) of that section insert
	(3A) In proceedings under this section both the prosecution and the defence may lead, as further evidence, any evidence that would be admissible in proceedings for an injunction under section 3.'.
	No. 27, in page 7, leave out lines 31 to 33. [Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 13
	  
	Restraining orders: Northern Ireland

Amendments made: No. 28, in page 8, line 12, at end insert
	'( ) After subsection (3) of that section insert
	(3A) In proceedings under this Article both the prosecution and the defence may lead, as further evidence, any evidence that would be admissible in proceedings for an injunction under Article 5.'.
	No. 29, in page 8, leave out lines 25 to 27. [Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 16
	  
	Higher fixed penalty for repeated road traffic offences

Cheryl Gillan: I beg to move amendment No. 65, in page 10, line 22, leave out clause 16.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 11, in page 10, line 29, leave out from 'driving' to end of line 31.

Cheryl Gillan: On 14 June, the House gave the Bill a Second Reading. All hon. Members who were present witnessed an amazing act of magic performed by Home Secretary. He had come under much fire for his proposals to surcharge speeding motorists and was under some pressure when he rose in the Chamber. He sought to deflect anger by making specific statements in his opening speech on Second Reading, when he said:
	we accept that it would be wrong for low-level first-time offences to be subject to a surcharge. Helpfully, the Department for Transport will shortly consult on changes in the points system for fixed penalty notices. The new system will be introduced in 2006, which is when we will consider introducing a levy of 10 on fixed penalty notices for serious repeat offenders, as opposed to general fixed penalty notices.[Official Report, 14 June 2004; Vol. 422, c. 540.]
	That allayed the many fears of those inside and outside Parliament.
	Indeed, so well did the Home Secretary camouflage his intentions and succeed in creating a smoke screen, that the trick that he performed on us led even the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) to praise him for ensuring that muggers, not motorists would pay for the support of victims.

David Heath: I wish to confess that I made a grave error of judgment. I took the Home Secretary at his word and believed him when he said that he would deal with serious, persistent offenders, not people who go through two speed cameras at 33 mph.

Cheryl Gillan: I am afraid that we all fell for the trick. Even outside organisations genuinely believed that the Home Secretary had almost dropped his proposals to prey on the motorist.
	When the measure reached Committee, however, we discovered the Government's genuine proposals and their definition of a serious and persistent offender. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is right: a serious and persistent offender turned out to be someone who was caught by a speed camera not once, but twice; not three or four times, but twice. Such a person constitutes a persistent and serious offender. It became obvious, despite the Under-Secretary's charm, that the attempt to impose yet another stealth tax on the motorist was alive, well and progressing. That is because the Government intend that every motorist who gets caught speeding more than oncethat is, twice or more

Chris Bryant: Duh!

Cheryl Gillan: Well, I need to spell this out. Twice constitutes persistence. Every such motorist will have to pay a surcharge of 5. So a persistent and serious offender is someone who is snapped by a speed camera doing a couple of miles per hour over the speed limit twice. Well, in my book, twice does not mean persistence. We need to be very careful before we label this type of offender serious, when the issue is put into a wider context. Driving at 100 mph in a 40 mph zone is serious, but the word should not be used to describe the driver who slips over the limit unintentionally.
	Indeed, one of the problems that this issue raises was thrown up in the Home Office's own consultation, from which I would like to quote, as it is a matter of public record.

Chris Bryant: I think that the hon. Lady has just said that she wants to introduce a new test of intentionality into this issuein other words, that she wants to test whether someone has unintentionally gone over the speed limit. How would she adjudicate such matters?

Cheryl Gillan: That is absolutely not what I said. I have no intention of introducing a test. I am asking the Minister to wipe this proposal out of the Bill and to stop preying on the motorist. The hon. Gentleman is completely wrong in his assumption.
	Let me turn to Mr. Holdsworth, who wrote to the Minister:
	My 80-year-old mother who had an excellent driving record with no convictions in over 50 years of motoring now has three points on her licence for going over the limit on a main road at 11 o'clock at night nowhere near a school by 5 mph. Does that make her a criminal who should contribute to criminal convictions? After the stress on her of dealing with this fine (for example, having her in tears for several hours) I think that it is the Government that should be paying into a victims fund to contribute to the criminal extraction of money from her.
	He happens to add:
	After voting Labour all my life . . . I'm finally going to vote Conservative next time.
	Hypothetically, if that lady did that again, she would be branded a persistent and serious offender by the Government.

Douglas Hogg: I concede at once that I do not have the hinterland in this matter that my hon. Friend has. Would she be good enough to say where in the Bill we can find any statement on the level of the charge? She will also be aware that it will be raised by the negative procedure, which means that the House will never actually vote on the impost to be levied.

Cheryl Gillan: My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. There is some doubt as to whether the charge will be 10, as referred to by the Home Secretary on Second Reading, or 5, as referred to by the Minister in Committee. I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify this, otherwise the House will have no knowledge of this matter and no say on it at this stage, which would be very serious.
	The Home Secretary has referred to a consultation being carried out by the Department for Transport later in the year. We have had to wait a long time for that consultation to emerge. In fact, it emerged on 1 September this year, when the Transport Secretary announced that he was going to consult on a fairer system of penalties for motorists caught speeding. The implication of that is that the existing system is unfair and needs to be put right.
	In that consultation, there is reference to a lower penalty of two points and a 40 fine. That is not applicable if someone exceeds the 20 mph speed limit but drives at under 31 mph, but it is applicable in relation to other speed limits. For example, someone who is caught driving at 39 mph in a 30 mph zone will attract a penalty of two points and a 40 fine. Someone travelling at between 40 and 44 mph in such a zone would get three points and a 60 fine, and if they were doing 45 mph, they would get six points and 100 fine. Ironically, they would get only two points if they were travelling at 72 mph in a 60 mph zone. That has to be looked at very carefully. It is obvious from the consultation that someone who had had four points put on their licence twice, at the lower end of the limit, could attract the surchargethe stealth taxthat the Government are intent on putting on motorists. So I hope that the Minister will tell us that he was consulted before the matter was put out for consultation, that there has been joined-up thinking between the Home Office and the Department for Transport, and that there is no intention to lower the fines on speeding offenders to hide the surcharge, in order to pretend that the Government are not being so hard on the motorist.
	In Committee, we tried hard to dissuade the Minister from pursuing this measure, but absolutely to no avail. My hon. Friends and other members of the Committee deployed some very good arguments, but at the time we did not have the advantage of seeing the papers that were sent in to the Department during the consultation. I did challenge the Minister in Committee to produce the results of the consultation, and he did so. They have been extremely enlightening and I thank him for them. If he will not listen to Members of the House on this proposal, will he first listen to the AA Motoring Trust?

Douglas Hogg: Will my hon. Friend also make the point that the Minister should only listen to relevant Members of the House? She will observe that this clause applies to England and Wales only. Would it not be inappropriate to listen to Members who represent Scottish constituencies?

Cheryl Gillan: My right hon. and learned Friend is tempting me down the road, and I will follow him down it.

Stephen Pound: Not at speed, I hope.

Cheryl Gillan: I will take it at my own steady pace, thank you very much, and I will not take it at speed, but I agree entirely with my right hon. and learned Friend. The Minister should only be consulting England and Wales Members, as they represent the people to whom the legislation will apply.
	I return to the AA Motoring Trust. It wrote to the consultation co-ordinator of the performance and delivery unit at the Home Officeif that is not a contradiction in termsto say:
	However, there is one area which we would strongly opposethe proposal to impose a 5 surcharge on the fixed penalty system for motoring offences. The AA Trust considers the proposal to impose this surcharge to be ill conceived and bordering on the inept.
	I am not sure which part of
	ill conceived and bordering on the inept
	the Minister would not understand. I think that the AA Motoring Trust, although I admit that it may be seen to have a vested interest, has made a very strong point.
	Let us consider other consultees who do not necessarily have a vested interest. The Association of British Insurers wrote:
	ABI does not support the use of a surcharge.
	Funding for improved support for victims of crime should be provided by the perpetrators of those crimes. More stringent and efficient collection of fines already imposed by the criminal justice system, along with the money collected from orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, could raise significant funding for improved victim support and compensation, without the need to impose a surcharge.
	Motorists already contribute to victims of crime by way of the Motor Insurers' Bureau (MIB). The MIB was set up by insurers in 1946 to compensate the victims of uninsured and 'hit and run' motorists. The increased policy costs to cover the provision of compensation to victims of uninsured drivers is estimated to be up to an additional 30 on each policy. Adding a surcharge to fines for offences such as speeding would be a further burden on those motorists who meet their statutory insurance obligations, representing a double charge.
	Perhaps the Minister will say to me that the Association of British Insurers has a vested interest, but let us look at what the Devon and Cornwall police said to the Minister.
	A surcharge on FPNs
	fixed penalty notices
	for excess speed offences will only serve to cause even greater alienation of the motoring public from the police. The present system under netting off has created unexpected levels of media interest and huge volumes of correspondence from the public.
	So the Devon and Cornwall police are not exactly keen on the proposal of the Minister and the Home Secretary.
	Another police force, the Greater Manchester police, also came up with some valid points. It said to the Minister:
	The idea of using fixed penalty tickets to raise funds is severely flawed, especially where the use of the Road Traffic Act, GATSO and other camera detection methods are used.
	It continued:
	At the moment only 60 per cent. of the tickets issued by these means are paid. The 40 per cent. of the tickets that are not paid, and the moneys that are not recovered from those tickets, are from vehicles that are not registered to anyone, stolen cars, cars on false number plates, cars that are used by the criminal element in society.
	The 60 per cent. that are paid are therefore paid by the more responsible and 'law-abiding' persons in society. This means therefore that the offenders in society will not be contributing to the fund, but it is another form of taxation on the motorist.
	I remind you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that those are the comments of the Greater Manchester police. It continued:
	The popularity of these 'Speed Cameras and GATSO cameras' is low, and they are already seen as a money spinner for central government. To impose an extra 5 penalty to fund victims would not be a popular move. What happens to the funds that are raised from these cameras at present, and why cannot a proportion of the existing fine be diverted to the Victim Fund? This would provide funds without further alienating the motorist.
	I could not have put it better myself. I hope that the Minister will answer Greater Manchester police and explain why a proportion of the existing fine cannot be diverted, if that is the way that he wants to go. As the Greater Manchester police says, it is mostly the law-abiding public and responsible members of society who will face that charge.

Elfyn Llwyd: I agree with what the hon. Lady says. There is a strange kind of logic about penalising a repeat offender the second time for the same offence, and in this instance, an unthinking logic, if I may put it that way. The person who is convicted twice has six points, three times, nine points, and so on. Therefore, such a person will be under pressure, and should realise that they are getting nearer disqualification each time. I speak as one who has a point-laden licence, I confess, so I speak from some experience. Therefore, the extra 5 is not neededit is, as Arthur Daley would say, a nice little earner and nothing else.

Cheryl Gillan: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. I agree entirely that there is a strange kind of logic to the proposal, and I commiserate with him.
	There are two other responses to the consultation that the House should hear about and that the Minister should address. The first of those is from the Police Federation, which started off quite generously, as I think that the Minister will agree:
	We wholeheartedly endorse the proposals to add a surcharge on those who have been convicted of criminal offences or those who receive a penalty notice, fine or imprisonment for disorder.
	So far so good. It then said:
	We cannot however support in any way surcharges on fixed penalty notices for Road Traffic Offences. We are aware of the research into other similar schemes in other countries across the world, and the apparent success of those schemes in raising revenue for victim assistance. However, we are firmly of the opinion that surcharges on fixed penalties for traffic offences would cause an unwelcome backlash from the general public that would considerably damage the relationship between the police service and the communities they serve.
	There we have it. That is the Police Federation speaking on behalf of all the police throughout this country. It thinks that the Government's proposals to surcharge the motorist will damage the relationship between the police and the public. The Minister ought to take that seriously.
	The last response to the consultation that I want to read out is from the Magistrates Association, which represents the people who sit on the bench, who are at the sharp end and who must deal with these offenders. It said:
	A surcharge on fixed penalty notices for motoring offences would be seen by many motorists as a further hidden tax on motorists and added to the argument on the use of more speed cameras as tax collection. This would draw the courts into the argument with the real potential of a loss of credibility and liable to the charge of courts being used as tax collectors. This should be avoided.
	Any reasonable person can see from all those submissions to the consultation that we should drop this part of the Bill. Therefore, I hope to be allowed to press amendment No. 11 to the vote at the appropriate time.
	I turn to another aspect of the proposal, because I did not receive a satisfactory answer in Committee. I may be doing the Minister a disservice, but I have not come across the letter that fully explains to me how he will deal with the issue. I refer to the possibility that people being surcharged can exchange their fine and surcharge for work. I will not delay the House by hunting for the appropriate passage in the Committee proceedings, but he said that he was not sure how the proposals would work but that it would be possible to exchange the fine and the surcharge for work. It will be interesting to find out exactly what he has done in the meantime to clarify those proposals.
	I also hope that the Minister will clarify the financial side to the operation. The figures that we were working on at Second Reading and in Committee were those for 2002, which seemed to be the latest date for which he had the information. He told us that 1.7 million fixed penalty notices were issued, but then said that the estimated administrative cost of collecting this stealth tax would be approximately 1.6 million. For every 5 that is surcharged, approximately 1 will go in administration costs. Only 4 will ever go into a victims fund.
	We are seeing 1 disappear in bureaucracy but that is coupled with the fact that the collection of fines is now running at anything between 50 and 75 per cent. I acknowledge that there has been an improvement recently, but let us not get carried away. It could be a temporary blip; one swallow does not make a summer. As the figure was running at 50 per cent. before the drive to improve the collection rate of fines, we could, on the figure of 1.7 million, expect to obtain 8.5 million. If a quarter of those fines and surcharges are lost in non-payment and if we add in the administrative costs, 3.8 million will disappear straight away. That is not very good value for money, is it? I do not think it is good value for money, because if the Minister was expecting 8.5 million for the victims fund, he will find that he gets nowhere there that. However, he will create and build up an enormous bureaucracy and the enormous resentment and problems that were evidenced in those very honest submissions to the consultation.
	The bottom line is that the criminals will be laughing all the way to the bank. Once again, they will get away without paying for their crimes but the inadvertent, middle-class motorist whom the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) mentioned in Committee and who is a responsible member of society will end up bearing the cost. For all those reasons, I seriously ask the Minister to think again and remove this unpopular, unnecessary and costly attack on the motorist from the Bill.

David Heath: This Government have a peculiar and almost unique genius for taking a good idea and making a complete pig's ear of it, and this is another instance of exactly that. When the proposal for a victims support fund was announced, the general view in the House and among the public was that it was a sensible idea to make the criminal pay something back to the victim of crime. I certainly welcomed it, as did members of other parties.
	Most of us saw the measure asI think I used this term in Committeea crude form of restorative justice. It provided a degree of proper recompense. A person who had been properly convicted would pay the surcharge, and life would be made a little more bearable for victims of crime. So far so good; then the Home Secretary took it into his head to include in the category of criminals those convicted of motoring offences.
	Some who are convicted of motoring offences are indeed criminals; they have committed a serious crime through the reckless or heedless operation of a motor vehicle. They are a menace to society and should be dealt with accordingly. But we all know, because we live in the real world, that many people do not fall into that category but find themselves in receipt of fixed-penalty tickets.
	I confess, as I confessed earlier in an intervention on the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan), that I was enormously relieved when I heard the Home Secretary say in terms on Second Reading that he had listened to representations by my party and others, and that a victims fund, properly constituted, would be paid for by the mugger and not the motorist. I believed him when he told us that he had taken the message on board, and would amend his proposals accordingly.
	I was frankly astonished when, at a late stage in Committee, we were faced with a huge panoply of amendments, including the Government's proposal to define a serious and persistent offender as someone who at some stage has been caught twice by a speed camera. If we continue to see such inflation of terms, we shall have to rewrite the entire language of jurisprudence. It is a nonsense, and the Minister knows it.
	I am not one who takes lightly the problem of dangerous or speeding motorists. I always try hard to obey speed controls, andunlike the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd), it appears I have a clean licence at the moment, touch wood; I am very happy about that. I entirely understand the position of the hon. Members for Chesham and Amersham and for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), but whatever their own views, I do not side with some of their colleagues who appear to think that every speed camera represents an imposition on civil liberties and an affront to the freedoms of the motorist. That is simply not the case.

Cheryl Gillan: I would never want to give the impression that there is not a perfectly proper role for speed cameras. Indeed, I have requested them on certain roads in my constituency. I abhor people who break the speed limit, and would not want to diminish the offence.

David Heath: We are at one on that. I am merely saying that some members of the hon. Lady's party have given the impression that they are leading some sort of crusade against speed cameras. That is unfortunate and regrettable, and against the interests of road safety.
	There is, however, a big difference between recognising the requirements of road safety and believing that it is fair to impose this measure on top of what is already a stringent penalty; it has still to be reviewed, we understand from the Department for Transport. At present the motorist incurs both a fine and an endorsement, which is often the greatest deterrent in terms of future misdemeanours because of the totting-up process that leads to the loss of a licence. However, if we want a way to define a serious and persistent offender in motoring terms, we have one; the points process and disqualification. I would have no difficulty with those who were disqualified or convicted of a serious driving offenceusing the term serious in its proper sensebeing brought into that definition. If they have committed the same offence several times, clearly they are persistent offenders.

Chris Bryant: The hon. Gentleman seems to be allowing himself a little wriggle room. What counts as persistent? Two, three or several offences? At what point does he set the limit?

David Heath: There is no wriggle room at all. I have made it perfectly clear that disqualification is the definition.

Chris Bryant: So three counts as persistent?

David Heath: Well, there is a different points tariff, as the hon. Gentleman may understand, for certain motoring offences, so three would not necessarily be the figure. Disqualification suggests that the person in question is a serious or persistent offender in road traffic law terms, so we have a definition. So where is the problem? Why does the definition have to be set at the level of the second offence? The answer, the Minister hopes, is that enormous revenue will result. The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham has already pointed out some of the difficulties attached even to that proposition, but that is undoubtedly the motivating force.
	The Minister wants a victims support fund sufficient to make a real difference, and the best way to do that is to tax the motorist to provide it. He told us in Committee that, in 2002, 1,505,504 endorsable speeding offences were committed, so we are dealing with a significant part of the population. They are being treated as though they were criminals who should contribute to a fund for the victims of crime. That is wrong in principle, and I am particularly aggrieved by what I think was a blatant deceitif that is a parliamentary termon the Home Secretary's part.

Chris Bryant: It does not sound very parliamentary.

David Heath: If it is not parliamentary, I of course withdraw

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman should withdraw the rather direct accusation that he made. If he wishes to suggest that there was a discrepancy, it should be done in another way.

David Heath: Absolutely, Mr. Deputy Speaker; immediately before you stood up, I did indicate that I should be very happy to withdraw that remark. But I must say that the Home Secretary is clearly not a man from whom I should like to buy a used car. I am very concerned; on comparing carefully the impression that he gave to the House and the reality of what is proposed in the Bill, I find very little correlation between the two.
	I hope that the House will look very carefully at my amendment No. 11, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham and her colleagues for putting their names to it. They have said that they would prefer to divide on it and so would I; not because it is my amendment, but simply because it deals with the specific issue of the second offence, rather than the generality of traffic offences. If we do not take a stand on this, the result will be not only an injustice to very many motorists, butmore importantly, from my point of viewthe undoing of all the good work that the Government have done in recent months in arguing for the useful function performed by speed cameras, traffic restrictions and traffic-calming measures. Their provision will cement in the public mind the view that all that is simply a front for what is a revenue-raising measure.
	The point that the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham made in quoting Devon and Cornwall police will be echoed by police forces throughout the country. They have a difficult enough job as it is enforcing traffic law without it being made more difficult by the Minister's applying an arbitrary surcharge on their endeavours. That is wrong, and I hope that this House will reject it. If not, I hope that the other House will.

Douglas Hogg: I want to support the arguments that were advanced very clearly by my hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) and, indeed, by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath). In doing so, I want to make three points. First, as regards the principle, I find it difficult to justify the proposition that a victims fund should be funded in part by people whose criminal culpability is at the very low end of the spectrum. It seems to me that if we were to fund a victims fund by raising money from criminals, there should be some relationship between the quality of the criminal act relied upon and the nature of the injury suffered by the victim. With speeding offences that do not result in personal injury, there is no such relationship of any kind. Drivers who are disqualified under the totting-up procedure may not themselves be guilty of criminal offences of any high degree of gravity. I find it very difficult to justify in principle why individuals whose criminal culpability is, or may be, at a very low level should be required to contribute to the victims fund in the way that we are debating now. It is an objection on principle.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham made some points about repeated offences and other matters with which I entirely agree. I associate myself with what she said, but my fundamental objection is on principle; there is no relationship between the quality of the offence and the injury in respect of which the fund is intended to address.

Chris Bryant: I think the point that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is makinghe will correct me if I have misunderstood himis that if someone is speeding and hits someone else, thereby causing personal injury, it is a grave crime; whereas if someone is speeding and does not hit anyone else, it is nowhere near as grave.

David Heath: That is what the law says.

Chris Bryant: Indeed, but the point is that we have to reduce everyone's speeding. Otherwise, when people are hit, it will cause further damage to individuals.

Douglas Hogg: I think that one has to go back to first principles and ask oneself in respect of people who have committed a criminal offence, what is the nature and level of culpability? That, of course, clearly goes to the nature of the penalty. If we are in the process of doing something different, such as requiring a person judged to be a criminal to compensate someone who has suffered an injury as a result of an alleged crime, there has to be some relationshipnot a direct one, but some relationshipbetween the quality of the act adjudged to be criminal and the quality of the injury in respect of which compensation is to be paid.
	We all know that those who drive too fast may do so to only a small extent. The idea that they are somehow obliged to make a contribution to a fund to compensate someone who has been the victim of a serious mugging is, I find, impossible to justify. There is no sort of relationship that applies in those circumstances. It will be perceived to be inequitable and wrong. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) may not agree with me, but at least he knows where I am coming from.
	I have a range of other objections, which I shall make fairly briefly; partly because I have been heard on these particular hobby-horses before. Nevertheless, I will get on a number of those hobby-horses again. The first pertains to the negative procedure. My hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham has characterised the surcharge as a tax. She makes rather a good point, as it is close to a tax; if it is to be levied at all, it will be levied under the negative procedure.
	Let us be plain about what the negative procedure means. It means that a tax will be levied, if it is levied, without the House voting on it. This House will not be called on to vote for it. The House will remember the old dictum of no taxation without representation; lo and behold, that is precisely what the clause proposes. If we go down the road of imposing a tax, surely it should be by way of the affirmative procedure. I very much dislike the affirmative procedure because, as the House knows, affirmative orders cannot be amended, but at least they require the consent of both Houses. Here we are talking about an order that will impose a tax but will never be voted on.
	We are entitled to ask what tax will be levied. I can find nothing in the Bill that makes it plain what sum will be the subject of the surcharge. The Bill gives the Secretary of State powers, which are not properly constrained, to impose a tax without representation.
	A further defect is that the Bill does not oblige the Secretary of State to impose a surcharge, but merely empowers him to do so if he chooses. If the House thinks that a surcharge should be imposed, we should make the duty mandatory and not merely permissive. I see no merit in creating a permissive power in circumstances of this kind.

Cheryl Gillan: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that there is no incentive for the Government to improve their success in collecting fines or fixed penalty notices? If the form of taxation that is the proposed surcharge does not yield the amount of money expected for the victims fund, the Bill contains no brake on the Secretary of State increasing it proportionately. There is no safeguard to ensure that motorists will not find that they have to pay 50 on top of the fine in, say, two years' time.

Douglas Hogg: That may well be right. What is more, as I said earlier, the amount will be raised without parliamentary authority, as there will be no vote on the matter.
	The last of my specific points is another of my hobby-horses; I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you will forgive me when I note that the clause applies only to England and Wales and not to Northern Ireland or Scotland. I hasten to say that I do not object to that, but I do object to the fact that the clause could be voted on tonightas could the negative orders, if they were brought before the Houseby hon. Members who do not represent constituencies in England and Wales. A very bizarre proposition follows from that. It is that imposts that, in essence, are taxation will be voted on by Members of Parliament who do not represent the areas subject to that taxation. That strikes me as very offensive, as it amounts to taxation without accountability.
	I know, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you want me to be brief and that you have heard me speak about these matters many times. I am against the proposals in the Bill, for the reasons that I have advanced. I think that the proposal is wrong in principle, and I do not like the use of the negative procedure. I am very much against imposing taxes without representation, and I think that it is quite wrong for hon. Members who do not represent constituencies in England and Wales to have any part in this business.

Christopher Chope: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) on introducing this amendment, and on highlighting the duplicitous and underhand way in which the Government introduced this measure. It is another stealth tax on motorists, and the timing of its introduction is extraordinary. Last week, a Minister said that a Bill on road safety would appear in the Queen's Speech. That would be the appropriate vehicle for legislation on this matter, if indeed legislation were needed.
	As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said, the proposal purports to raise money for a victims fund, but most speeding offences are, fortunately, victimless. We penalise speeding because of the potential danger that it poses to others, so penalties are imposed for reasons of deterrence. However, fixed penalty notices are imposed only when the excess speeds involved are modest rather than severe. If a motorist is detected driving at very great speeds, he does not have the option of going for the fixed penalty notice, as the prosecuting authorities will require the matter to be referred to the magistrates court. As a result, the Bill surcharges fixed penalty notices even though, by definition, they apply to the lesser offences in any particular category.
	Speed cameras are also used to raise revenue, and that is one reason why they have fallen into disrepute. The best way to help victims of speeding drivers is through education. That is why Conservative Members argue that the so-called camera safety partnership funds into which the fixed penalties for speeding offences are paid should be available for use in road safety education, generally, and driver improvement programmes in particular. Surely if the Government are serious about helping the victims of speeding motorists, the first thing that they could do, without having to amend the Bill or introduce such a proposal, is allow the funds to which I refer to be allocated for road safety education and driver improvement programmes.
	Sadly, the more the Government impose stealth taxes on motorists and penalise them to a greater extent than is reasonable for minor infringements, the more the burden of fatalities on the roads increases. In the past five years, the number of fatalities on our roads has increased under the Government. A Government who were more contrite would wonder why and say, Perhaps we got the psychology of penalising motorists with fixed penalty notices wrong, and this is just compounding the felony.

Paul Goggins: I shall remind hon. Members what my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said on Second Reading. I reminded hon. Members of this in Committee, and I do so again today in view of the comments that have been made. He said:
	Following the consultation, we accept that it would be wrong for low-level first-time offences to be subject to a surcharge.[Official Report, 14 June 2004; Vol. 422, c. 540.]
	He listened to the consultation and was quite clear about that. Under the Bill, therefore, any offender who commits a road traffic offence for the first time and receives penalty points on their licence will not have to pay the surcharge.

Cheryl Gillan: The Minister is quite rightI quoted the record in exactly the same waybut that is where the Home Secretary sought to pull the wool over our eyes. In no response to the consultation was it assumed that first-time offenders would be involved. It was always assumed that more than one offence would be needed; it was never assumed that the number would be as few as two. That was how the Home Secretary managed to pull the wool over all our eyes.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Lady talks about assumptions, and she previously gave us a number of quotes, which I shall come to shortly, in relation to the consultation.
	Only when someone commits a second endorsable road traffic offence within three years will they become liable to pay the surcharge, and the regulations will make it clear that the further road traffic offence must be endorsable. Let us be clear what we mean when we talk about endorsable motoring offences. We are not talking about people who have a brake light out, people who park on the hard shoulder or those who do not have a working car horn. Those offences are not endorsable.
	We are talking about people who, for example, travel at 50 mph in a 30 mph zone; people who go through red traffic lights, endangering people's lives; and people who overtake on pedestrian crossings. Those are endorsable offences, and they are very serious matters indeed. That is why introducing the surcharge after the second endorsable offence is a fair method. Drivers will receive a warning. If they offend again, they will be required to pay the surcharge. Whatever the outcome of the Department for Transport's review of penalty points, it will be clear that the second endorsable offence, not the value of the penalty points, will attract the surcharge. The number of occasions on which an offence is committed will be considered.
	Amendment No. 65 would completely remove those who commit serious and persistent road traffic offences from liability for the surcharge. Under amendment No. 11, the surcharge could be applied only to someone who had been disqualified from driving. Both those amendments would smash into the provisions as currently drafted.
	Sometimes in debates in the House and in conversations outside it is suggested that, somehow, people who commit an endorsable motoring offence are not really offenders. They are offenders, and many people commit such serious offences. The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) cited several responses to the consultation and I read a comment in this morning's newspapers by a spokesman for the motoring lobby describing speeding as a victimless crime. In some senses, the hon. Member for Christchurch (Mr. Chope) echoed that sentiment. How can it be argued that a speeding motorist commits a victimless crime? Speeding contributes to 36,000 serious injuries a year, and people who speed cause 3,400 fatalities on our roads every year. Some 85 per cent. of people who are hit by motor vehicles travelling at 40 mph are killed. The impact on a pedestrian is a third greater if the speed of a vehicle increases from 30 to 35 mph. These are serious matters.

Elfyn Llwyd: Will the Minister explain what the Home Secretary meant when he said on Second Reading that he would consider introducing
	a levy of 10 on fixed penalty notices for serious repeat offenders, as opposed to general fixed penalty notices?
	That does not seem to be what the Minister is saying. The Home Secretary went on to say:
	We will link the levy to the higher number of points added to people's licences, so the system will be fair to everybody.[Official Report, 14 June 2004; Vol. 422, c. 540.]
	The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I did not think that higher points were applied to fixed penalty notices by definitionthat is complete nonsense.

Paul Goggins: The important part of my right hon. Friend's comments is the word repeat. He was rightly making the point that the scheme would apply if a person committed an endorsable offence a further time. The provision sends the important message that we want to reduce the incidence of speeding and road traffic offences, and the impact that such offences have on victims.

Cheryl Gillan: I am beginning to get really worried. I understood that the surcharge would go into a victims fund to be spent on victims generally. The Minister now says that the surcharge is supposed to hit motorists hard to stop them speeding. He cannot have it both ways. Is the surcharge a revenue-raising measure for the victims fund, or another attack on motorists using a heavy-handed tool to try to bring them in line?

Paul Goggins: It is possible to achieve both things. The surcharge will help victims, and if motorists pay attention to the message that goes out and fewer of them are caught speeding, there will be fewer victims of speeding. The hon. Lady suggests that there is a contradiction, but both benefits are possible, so that is not the case. If the accusation is that we are surcharging offenders to provide additional support to victims, I am happy to plead guilty. It is important for people who commit such serious offences to support victims in the way we suggest.
	We are responding to organisations such as Greater Manchester police, who do a good job policing my constituency and many others. I do not think that the scheme will be a nice little earner, as it has been described today. The money raised will go to the victims fund. That will be welcomed by the victims of not only motoring offences but sexual offences and domestic violence, about whom we talked earlier.
	The Bill allows us to convert fines and surcharges into work; the enabling powers are included in the Courts Act 2003, although they are still being piloting. We intend to convert fines to work only if there is absolutely no other way of extracting the money from an offender.
	The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham was right to cite 1.6 million as the cost of administering the fund, but that will be the cost of administering the whole fund, not just the bit relating to motoring offences, so the money will pay for a larger administrative task than she might have thought. Of course we will bear down on the cost of administration when we can, but we think that the administrative costs are worth bearing in pursuit of our objective.
	I do not think that I will persuade the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham to change his mind. Some parts of the Bill apply to England and Wales and others apply to Northern Ireland. There are varying powers in various parts of the Bill. On the negative procedure, the powers in section 53 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 are not used in secret, even if they are employed by negative resolution. There is a responsibility under section 88 of the 1988 Act to consult representative organisations when secondary legislation is made. That consultation will take place.
	There has been considerable debate about how we define the word persistent and what we mean by the word repeat. Frankly, twice is once too many. The issue is deeply serious. If someone who travels at 50 mph in a 30 mph zone twice in three years or who goes through a red light and then overtakes on a pedestrian crossing twice in three years merely faces a modest surcharge on their fixed penalty notice, and not the consequences that could have arisen had they knocked down a child or severely injured someone, that is a price worth paying.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister knows that if the police consider that the facts surrounding a speeding offence are such that the person should be brought before the court rather than receive a fixed penalty notice, they have the power to do that. By the very action of issuing and agreeing to a fixed penalty notice, the police signify that they consider the offence to be at the bottom end of seriousness; otherwise, the fixed penalty notice would not operate.

Paul Goggins: The hon. Gentleman knows the arguments on fixed penalty notices. Part of the reason for them is to deliver fast and efficient justice, but of course people can be prosecuted and taken to court if the circumstances demand it.

Tim Boswell: Will the Minister consider the situation, which is not untypical, although I cannot claim to have been involved in it myself, of someone who commits two offences or is given two tickets on the same day and on the same stretch of road because he has triggered a camera twice, as opposed to the scenario that he describes? How can that be called a persistent offence?

Paul Goggins: Because he has done it twice. We have discussed whether persistent means twice or more often, but twice is once too often, whether it is on the same day or over a period of three years. If all someone has at the end of committing those serious offences is a small surcharge, and not the consequence of knocking down and killing a child, he has got off lightly. Having said that, I ask for the amendment to be withdrawn.

Cheryl Gillan: I feel a bit sorry for the Minister because he put up a bit of a fight, but his position is indefensible, and he knows it. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) was right in what he said in support of the amendments and I invite him to join us in the Lobbyor perhaps he will invite us to join him in the Lobby if I withdraw amendment No. 65 and allow amendment No. 11 to stand as our test.
	My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) made his usual valuable contribution to the passage of legislation. Frankly, the Minister is trying to get at the lower end of the scale because that is where the volume and numbers are and where the money can be raked in. The points about no relationship between the quality of the offence and the fund were valid.
	The Minister ignored our concerns about the negative resolution. The proposal imposes taxation without limit and representation.
	There is no safeguard on the level at which the Government could set the fine. The Minister failed to address my point that the Home Secretary said that the surcharge would be 10, whereas he himself said that it would be 5. There is already confusion about the proposal before we have even reached square one.
	A Government who ignore the views of the Police Federation, the Magistrates Association, various police forces and motorists' organisations should think twice. Speeding fines are widely viewed as stealth taxes and are not always a means of improving road safety. Indeed, the revenue generated from motorists is not put towards road safety. Very little of the income generated by fines for motoring offences or duties on vehicle excise, fuel and insurance is spent on road safety or even on the general upkeep of roads. The motorist is therefore already getting poor value for money from the Government, even before this new stealth tax is introduced. The majority of people who will pay into the victims fund are otherwise law-abiding individuals. With the possible exception of the driver who went down the road and triggered a camera twice, they are tax and insurance-paying motorists. They have been caught in the headlights of the Minister and the Home Secretary, who think that they have a captive audience. Ministers are leading the fatted lamb to the slaughter, and once again they believe that the motorist can pay for other people's crimes. The criminals are laughing, but the motorists have been caught, so I urge my hon. Friends and other Members to join us in the Lobby and vote against this preposterous measure.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. I think that the hon. Lady intends to withdraw amendment No. 65.

Cheryl Gillan: Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Amendment proposed: No. 11, in page 10, line 29, leave out from 'driving' to end of line 31.[Mr. Heath.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:
	The House divided: Ayes 175, Noes 290.

Question accordingly negatived.

Clause 17
	  
	Application by prosecution for certain counts to be tried without a jury

David Heath: I beg to move amendment No. 8, in page 11, line 32 leave out subsection (9).

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendment No. 33.
	Amendment No. 9, in page 11, line 34 leave out 'and' and insert
	'(b) evidence in respect of each count is admissible at the trial of the sample count, and'.

David Heath: We now move on to trial by jury of sample counts. The debate in Committee was slightly confusedI rarely accuse the Solicitor-General of being confused, but some of her responses to my points were confusedand the confusion lay in the difference between the conditions in clause 17. A court would apply those conditions to determine whether it is appropriate to deal with sample counts, and some of us feel that the definition in subsection (9) is incomplete.
	In Committee, the Solicitor-General was at pains to tell me that it is important that all the conditions are fulfilled, and I agree with that point. Subsection (2) identifies that the conditions must be fulfilled. Subsection (3) states:
	The first condition is that the number of counts included in the indictment is likely to mean that a trial by jury involving all of those counts would be impracticable.
	Subsection (4) states:
	The second condition is that, if an order under subsection (2) were made, each count or group of counts which would accordingly be tried with a jury can be regarded as a sample of counts which could accordingly be tried without a jury.
	Subsection (5) states:
	The third condition is that it is in the interests of justice for an order under subsection (2) to be made.
	Those conditions are perfectly proper.
	Subsection (9) contains an almost redundant definition of what might be a sample count under clause 17. If we treat it as a definition, the missing ingredient is a provision on cross-admissibility. Such a provision was inserted in another place and removed by the Government in Committee, and I seek to reinsert it through amendment No. 9, which I intend to press to a Division at this debate's conclusion if the Government do not accept it.
	Amendment No. 8 would delete subsection (9). To some extent, it is a facetious amendment because I do not necessarily want to do without definition. However, it is better to have no definition than incomplete definition. If we are interested in making proper law, the definition should be complete. In Committee, the Solicitor-General said that a judge would understand what it meant. Perhaps that is the case, but why do not we write it in bold in the Bill so that everybody understands it and there is no room for misunderstanding? If we are to have a definition, let it be complete; if it is not complete, let us do without it.
	A more satisfactory answer was provided in another place through an amendment supported by Liberal Democrat and Conservative peers. I note that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and his colleagues have been happy to add their names to amendment No. 9. It simply states what we expect of cross-admissibility. It would insert a new paragraph (b), which states that
	evidence in respect of each count is admissible at the trial of the sample count.
	The point is important and cannot simply be ignored. It would be helpful if the Solicitor-General accepted that even at this late stage. If she does not, I suspect that we will debate the matter again in the future. I do not especially want to press for the removal of subsection (9), although I shall consider that option in the light of the Government's response. It would be far better to have a complete definition.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) knows from our debates in Committee that the official Opposition's view was that, although the Government had the justification for introducing clause 17 of trying to simplify the trial process in cases of a multitude of identical counts by enabling some to be tried as sample counts and the others either to be taken into consideration, or, if the defendant refused, to be tried without a jury, we were worried when we read how far the definition of sample could be extended. The Government's introduction of subsection (9) highlights the fact that, although in my experience as a practitioner, the use of the term sample count is common at the Bar, it has not been subject to legal definition. Subsection (9) tries to provide that definition.
	The definition begins with the bizarre statement that
	the defendant in respect of each count is the same person.
	I should hope so, otherwise we would be in a strange world. It continues by saying that a count is to be regarded as a sample if
	the judge considers that the sample count is a sample of the other counts.
	I have great faith in our judiciary but not to the extent that Parliament should avoid providing it with guidance if we have a clear view of what constitutes a sample count.
	Let me give an example of a sample count. A defendant steals a credit card and uses it 50 times. Each time, he obtains property by deception. Instead of charging him with 50 offencesthat would lead to a long, complicated and rather ponderous trial he would be charged with one count for the first time he used the card to obtain property, another count for the last time and perhaps two or three other counts to cover the period when the offences were taking place. I am content with the notion that, if, at the end of the trial on those counts, the defendant did not accept having the others taken into consideration, it would be proper to say that there had been a trial of the sample and the judge could deal with the others. I fear, however, that under subsection (9) as it is currently drafted, it would be possible for the scope of a sample count to be considerably widened.
	This matter was considered in great detail in the other place, and an amendment to the Bill was passed I think that it was a very good oneto ensure that in any case involving sample counts, the defining element linking them all together would be that
	evidence in respect of each count is admissible at the trial of the sample count.
	That principle is well known in our legal system, and it seems completely to address the vagueness that might otherwise result from subsection (9).
	I join the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome in sayingand I am sorry to have to say itthat no adequate explanation was provided in Committee as to why amendment No. 9, on which I hope that we shall be able to vote, would somehow wreck this part of the Bill. I was mystified by the fact that the only argument being put forward was that we did not need proposed new paragraph (b), as shown in amendment No. 9, because a judge would be able to deal with the matter quite satisfactorily.However, the Solicitor-General cannot have it both ways.

Douglas Hogg: Might I suggest a reason why this proposal might create a difficulty? If the evidence is mutually admissible, the fact of a conviction in the trial before a jury would be admissible in evidence in the trial without a jury. As we all know, once someone has a previous conviction, their chances of getting an acquittal are greatly diminished.

Dominic Grieve: My right hon. and learned Friend makes a good point, although it is also right to point out that from December, the operation of the new rules under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 will completely change the position in respect of the admissibility of previous convictions. It is certainly envisaged that, in this scheme of things, the same judge who tried the previous matter with a jury would subsequently try the other countsif they were not acceptedwithout a jury.
	At this stage of the Bill's passage, we can only do our best to rectify its worst mischiefs. In amendment No. 9, we are seeking to ensure that a sample count involves what the majority of legal practitioners would understand a sample count to be. For that reason, we support the intention to put the amendment to the vote. In the meantime, I shall be interested to hear from the Minister an explanation as to why it would do so much damage to the main thrust of clause 17.

Douglas Hogg: Before we hear the answers from the Minister or the Solicitor-General, might I rise briefly to make my points? Personally, I would prefer the removal of the definition for the perverse reason that it would make it less likely that a judge would exercise the powers provided by clause 17, because I am deeply disturbed by those powers. I do not see the justification for them. I am keeping firmly to order in this matter, Mr. Deputy Speaker. To start off with, if a judge had this powereven if it were modified by subsection (9) as amendedthere would be a tendency for them to overload the indictment. If lots of counts can be put into the indictment, they will be, and that is bad news.
	Secondly, and quite differently, the courts already have the power to deal with the matter on the sentence. The prosecution will simply say to the trial judge, My Lord, you know that this is a sample count in respect of which a conviction has taken place. In all probability, the trial judge will have the power to impose an appropriate sentence. I therefore find it difficult to see why we should have the powers set out in clause 17 at all. If we removed the definition in subsection (9), as proposed in the amendment, the trial judge would be less likely to invoke the clause 17 powers.My first argument, therefore, is to ask whether the clause 17 powers are desirable. If the answer to that is no, I shall be in favour of removing the definition, because that would be one way of making it less likely that a judge would use those powers.

Harriet Harman: I will be asking the House to support Government amendment No. 33 and to resist amendments Nos. 8 and 9. Perhaps it will assist the House if I briefly explain what these clauses are designed to do. Their purpose is to establish a two-stage procedure to provide in statute for the replacement of the sample count procedure that was formerly used in cases where an alleged offence has been repeated many times against a series of victims. Because there is a limit to the number of counts that can be reasonably included in a single indictment, the practice used to be for a defendant to be indicted for a number of sample counts, and then, if he was convicted on the sample count, to be sentenced on the basis of all the offences. However, this practice was disapproved by the Court of Appeal in a case called Kidd in 1998, on the grounds that it involved sentencing an offender for offences to which he had not pleaded guilty, of which he had not been convicted, and which he had not agreed to be taken into consideration. So we had a long-standing sample count procedure, with which everyone will be familiar, and that was disallowed in 1998 in the Kidd case.
	The court's decision in Kidd was no doubt correct, but the result is that in cases of multiple offences, it is no longer possible for the court to take account of more than a fraction of the defendant's offending when sentencing him, even if he is convicted of all the counts on the indictment. For example, where the offending consists of a scam in which hundreds of victims are cheated of small sums of money, the proceeds of the offences represented by the counts on the indictment could only amount to a tiny fraction of the total sum that was defrauded.
	The result is a threefold problem. First, the sentence will not necessarily be able to reflect the totality of the offending. Secondlythis is important as wellmost victims will be denied the satisfaction of knowing that the defendant has been dealt with for the offence committed against them. Thirdly, where there has been no conviction, the court has no power to award compensation, so that victims may miss out on compensation where their case was one of the offences that could not be accommodated on the indictment. So yes, there is the sentencing point, but there are two further points as well.
	Even where the individual offences are more serious, such as indecent assaults, and the court is able to impose an adequate sentence simply on the basis of the limited counts on the indictment, it will still appear to the victim that the accused has been dealt with for only part of his offending. So convicting multiple offenders of all their offences is important. The objective of the present clauses is to provide the courts with a replacement for the sample count arrangements that would have been used before Kidd ruled them out.

Douglas Hogg: Will the Solicitor-General address in due coursenot necessarily immediatelythe point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) about the mode of trial? Is he right to say that it is intended that the trial judge in the first trial, who has heard all the evidence and knows the facts of the conviction, should then be the presiding judge in the second trial, held without a jury, because in that case you will have a single judge, without a jury, who already knows of all the facts of the previous convictions?

Harriet Harman: Well, if that is the caseand it is most likely to be the casethat makes it more like the procedure that used to obtain before Kidd, with which the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) is no doubt wholly familiar and to which he no doubt had no objections. The House needs to understand and accept that this is a tightening of safeguards compared with the pre-Kidd situation, not a loosening of them. The objective of the current clauses is to provide the courts with a replacement for the sample count arrangements that they would have used before Kidd ruled them out. We do not wish to go further than that, nor do we believe that we have done so.
	These clauses introduce a new procedure and provide safeguards. I want to take the House through those 10 safeguards.
	First, when the new procedure is used, only when the defendant has been convicted by the jury of the sample counts can the judge proceed to consider whether the defendant is guilty of offences not before the jury. Therefore, if the defendant is acquitted: end of story. There is no opportunity in the procedure for the jury to acquit and for the judge then to come along and convict on the sample counts. That is an important first safeguard and the effect of clause 19(1).
	Secondly, the judge must be satisfied that the counts that the jury would try can be regarded as a sample of the counts that would be tried by him in the second stage, which is the effect of clause 17(4). I guess that that is the nearest that we come to a definition, which is that the judge must be satisfied that those are indeed sample counts.

Dominic Grieve: Government amendment No. 33 appears to remove the requirement in subsection (9) that the judge should consider that the sample count is a sample of the other counts. Therefore, I hope that when the Solicitor-General comes to deal with that, she will explain where the requirement lies that the judge should consider it as a sample.

Harriet Harman: The requirement lies in clause 17(4), which I have just dealt with.
	The third safeguard is that the judge must be satisfied that it would be impractical for a jury to try all the counts. That is in clause 17(3). The first impulse must therefore be jury trial. But that is still not enoughthere is a further safeguard, which is the fourth one.

David Heath: I appreciate that there are six more safeguards to go, but I am going to take the Solicitor-General back one. I want to be absolutely clear on the point raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) about Government amendment No. 33 removing the condition in clause 17(9)(b) that the judge considers that the sample count is a sample of the other counts. What is the subtle distinction that I have missed between the judge considering that each count or group of counts
	can be regarded as a sample of counts,
	under clause 17(4), and
	is a sample of the other counts,
	under clause 17(9)(b), which is now to be removed?

Harriet Harman: The point is that clause 17(9)(b) was simply repetitive and added nothing to clause 17(4), which is the second condition, as described in the Bill, which says that it must be regarded as a sample of counts.
	The fourth safeguard is that the judge, having decided that the first impulsejury trial of all the issueswould be impractical for some issues, would have to be satisfied that there are not other steps that could be taken to facilitate a trial by jury. That is the effect of clause 17(6).
	The fifth safeguard is that the judge must be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice for the two-stage procedure to be used. That is under clause 17(5).
	The sixth safeguard is that the defendant tried by the judge on the sample and remaining counts must be the same person. That is the effect both of clause 17(9) and of our proposed amendment to it. We ask the House to reject amendment No. 8 and to support Government amendment No. 33.

Jonathan Sayeed: If, in the view of the defence, the judge has misdirected himself, what steps can the defence take to suggest that it should be a jury rather than a non-jury trial?

Harriet Harman: That relates to the seventh and eighth safeguards if I remember the correct order. I shall come to them and the process by which challenges can be made.
	I was dealing with the sixth safeguard, which is that it must be the same defendant on the sample of the remaining counts to be tried by the judge. That is the effect of clause 17(9) and our proposed amendment to it. Our amendment removes the circular definition that was criticised in Committee and simply provides that a sample count is not to be regarded as a sample of other counts unless the defendant in respect of each count is the same person.
	Seventhly, there is also the safeguard laid out in rule 9 of the indictment rules, which will apply. All the offences must be founded on the same facts or form part of a series of offences of the same or similar character.
	The next safeguard addresses the point raised by the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Sayeed). The defence will have the opportunity to make representations against the use of the procedure if they want to challenge it. That is provided for in clause 18(4).

Dominic Grieve: I do not draw reassurance from the suggestion that rule 9 of the indictment rules is sufficient in such a case. Is it not a fact that if that were the only safeguard, it would be possible to have one of a series of counts of completely separate incidents of burglary that took place within a short time going to jury trial with the others determined afterwards? That is not what I originally understood the Home Secretary to say when he put forward the proposal for introducing the mechanism of clause 17 when he made his announcement at the end of proceedings on the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Harriet Harman: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. It would not be satisfactory if the only protection were rule 9 of the indictment rules. It is not the only protection; it is an additional protection. There are nine others. I ask him and the House to consider them altogether.

Dominic Grieve: I am sorry to intervene again, but I come back to the definition of a sample count. I would be interested to hear whether the Solicitor-General can give the House the definition as she understands it. Obviously it may just have its ordinary dictionary definition but if that is the only definition that we have, insufficient safeguards are available to ensure that it is not simply used to avoid jury trial on quite separate offences.

Harriet Harman: I think that there are sufficient safeguards and the Law Commission is satisfied that, with these 10 conditions and safeguards, the situation will be fair. The hon. Gentleman keeps rising to his feet and saying, But this is not fair, but I have not even got to the end of my list. We are using both belt and braces, with many safeguards in place. I imagine that most members of the judiciary think that they are entirely unnecessary on account of the fact that the judiciary would probably argue that it knows what is and is not a sample. The defence can challenge the decision and appeal if necessary. However, we are not leaving it at that. We are putting in place all the safeguards.
	As I say, the defence will have the opportunity to make representations and if it does not accept the judge's ruling, it will be able to appeal against his decision to use the procedure. That is the effect of clause 18(5). Not only will the defence have the opportunity to make representations, but it will be able to appeal and article 6 of the European convention, which is the tenth safeguard, will apply to guarantee a fair trial.
	On the basis of the safeguards, the Law Commission is happy. I ask the House to reject the amendments Nos. 8 and 9, but to support Government amendment No. 33.

David Heath: The Solicitor-General's remarks have underlined the tortuousness of the process. She has made it more difficult, not easier, to understand what is intended. The precautions that she has outlinedthe 10 stepsdo not make sense. We feel that we must press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made:
	The House divided: Ayes 180, Noes 296.

Question accordingly negatived.
	Amendment made: No. 33, in page 11, line 32 , leave out from 'count' to end of line 36 and insert
	'may not be regarded as a sample of other counts unless the defendant in respect of each count is the same person'. [Mr. Heppell.]

Clause 22
	  
	Procedure for determining fitness to plead: England and Wales

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 67, in page 13, line 24, leave out Clause 22.

Madam Deputy Speaker: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 68, in page 37, line 8, at end insert
	'This subsection does not apply to the amendment in paragraph 60 of Schedule 10 (which accordingly extends to England and Wales only)'.'.

Dominic Grieve: We now come to a part of the Bill that has caused me considerable concern. The Government propose to reform the rules under which unfitness to plead and insanity are determined. At present, the determination of whether a person is fit to plead is made by a jury. If there is a question about fitness to plead, a jury is empanelled for the specific purpose of deciding the matter. In my professional experience as a barrister, I can remember no occasion on which that procedure took a long time, or on which the jury encountered difficulty in reaching a correct decision. However, the Government propose to remove that power from a judge and jury, and to leave the decision to a judge alone.

Douglas Hogg: Does my hon. Friend agree that that is so only in part? Clause 22(5) preserves the jury's right to determine the matter when it arises post-arraignment. In other words, the Government accept that the jury is competent to perform the task.

Dominic Grieve: My right hon. and learned Friend makes a very good point.

Tim Boswell: Does my hon. Friend agree, therefore, that it is incumbent on the Government to present evidence on the general point, and to apply the method of difference to explain why different regimes should apply pre and post- arraignment?

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend is right. If no one has questioned the fact that the jury should continue to play such an important role post-arraignment, why should that role be removed from the jury pre-arraignment?
	I am afraid that the Government have a long history of disliking jury trials. The Government showed their hand very clearly in previous statutory attempts to curb jury trial. They believe that jury trial is an inconvenience that must be tolerated at best because of some unfortunate public adherence to its principles. There really is nothing more to this. If the Home Secretary had had his way in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, he would have removed jury trial for a raft of substantive offences, and the Government have made earlier attempts to do the same thing.

Greg Knight: In what percentage of cases is fitness to plead an issue?

Dominic Grieve: My right hon. Friend asks an interesting question to which, I am afraid, I do not have the precise answerthe Minister may well be able to provide onebut I can say that fitness to plead is an issue in a tiny percentage of the total number of cases tried.

Douglas Hogg: I imagine that my hon. Friend would also want to say that the same kind of issue arises in quite a lot of casesfor example, with regard to diminished responsibility, to the defence of insanity and to the question of special reasons when a defendant chooses not to give evidence.

Dominic Grieve: My right hon. and learned Friend is correct, so we are dealing with what appears to be a discrete issue in relation to unfitness to plead and insanity.

Humfrey Malins: I wonder whether my hon. Friend thinks that possibly money might be behind this plan? If the Government put the measure in place pre-arraignment, they would save the cost of empanelling the jury. I wonder whether that could be a factor.

Dominic Grieve: My hon. Friend may be right, but we have not heard sufficient explanation from the Government about their rationale. Indeed, I hope that we will have the opportunity this eveningadmittedly, at a late stage in the passage of a Billto hear a full explanation of why the Government think that this is the correct action to take.

Vera Baird: This issue arises in only a small percentage of cases, but in about 90 per cent. of the ones in which it does there is no disputeboth sides experts agree that the person is unfit to pleadyet the current law still requires a jury to be sworn in, which is an utter waste of money.

Dominic Grieve: The hon. and learned Lady, as she often does, makes an important point. I can only speak to the amendment, but I am aware that she has an alternative way to meet the problem: where agreement is reached on unfitness to plead, there is no need to empanel a jury, but where a dispute arises, which happens in very few cases, a jury should be empanelled. That goes a very long way to meeting my anxieties.
	My basic anxiety is that this is not an issue of administrative convenience. Clause 22 can cut two ways. First, some people may seek to masquerade behind unfitness to plead to avoid the consequences of a conviction against them because they think that that might be to their advantage. SecondlyI do not think that this is too far fetched, but I hope that it never happensthere may be instances where getting someone declared to be effectively insane and unable to stand trial is convenient to an authoritarian state. That has certainly happened in other countries. That is another reason why it is important that the issue should be determined by a jury if it is in dispute.

Douglas Hogg: Is there not is another important reason? If a person is found unfit to plead, section 5 powers under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 come into effect and orders that are analogous to hospital orders may be made. In other words, serious sanctions can be placed on a person who is found unfit to plead, which is surely a matter to be left to a jury.

Dominic Grieve: My right hon. and learned Friend is quite right, and that was precisely the reason why I said that authoritarian states have found it convenient to lock people up on the basis that they are insane without trial or due process. We might be a million miles from that happening in this country, but it is wise for Parliament to guard against anything that could tend to take us down that road.
	I do not wish to take up too much of the House's time, so I simply say to the Minister that I cannot understand why we are doing this. As a conservative with a small c as well as a large C, my attitude is that if something does not require reform, there is no earthly reason why we should tinker with it. The likely amounts of time and cost that will be incurred by preserving the existing system would be negligible. Inasmuch as there is a feeling that change should take place, the view taken by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) that the right of determination by a jury should be preserved when there is a dispute would be a better approach than that adopted by the Government.

Greg Knight: I am afraid to tell my hon. Friend that the more I listen to his argument, the more I conclude that the Redcar solution, if I may call it that, appears to be better than his. Why did he not table an amendment in those terms?

Dominic Grieve: I had not fully appreciated the solution proposed by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar at the time at which amendment No. 67 was tabled. My right hon. Friend will notice that the amendment would simply delete clause 22 entirely. Our approach says that we do not need to tinker with this aspect of the law. I shall invite the House to divide on the amendment unless the Minister can exercise colossal persuasion on me to take a contrary view because I do not think that it is an inappropriate way of dealing with the matter. However, the Bill still has to go back to the other place, which is where its passage started. The Government may well defeat us this evening, but if they consider that the hon. and learned Lady's suggestion has merit, they will have the opportunity to accept the proposalthe Minister could do so this evening, I supposeand the extent of the disagreement between us would be greatly reduced.

Tim Boswell: On a somewhat different yet related point, I note that my hon. Friend's amendment applies to clause 22. However, clause 23 provides for what I construe to be a parallel procedure for Northern Ireland, although that clause will amend an order. Will he clarify his thinking about that? Does he think that it would be appropriate to have a common arrangement throughout the various parts of the United Kingdom?

Dominic Grieve: If my hon. Friend reads amendment No. 68, which is linked to amendment No. 67, he will note that it says:
	This subsection does not apply to the amendment in paragraph 60 of Schedule 10 (which accordingly extends to England and Wales only).
	I hope that that answers his question.
	We want the Government to give us a proper explanation of why the procedure should be changed. I am wholly unconvinced and do not think that we are discussing an exercise in semantics. Important decisions, such as a person's fitness to plead, should be determined in our legal system by a jury, especially if that is a matter of dispute. Unless the Minister can persuade me to the contrary, I shall press the amendment to a Division.

Douglas Hogg: I support the observations made by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). It is important to bear it in mind that a disability applicable to clause 22 has a fairly wide meaning. Insanity is covered, of course, but so are deafness and the fact that someone is dumb. The provision extends to circumstances in which it is thought that a defendant is incapable of giving instructions to his or her legal team. One also needs to keep it in mind that juries have to address similar issues in many circumstances that are not unlike what we are contemplating. For example, if the question of diminished responsibility is raised in cases of alleged murder, juries have to address technical questions not unlike those that arise in cases of an unfitness plea. That is also true when the defence of insanity is raised because that, too, has to be addressed by a jury.
	I refer my hon. Friend to a further range of cases in which a defendant refuses or declines to give evidence. It can then be asserted that there are good reasons for that, and that person's failure to give evidence should not be held against him by reason of those good reasons. In that class of case, the jury often has to determine whether the reasons were good, which often relates to the mental state of the defendant. So the jury already has to consider technical questions in many cases.
	Indeed, the Government cannot say that a jury is incapable of addressing those questions because subsection (5) of clause 22 preserves the role of the jury in those cases when the question of fitness to plead arises after arraignment. In those cases, the Government have said in terms that the question is to be determined by the trial jury. So just pause for a moment: it cannot be asserted that a jury is incapable of dealing with the question because the Government say that it is to be dealt with by the jury in post-arraignment cases, and in the other cases those questions have to be determined by a jury, so why the change, given that it cannot be the incompetence of a jury to determine the issue?
	The hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) may have identified both the cause and the solution. I am prepared to accept that there is agreement in the great majority of cases between the Crown and the defence teams on unfitness to plead. Incidentally, that does not conclude the issue because a judge, for example, might decide that the Crown and the defence teams are wrong. I have encounteredalthough I do not think that I ever personally appeared incircumstances in which that has arisen.
	The hon. and learned Lady's solution is attractive, but there probably should be a discretion for the judge to order a jury trial if he thinks that the consensus between the Crown and defence is unsound or needs to be tested. Although the Redcar solution has huge attractions, it should be underpinned by a discretion on the part of the judge to order a jury trial on that issue of fitness to plead if for other reasons he thinks that that is appropriate.
	My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield asked why we are going down this road. In part, it may be because it will save money. That is not an unworthy motive and is addressed by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, but I am concerned that we should not diminish jury trials arbitrarily. My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said that the jury trial is under attack by the Government. Indeed, it is even under attack within the Bill, at clause 17, which we debated. I do not want to attack it.
	It is also important to keep in mind the point that I made to my hon. Friend. Under clause 24, if a person is found to be under a disabilityaccording to the Government's position that will be decided by the trial judgeit falls to the court in appropriate circumstances to impose various orders in respect of the defendant, including hospital orders, supervision orders and treatment orders. If the Government's position remains unchanged, the question of fitness to plead will be determined by the judge alone. That may lead to the introduction of a number of orders, which can be used to deprive a defendant of his or her liberty, and I simply do not like that.

Elfyn Llwyd: To reinforce the powerful and valuable point that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is making, some of those orders can be made for an indeterminate period.

Douglas Hogg: Indeed. If you will forgive me, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall pursue that. I was Under-Secretary at the Home Office very many years ago, and was involved in decisions about when individuals detained in special hospitals should be released. I therefore know that it is extremely difficult to determine whether someone held in a special hospital is sufficiently safe to be allowed back into the community. I therefore echo the point made by the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd)the power of a judge sitting alone to impose a sentence or order following his adjudication about fitness to stand trial could result in a patient being held for a long time in a special hospital, because people are sensitive about the risk of discharging them.

Vera Baird: I am flattered that the right hon. and learned Gentleman finds the Redcar solution attractive, but he is going slightly over the top. Two psychiatrists on opposite sides in a case may agree that someone is not fit to plead. Indeed, in cases that I have handled, four or even more psychiatrists have reached such an agreement. In those circumstances, why would we need a jury? I urge the right hon. and learned Gentleman to consider that somebody in the community can be sectioned by two doctorswe do not have a jury to rubber-stamp that decision.

Douglas Hogg: That is a perfectly fair point, but may I mention the name Saunders to the hon. and learned Lady? She will remember that there was extensive agreement that Mr. Saunders was suffering from advancing dementia. As I recall, the Court of Appeal decided that his illness was so advanced that he should not be held in custody. I believe that that gentleman has now made a remarkable recovery. Sometimes, the experts can get it wrong, and in cases where the trial judge smells a rat he may think that the issue should be determined by a jury.

Tim Boswell: My right hon. and learned Friend will know that I am a lay person, so I defer to his legal expertise in this matter. I do not wish make any claims of my own, but the issue of detention and process is important. He will have studied the recent law report on the Bournewood judgment in the European Court of Human Rights. The court, in its wisdom, found both the Government and British legal procedures defective, as people were held without their consent, which they were not capable of giving, and were effectively detained without due process. Is it not incumbent on us, therefore, to get the process absolutely right?

Douglas Hogg: I am sure that we need to do so but, to address the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, in many cases, perhaps even the great majority, there is not any dispute about the extent of the disability. In such cases, I accept that a jury should not be empanelled. I do not, however, accept that that conclusion is appropriate when there is a serious dispute. In any event, there should be discretion, even when the experts on both sides are in agreement, to hold a jury trial and have a proper adjudication if the judge thinks fit. If I continue speaking, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall repeat my argument, so I shall conclude.

Greg Knight: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. The House faces a dilemma. The more we listen to the debate, the clearer it becomes that the mood of the House is in sympathy with the amendment suggested by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), which is not before us. Would you be prepared to accept a manuscript amendment on the basis of the amendment suggested by the hon. and learned Lady?

Madam Deputy Speaker: I note what the right hon. Gentleman says. However, the debate is timed and there are just 20 minutes to go before the debate reaches its conclusion.

David Heath: What a shame it is that we have such a restrictive timetable that we are not able properly to debate matters before us in this important Bill. It illustrates the difficulties that we face. When the point of order was raised, I had high hopes that there might be a way of considering the sensible suggestion from the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). I noted carefully the Minister's response to it, which seemed positive, judging from his body language. He was writing away. It is not unknown for Ministers to make important announcements very late in the proceedings on a Bill. Some of us might have considered this a perfect opportunity for him to announce that he was proposing to make an amendment to the Billone which, for once, many of us would find entirely suitable and proper.

Vera Baird: May I make it clear, first, that I have not proposed an amendment either now or in Committee and, secondly, that I made the suggestion in July or thereabouts, so there has been ample time for anyone else to table an amendment along those lines if they wanted to do so? It is hardly fair to blame the Minister for the fact that the Opposition did not table an amendment.

David Heath: We are always careful not to tread on each other's toes by taking amendments that other hon. Members suggested. It is not at all good parliamentary procedure. Let us return to the case in point. We are seeking to address the issue that the Government have put before us, which is

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. I feel obliged to point out, in respect of comments about pinching other people's amendments, that it was well established in Committee that the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) was extremely sensitive on that topic, when there was any suggestion that anybody might be running with an amendment that she was interested in.

David Heath: It is simply parliamentary good manners to recognise the provenance of amendments when they are discussed.

Vera Baird: I have never proposed an amendment on this issue. Can we be clear about that?

David Heath: I am grateful for the clarification from the hon. and learned Lady. There is a difference between an amendment and a suggestion. I accept her point.

Cheryl Gillan: rose

David Heath: I have made very little progress in what I intended to say, but I will give way, for the last time.

Cheryl Gillan: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. I wanted to intervene on his opening remarks, but events overtook me. I bemoan the fact that we do not have time to debate the Bill. As this may be my only opportunity, may I say how disappointed I am that we could not debate the two groups of amendments on domestic violence and restraining orders, especially those on domestic violence, which contain the precious provisions on the domestic violence advocacy service? I have therefore been even more alarmed at the sparsity

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. I understand the hon. Lady's disappointment, but we must return to the amendment under discussion.

David Heath: Absolutely, Madam Deputy Speaker. We have not had the opportunity to discuss the points that the Government conceded in a couple of later amendments, which I would have welcomed.
	There is a serious concern about what is to some extent an anodyne suggestion about fitness to plead. Somewhere deep within the recesses of the Home Office, there is a Department whose sole interest and mission is to find ways to reduce access to jury trial. Every single Home Office Bill that comes before us nibbles away a little bit more at the concept of recourse to jury trial in this country. Some hon. Members in all parts of the House, but particularly on the Opposition Benches, believe that jury trial has stood us well over the centuries and we wish to protect it. We have had to fight off such depredations time and again.
	It may be that economic issues are involved and that it will be cheaper to proceed as the Government propose. It may be that the measure will make little difference in most cases, but there will be instances in which it does make a difference. Where there is dispute, as the hon. and learned Member for Redcar said in her suggestion that fell short of an amendment, it is appropriate that the case should be referred to a jury for the protection of the defendant and in the interests of justice.
	As the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said in what I thought was a very apposite contribution, the point is that we are not talking simply about the initial decision on fitness to plead in terms of the conduct of the criminal trial; we are talking about everything that flows from that in the future determination of what will happen to the individual concerned. That could, in effect, involve incarceration, albeit in the context of mental health treatment, and that could mean sine die if it happens. That is an important issue, and I believe that it is appropriate for a jury to be involved, which is the situation at the moment.
	If we are to make this change, the Government must produce a very cogent reason as to why it is essential for us to do so. We have not heard that argument in Committee, on Second Reading or in the debates in another place. Indeed, those who were exercised about the issue in another place felt that the points that they were raising were simply not addressed by the Minister who responded to the debate.
	The only assumption that we can make is that the provisions are part of the war of attrition against the process of jury trial that this Government have for some reason chosen to wage. That is not good enough reason. On the contrary, it is good enough reason in itself for us in this House to say no. Until and unless the Government produce arguments that what is proposed will not only be cheaper, but will improve the quality of justice in our courts, I think that we are entitled to take not just a sceptical attitude, but a hostile one, to something that is not of proven value.
	When the Minister responds, I hope that he will do one of two things. He should either provide a definitive argument as to why the Government must have the measure at this time and what the benefits arewe have yet to hear such an argumentor say No, we were clearly mistaken; there are better ways of doing this. The debate that we have heard has perhaps provided some signposts as to where that eventual resolution may come, and although we do not like making announcements at the end of proceedings in the later stages of a Bill's passage in the House of Commons, we will nevertheless give the matter careful consideration and table an appropriate amendment in another place, even at this late stage in the proceedings, and before the Bill comes back. That seems to me to be the right way of proceeding, and I hope that it is an avenue that he will consider.

Cheryl Gillan: It would be most appropriate if the Government were to agree to our requests and make the amendments in another place, where the noble Baroness Scotland of Asthal deployed the argument that to convene juries in such instances would be a waste of time and resources, which is not an adequate basis from which to advance the proposals.

David Heath: The worst possible argument against having a jury in a trial is that it is a waste of time and resources. Those of us who are interested in the quality of justice and the process of our courts say that juries are not a waste of time and resources, but the bedrock on which the British system of justice is based, and we should not resile from that position.

Humfrey Malins: As always, I declare an interest: I sit as a recorder of the Crown court and as a part-time district judge in the magistrates courts. My hon. Friends on the Front Bench have done the House a service by tabling the amendment, which addresses the important issue of fitness to plead. I am bound to say that the issue has not arisen very oftenif at allin my experience of magistrates courts. Of course, certain cases may only be tried summarily, so one can envisage a situation in which it might arise, but I have not come across it in some 10 years of part-time judicial sitting. That is not to say that mental health issues do not arise in those courtsthey dobut I have not come across the issue of fitness to plead. I imagine that it occurs fairly infrequently in the Crown court and, as was said earlier, I imagine that in many such instances the Crown and the defence agree on the proper way forward.
	When one deals with fitness to plead, one inevitably deals with a defendant who is, for one reason or another, vulnerable and who may need more protection than a less vulnerable defendant. So far as such a vulnerable defendant is concerned, the consequences of a finding and a disposal may be severe, which is a point that was made earlier in the debate. Such individuals may be detained for almost indefinite periods in very difficult situations, which is the point that the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) made very well in his intervention a moment ago.

Vera Baird: I have not actively practised for some little time, but is it right that if a judge decides that someone is unfit to plead, they can automatically send them away? I think not. In that case, a second process is undergone to establish whether that person has committed the alleged acts that would form the crime, if they were not unfit to plead. A jury must hear the second stage, which it is not proposed to change.

Humfrey Malins: Those who practise at the Crown court more than me will correct me. Disposals are available in such situations, and they involve the detention of the person concerned.

Elfyn Llwyd: A jury is not required for the second stage referred to by the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). If evidence is given to the judge, it is sufficient for a hospital order to kick in, in which case a second jury is not required.

Humfrey Malins: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.
	Let me move on. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) made the important point that clause 22 recognises and establishes the value of the jury. The Government propose that, pre-arraignment, the matter will be for the judge alone, but post-arraignment it will be a matter for the judge and jury. That recognises the value of the jury in certain circumstances, so the Government are not saying that the jury is not properly qualified. They are saying that, pre-arraignment, it will be a matter for the judge alone.
	I am interested in the Government's reasons for their actions. So far, there has been no suggestion of the reasoning behind the proposal. It cannot be that the jury is not competent to determine the issue. It must therefore be to do with money. Earlier, the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) referred to a statement in the other place about the reason having to do with time and resources. As I understand it, that means time and money. The Under-Secretary should tell us how many examples a year he envisages in the Crown court. How often will the provision be applied? He must have figures, otherwise he would not have made the proposal.
	What is the cost of empanelling a jury? I do not believe that it is necessarily terribly expensive. Even if it were, surely the principle of what is just, right and in the interests of the person in the dock comes way ahead of financial considerations.

Elfyn Llwyd: The Auld report referred to that. Its sub-text was to smash away as many jury trials as possible.

Humfrey Malins: The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. As well as the financial point, the provision may be a further attempt by the Government to reduce juries' influence in our legal system. I, for one, deplore it.

Greg Knight: I refer hon. Members to my entry in the Register of Members' Interests.
	In most debates on new provisions, the proposer makes a case for change. Our problem, which the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome mentioned, is that we are operating in a vacuum to some extent because we have not yet heard what the Under-Secretary has to say. He has not sought to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker, early in the debate to explain why he believes that the clause is necessary. The Government seek to remove a provision that has existed in our law for 40 years and the Under-Secretary therefore has to make a case for the change.
	Subsection (5) reveals the reason for including the clause. It gives the game away, and it would appear that the reason centres on cost. As I listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), I was increasingly attracted, if not to the Redcar amendmentthe hon. and learned Lady claims that that does not existthen to the Redcar suggestion. I am reminded of the words of the late Lord Hailsham, who said:
	Two heads are better than one even if they are sheep's heads.
	I believe that 12 heads are better than one. As we do not have the option of voting for the Redcar amendment, I am happy to support amendment No. 67.

Paul Goggins: I have little time and I therefore want to make two or three simple and clear points. Clause 22 does not mean the erosion of trial by jury. In answer to several points, I emphasise that we propose that a judge makes the fitness to plead decision but that finding facts and ascertaining whether the defendant has committed the offence with which he has been charged is a matter for the jury, not the judge alone. We must be clear about that. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) read far more into clause 22 than is the case. The judge will determine fitness to plead and the jury will subsequently hear the case. It is important that that message is understood.
	There is an issue about the effective use of court resources and we need to ensure that every jury is valued for the time that it can give. The provision is also in the interests of vulnerable defendants who currently undergo two lengthy processes whereby they have to listen to evidence from medical practitioners in the first hearing. And of course, if the defendant subsequently wishes to challenge the judge's finding, the judge must state his reasons to the court. The jury would not have to give their reasons, but the judge would. That would give grounds on which someone who was found unfit to plead could challenge the decision of the court.
	The provision is a recommendation of Lord Justice Auld, and the recommendations are now four years old. We believe that the proposal is too important to the courtsand, indeed, to vulnerable defendantsto be delayed any further. It is time that we made progress

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman's time is up.
	It being five and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings, Madam Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to Order [this day].

Question put, That the amendment be made:
	The House divided: Ayes 172, Noes 294.

Question accordingly negatived.
	Madam Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.
	Question put, That the remaining Government amendments be made:
	The House divided: Ayes 282, Noes 175.

Question accordingly agreed to.
	It being after Seven o'clock, Madam Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question, That the Bill be now read the Third time, pursuant to Order [this day].
	Bill reported, with amendments; read the Third time, and passed, with amendments.

Dominic Grieve: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I seek your guidance in view of Mr. Speaker's ruling that important announcements on policy should first be made to this House. At 10.11 this morning, the Home Office put out a news bulletin entitled Putting Victims First: the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill. It says:
	The Home Secretary also announced today that the Government is setting up a review into the law on murder.
	On the second page in notes to editors, it states:
	The murder review was announced by the Home Secretary during the debate on the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill in the House of Commons today.
	[Interruption.]

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order.

Dominic Grieve: Madam Deputy Speaker, is it in order for the Home Secretary to make an announcement to the press that has not been preceded by an announcement to this House on a matter of such importance? Secondly, is it not misleading of the Home Secretary to suggest to any hon. Memberor, indeed, the presswho might read the statement that, notwithstanding his discourtesy in this matter, we were nevertheless going to hear from him during the course of our six-hour debate this afternoon? I seek your guidance, Madam Deputy Speaker, on what can be done to ensure that announcements are made properly to this House and not through the device of being announced in the course of a debate to which they are not germane. What can Members of this House do to ensure that they are not misled by Government press notices suggesting that something is going to happen during the day when it either will not or cannot?

David Blunkett: Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker[Interruption.]

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The Home Secretary wishes to speak.

David Blunkett: I may be able to help with the original point of order. It would have been perfectly feasible and possible for me to have made the announcement to the House had the Opposition not filibustered[Interruption.]

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order.

Christopher Chope: Outrageous!

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. The House must come to order. A point of order has been made, and the Home Secretary is speaking to it.

David Blunkett: Had the Opposition not filibustered deliberately to wipe out the Third Reading[Interruption.]

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order.

David Blunkett: That was a calculated way of avoiding a Third Reading debate. I do not understand why Opposition Members felt it necessary to do so and why they could not face me at the Dispatch Box[Interruption.]

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. Mr. Secretary Blunkett is responding to a point of order, and he is entitled to be heard.

David Blunkett: Notwithstanding that, I apologise to the House for not having had the opportunity to address it on the issues that have been raised tonight. Had I had the opportunity to speak on Third Reading, and therefore to be challenged on this matter, I would have done so.

Several hon. Members: rose

Madam Deputy Speaker: Order. We must now proceed with the remaining business of the day.

David Maclean: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Madam Deputy Speaker: Is this relevant to the matter at hand?

David Maclean: It is, Madam Deputy Speaker. We have all heard the Home Secretary accuse Opposition Members of the parliamentary abuse that is filibustering. That is an absolutely outrageous suggestion. [Interruption.] I understood that decisions on whether or not there has been filibustering are for the Chair alone to make. Have you, Madam Deputy Speaker, or any of your predecessors in the Chair today, heard anything at all that was out of order and which could be remotely connected with the abusive term filibustering?

Several hon. Members: rose

David Heath: Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Madam Deputy Speaker: No, I am not taking any more points of order. If Mr. Speaker is not aware already of the disquiet in the House, I shall make sure that he is made aware of it, and of the comments that have been made.

Douglas Hogg: On a new point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Madam Deputy Speaker: Is this a new point of order?

Douglas Hogg: It is, Madam Deputy Speaker. [Interruption.] The Home Secretary has made it plain, very courteously, that he was going to tell us about the statement that he wanted to make in the Third Reading debate. Would it be possible to arrange that he make an early statement tomorrow so that he can be questioned about what he wants to tell us?

Madam Deputy Speaker: I remind the right hon. and learned Gentleman that it is up to the Government to decide whether they wish to make a statement.

Several hon. Members: rose

Eric Forth: Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Madam Deputy Speaker: No, we are now proceeding to the Adjournment debate.

Eric Forth: Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Madam Deputy Speaker: I have indicated already that I will take no further points of order on this matter.

Patrick McLoughlin: I beg to move, That the House sit in private.

Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 163 (Motion to sit in private):
	The House divided: Ayes 24, Noes 316.

Question accordingly negatived.

David Davis: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. In view of the fact that the Home Secretary advertised to the press today that he was to make a statement on Third Reading, and in view of the fact that he could have made a statement at 7 o'clock, which is the point of interruption, have you had any notification that he intends to make a statement tomorrow about the very serious issues on the review of the sentencing for murder?

Madam Deputy Speaker: I have not been advised that the Home Secretary wishes to make a statement, but no doubt he will have heard the right hon. Gentleman.

Eric Forth: Further to that point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. Can you help the House and even the Government by ruling that on a future similar unfortunate occasion, should it ever occur, and I hope that the Chair will do everything to ensure that it does not, it will be in order for the Home Secretary to request to make a statement at the conclusion of business at 7 o'clock? His synthetic anger simply belies the fact that he either does not understand how the House works or he did not want to make the statement in first place.

Madam Deputy Speaker: I have ruled on that by saying that I have had no request from the Home Secretary to make a statement, but I repeat that he will have heard what the right hon. Gentleman said.

David Wilshire: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Madam Deputy Speaker: Is it a different point of order?

David Wilshire: It is a separate point of order about the business of the House.
	Can you confirm, Madam Deputy Speaker, that notwithstanding all the changes to truncate debate, it is still possible, if the Government wish, for business to run beyond 7 o'clock, so it was possible for the debate to continue longer if the Home Secretary was determined to say something?

Madam Deputy Speaker: The debate's timing was decided by the House.

NOTHING

NOTHING

DEMENTIA SERVICES (NORFOLK)

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.[Gillian Merron.]

Norman Lamb: rose

Christopher Chope: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. This raises an issue of command and sanction. Mr. Speaker has repeatedly commanded that the Government should comply with his rulings. He now has the opportunity of exercising a sanction by requiring that the Home Secretary comes to the Dispatch Box tomorrow.

Madam Deputy Speaker: I remind the hon. Gentleman of what I said earlier. Both the Home Secretary and the Speaker will have heard what has been said. The hon. Gentleman is now taking time out of the debate for a Back Bencher.

Norman Lamb: I am grateful for the opportunity provided by this debate to raise the concerns of friends and relatives of patients at Rebecca house, a specialist unit for people with dementia that was built just 10 years ago in North Walsham in my constituency. The unit faces closure as part of a review of older people's mental health services by Norfolk Mental Health Care NHS trust. The introduction of a report prepared by the trust stated:
	Older People's mental health services will change. Services, resources and staff will join existing localities to provide an age-integrated service within Primary Care Trust boundaries.
	It also said:
	Supported by national policies, the local Social Services strategy and carers and users workshops, mental health services for Older People will be updated to provide more community focused person centred care.
	If hon. Members can interpret the jargon, that might sound like a good thing, but there is a casualty, as we will lose specialist residential units, including Rebecca house and a unit in the constituency of the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr. Bacon).

Ian Gibson: Have the economics been satisfactorily analysed; and, if so, do they point to closure? It would help to know, because many other services in Norfolk and other parts of the country are in the same situation.

Norman Lamb: This is all about finding the resources to improve care for people with dementia in the community, but we must consider what is lost in the process.
	Rebecca house was built just 10 years ago as a specialist unit for people with dementia, but now it may be closed. It is highly regarded, and the common consensus is that it would be tragic if it were lost. The backdrop to the review is the Government's direction to strategic health authorities on the criteria for free NHS continuing care. At present, 101 beds for the elderly mentally ill are provided by the mental health trust, which has concluded that only a minority of the patients in Rebecca house and similar units qualify for continuing NHS care. Its assessment is that the whole county needs only 28 beds for acute cases meeting the eligibility criteria. The plan is to build a new specialist intensive care unit for those patients in Norwich.
	The Minister will be well aware of the report by the health service ombudsman last February about cases in which the NHS had been too restrictive in the eligibility criteria that it applied to the receipt of continuing care. As a result, strategic health authorities were asked to review their criteria, but since then there has been a great deal of criticism about their lack of progress. I should be grateful if the Minister could provide an update and explain how long it will take to complete those reviews.
	Wherever the line is drawn between individuals who qualify and those who do notmany people believe that the criteria are too restrictive, and exclude too many patients from free personal careit is inevitably arbitrary. Many people find it hard to understand why someone who needs intensive 24-hour care but does not meet the extremely restrictive criteria for NHS continuing care should be subject to means-testing, which, the Minister will know, sometimes leads to people having to sell their home to pay for personal care. People who have budgeted carefully throughout their working life are penalised for behaving responsibly.
	As the Minister knows, Liberal Democrats on the Scottish Executive insisted on the introduction of free personal and nursing care as a condition of their continuing support. Does the hon. Gentleman plan to review the unfair penalty that applies in England and Wales, which is imposed on families already under enormous pressure as a result of the tragic illness affecting a loved one? What is his reaction to the fact that because of the way in which the criteria are being interpreted, patients who have qualified for NHS continuing care might subsequently be disqualified because they have become frailer and more sedate? There has been no improvement in their health, their condition has continued to decline, yet they are excluded from free personal care. Surely that must be wrong. I know that the Alzheimer's Society shares that view.
	I return to the situation that we face in Norfolk. As I said, in presenting proposals the trust is essentially following Government policy. It was clear from a meeting that I attended at Rebecca house that staff have to care for a wide range of patients with very different needs, some of whom, because of their dementia, display fairly challenging behaviour, whereas others are more frail and sedate. That clearly presents difficulties, so I can see the case for a specialist intensive care unit. However, that raises the question of what happens to those who do not qualify for that unit, but whose care needs are such that they cannot easily be looked after at home. In all this we must remember the interests of those who are frequently required to care for a loved one at home. Often those people themselves are elderly and frail and find it difficult to cope on their own.
	Of most immediate concern are all the existing patients of Rebecca house and the other units who do not qualify for continuing NHS care. Where will they go? If Rebecca house closes, they face the prospect of a move to a residential care home or nursing home in the private sector. Given the quality of care that they have received at Rebecca house, we can assume that there is a considerable risk that they will end up in less appropriate surroundings, and in addition it must be borne in mind that the Alzheimer's Society says that it is best to avoid moving people with dementia. In the society's words, that should be avoided at all cost. A move can disorient the patient and accelerate the decline in their condition.
	The trust has made it clear that those who were admitted to the service before 31 March last year will continue to have their care funded by the NHS, irrespective of whether they meet the criteria for NHS continuing care, but it is also the quality of the care that concerns loved ones, not just the cost. For those admitted after 31 March last year there is no commitment to continue to cover the cost. There is also concern about the capacity of the private sector to provide the extra specialist beds that would be needed. There is already a national shortage, according to the Alzheimer's Society. At a meeting for carers held at Rebecca house, one lady described how each week it was necessary to search a local website availability list to find the odd bed that might become available that week.
	It also remains unclear what will happen to those who have used Rebecca house for respite care. Four beds are set aside for that purpose. Will the respite care of those people be paid for the rest of their lives? That is incredibly important to those affected. Privately funded respite care is very expensive. When I raised the point with trust representatives, they said that no decision had been reached.
	Everyone recognises how important respite care is. If more people are to be cared for at home, resources must be committed to provide an effective support infrastructure. In a rural area such as North Norfolk, people can be isolated in small village communities without public transport. If the carer has inadequate support, they can rapidly sink. The nature of dementia is such that the demands on the carer are intense and constant. Carers need a break. My fear is that the closure of the units will result in less respite care, not more. Does the Minister share my view about the importance of improving access to respite care for those cared for at home?
	Rebecca house provides what is described by the trust as informal day care. The loss of that facility will hit many more people. Again, the facility is part of the infrastructure of support for people caring for loved ones at home. We have a situation in which there is a strong case for not moving existing patients, based on their needs; a lack of capacity in the private residential nursing care sector; the imperative of increasing the availability of respite care and not reducing it; and existing day care facilities that are under threat.
	For me, that all points to a very strong case for trying to keep Rebecca house open. How that can be achieved given the rather unfortunate and clumsy demarcation between the mental health trust, the primary care trust and the county council social services department, I am not sure, but every effort needs to be made collectively to secure the future of this much-loved and much-valued unit.
	I have an open mind about who could run Rebecca house in future, but in an area that has an ageing population and already has one of the highest age profiles in the country, it is foolhardy and reckless to contemplate the closure of Rebecca house. The same goes for other units around the county. I note the commitment of the trust to use the resources freed up by the closure of these unitsI understand that the amount will be about 1.5 millionfor the improvement of mental health services in central Norfolk, but at the moment there are genuine and continuing concerns about the overall package of proposals.
	My plea to the Minister is to ask him to do whatever he can, working with the local trusts, to help Rebecca house and those other units, to help ensure not only that today's patients who are in the home and need it for the rest of their lives are protected, but that there are high-quality facilities for the future.

Richard Bacon: I congratulate the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) on securing this debate, and I pass on to him the thanks of Mr. Iain Dale for having done so; I know that Mr. Dale secured a meeting at Rebecca house on a cross-party basis to express the widespread concerns of residents and relatives about the position being taken by the trust.
	I want to highlight for the Minister a fact to which the hon. Gentleman alludedthis is not an isolated case, and the same situation is widespread across Norfolk. Indeed, there are five such units, including Cygnet house in Long Stratton in my constituency, which I understand the Minister visited today. I also understand that some friendly local fox hunters were present to greet him, although I had nothing to do with that. I hope that he found the visit congenial, notwithstanding some of the people by whom he was greeted.
	Cygnet house is one of the five units for the elderly across Norfolk. It has units catering for long-term residential care for the elderly mentally ill, and it also offers respite care. The number of units can vary from day to day. On 25 October, it had 11 residents, compared with 14 in Rebecca house. Adding Ellacombe, Yew Tree and Laburnam, which are located in Norwich, produces a total of 49 places on that datea number that will fall to some 28, as the hon. Gentleman said, under the proposals.
	That raises a number of concerns. First, some facilities, especially at Cygnet house, are very local to people in South Norfolk, for whom it is not always easy to get into Norwich, especially when they are elderly people. The Minister will have seen today how large my constituency is; it covers some 350 sq miles. At the moment, Cygnet house provides easy access for relatives, and there is no doubt that Norwich is more difficult to visit.
	In addition to the question of access, there is the quality of care that is provided. The father of a councillor in my constituency, Councillor Martin Wilby, has been at Cygnet house for two and a half years, and has received excellent care, both physically and mentally. Mr. Wilby senior has been in homes of various kinds for some 10 years, but his time at Cygnet house has been the best, according to Councillor Wilby. Mr. Wilby senior spent some time at Hellesdon hospital in Norwich, but there was a high staff turnover and the care could be patchy. Cygnet house, which has a low staff turnover and a higher and more consistent quality of care, is in my view and that of many local people better for residents.
	The hon. Member for North Norfolk also alluded to cost, which is the other issue that I want to raise. I have a copy of the report to the board of the Norfolk and Waveney Mental Health Partnership NHS trust, which refers to potential options for Cygnet house, including the refurbishment of the facility and its use as a care unit for the whole of central Norfolk. However, the report states that if that option were pursued, clinical and out-of-hours cover, as well as the high revenue costs, would raise concerns. On the face of it, it seems that the change is a cost-cutting exercise, with not enough thought being given to the needs of elderly people with mental health problems who need specialist care, and it does not seem right to make relatives pick up the tab, again.
	I strongly endorse the point made by the hon. Member for North Norfolk that Norfolk's demographic profile is old and that in many cases it is getting olderpeople move to many parts of my constituency in order to retireso dementia services will grow, not decline, in importance. There are serious concerns about whether the trust's proposal is the right way forward. I have asked Pat Holman, the chief executive of the partnership, to reconsider the closure of Cygnet house, and I look forward to the Minister's reply.

Stephen Ladyman: I appreciate the interest that the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb) takes in his local health service and congratulate him on securing the debate. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Norwich, North (Dr. Gibson) and the hon. Member for South Norfolk (Mr. Bacon) for their interest.
	I also thank the hon. Member for South Norfolk for his concern for my welfare. The fox hunters in his constituency were friendly and took their democratic opportunity to express their views in a reasonable manner.

Ian Gibson: They are wrong.

Stephen Ladyman: As my hon. Friend says, they are simply wrong, but we will leave that matter to another day.
	I would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to all the staff in the local health economy, who are committed to the improvement of local services and who are doing a fine job. I agree that older people with dementia deserve better services, which is why the Government have set in place a number of initiatives to try to ensure that that happens. More money than ever before is being invested in older people's services, and if I have one message for hon. Members on both sides of the House tonight it is that if we want better services for older people, and especially older people with dementia, we must modernise those services and be prepared to engage constructively and with open minds.
	As part of the ongoing process of Shifting the Balance of Power to a local level, it is for local NHS organisations to assess the needs of the local population and meet them from general allocation funds. They are in the best position to do that because of their specialist knowledge of their local communities. By devolving funding to the front line, we have given the NHS in every local area the freedom and the resources to develop a strategy for the future that will deliver financial balance and sustainable services.
	The latest round of allocations has been made for three years. That certainty of funding will enable health communities to plan their finances and will provide a surer foundation for PCTs to commission services in a way that will deliver improvements in performance. Older people will benefit from those record allocations to primary care trusts, as a considerable portion of those allocations will go to services for older people, including the care and treatment of those with dementia.
	That brings me to a point raised by the hon. Member for North Norfolk and challenged by the hon. Member for South Norfolk: if the reconfiguration frees up any resources, the intention is to reinvest those resources in further and better support for older peoplethe reconfiguration is in no way a cost-cutting exercise. The hon. Member for South Norfolk may be interested to learn that North Norfolk PCT has been allocated 97.6 million for 200405, which is an increase in cash terms of about 9.5 per cent.
	Just because we have given power and resources to the front line, it does not mean that the front line can duck difficult decisions. All hon. Members have a duty to help their local NHS face those challenges, which is what I ask the hon. Members for North Norfolk and for South Norfolk to be prepared to do.
	Before I deal with local issues, the hon. Member for North Norfolk raised some national issues about progress with continuing care. I have made two written statements that detail progress on that. The last one reported on progress up to the end of July. I have no plans to make a further statement on that, but when I have sufficient data I shall do so.
	The hon. Gentleman referred to criteria. The legal judgment to which he referred did not suggest that the criteria were too strict. It stated that there is an upper limit beyond which it is ultra vires for councils to provide support. It did not distinguish between social care and health care. The ombudsman, when investigating cases, subsequently said that errors were being made and that there was too much variation in the criteria. Consequently, we asked all strategic health authorities to produce new criteria based on central guidance and to ensure that they were legally compliant. They have all done that. The review is retrospective and covers people who may have been unfairly treated in the past. In addition, we are introducing new procedures to ensure that people are properly assessed in future. I believe that the new procedures are working well.
	Reassessment is necessary because people's conditions change from time to time. When their condition changes, the care package that they need changes. We must reassess to ensure that people are getting the care that they need.

Norman Lamb: I fully appreciate that care package needs will change, but does the Under-Secretary concede that that results in a change in the financial package? It means that people move from free NHS care to means-tested care.

Stephen Ladyman: That is possible. National health service continuing care applies not only to people with dementia, but to people with all conditions. Some conditions are curable and it is therefore necessary to remove the continuing care package when someone is cured. That is not the case for people with dementia. However, their care package will need to be changed and, in the very unlikely event that they are cured, it is theoretically possible that they would revert to means-tested support. That would happen only if their predominant needs were no longer health needs and they no longer fulfilled the eligibility criteria. The primary reason for reassessment is to ensure that the care package always matches people's needs.
	The hon. Gentleman mentioned personal care and the fact that it is not free in England. I do not know who controls the social services of his local council, but it is entirely in their power to make home care free if they wish to do that because the matter is devolved to local councils. Not one Liberal Democrat council in the country has chosen to do that and I doubt whether any councils will do it because it is not financially viable. It would cost 1.5 billion a year, not the 1 billion that Liberal Democrat Front-Bench Members claim. The Rowntree Foundation has suggested that the cost will increase to approximately 10 billion by 2050. That would be entirely unaffordable.
	I have listened to the hon. Gentleman's comments. The changes that he discussed locally in Norfolk, and especially in Rebecca house, are part of a set of proposals that Norfolk and Waveney mental health partnership trust developed in partnership with the PCT, social services and other stakeholders in a wider programme of service improvement and modernisation. There has been a robust and inclusive local process to develop the proposals, including a full needs assessment and options appraisal.
	Those proposals are a work in progress and it is for all hon. Members to engage in it and try to influence it. I can assure hon. Members that no final decisions have been made by the local NHS and its partners pending a formal public consultation process, which will commence later this year.
	The hon. Gentleman is a member of a party that says that it believes in power to the people, local decision making and devolution. Yet one could interpret his comments this evening as following none of those principles. He seems to have made up his mind before he has listened to the consultation and the views of his constituents[Interruption.] Well, the formal consultation has not yet begun, and he did not sound to me as though he was keeping an open mind. He sounded as though he had made up his mind. If the services in his constituency are not properly modernised, he will be doing his constituents no favours because they will not be getting the level of service that they deserve.
	The hon. Gentleman has talked about local services. There are several thousand older people with dementia in central Norfolk at any one time. Thankfully, only a few require specialist mental health in-patient treatment, yet there are five separate units providing elderly mentally illnessEMIin-patient continuing care services in central Norfolk. These are Laburnum, Yew Tree, Ellacombe, Rebecca house and Cygnet house. They provide a total of 101 beds. However, only 65 of the 101 beds are occupied, and only 22 of those 65 patients meet the criteria for NHS-funded and provided continuing care and, more importantly, require a specialist mental health in-patient service. The total cost of the services that I have just described is 3.8 million per year. That is an awful lot of money to be spending on empty beds and services that do not best suit some of the people in those places.
	Clearly, the demand for these services has changed since they were established. New therapies are now available, and there is a greater recognition that it is important to identify and intervene in the onset of dementia early. That is why the proposal to reshape the services currently provided from these units is being put forward. It will ensure that the resources available to mental health services meet the needs of more people with dementia and their carers, and better fit the needs of the hon. Gentleman's constituents. If we close our eyes to the need to reshape these services, we are ducking our responsibilities. If the hon. Gentleman's first instinct is to say that there should be no change, or evenheaven forefendto climb on the bandwagon of sentiment that is often associated with establishments, rather than with the people in them, he will not be doing his constituents any favours.

Norman Lamb: I am certainly not suggesting that there should be no change. Indeed, I acknowledged in my speech that there is clearly a case for the proposed specialist intensive care unit. I took on board the views of staff who said that it was very difficult to care for people with all these different types of needs in the same unit. I accept that, but this debate is about engaging in the process that the Minister wants us to engage in.

Stephen Ladyman: I am glad to hear that, but I would be even more glad to hear the hon. Gentleman say that he still had an open mind about the outcome and that he was prepared to accept that it might be in the best interests of his constituents if Rebecca house did not continue to offer the services that it offers at the moment. He will also have to consider the idea that, if there are to be fewer of these units, the 28-bed unit to which he referred will almost certainly have to be very close to acute services, because of the intense health care that many of the people in these facilities require. The primary consideration in determining the location of that unit will have to be the safety and the health care of those patients, and it might not be appropriate for that type of unit to be in his constituency. It might be much better for his constituentsalthough it would no doubt be more inconvenient for carersfor it to be in Norwich. That is one of the issues that the local population will have to grapple with and talk about in the consultation. The hon. Gentleman will clearly have views about whether the right decision has been made, but we all need to keep an open mind about this.
	The national guidance to improve services to which the hon. Gentleman referred includes the national service framework for older people and the national service framework for mental health services. That is the national guidance that his local primary care trust is trying to deliver
	The motion having been made after Seven o'clock, and the debate having continued for half an hour, Madam Deputy Speaker adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.
	Adjourned at six minutes to Eight o'clock.